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UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHAMPTON
ABSTRACT
FACULTY OF ENGINEERING AND APPLIED SCIENCE
DEPARTMENT OF ELECTRONICS AND COMPUTER SCIENCE
Doctor of Philosophy
by Renato Alexandre da Cruz Silva
We believe that the task of developing large systems requires a formal approach. The
complexity of these systems demands techniques and tool support to simplify the task of
formal development. Often large systems are a combination of sub-components that can
be seen as modules. Event-B is a formal methodology that allows the development of
distributed systems. Despite several benefits of using Event-B, modularisation and reuse
of existing models are not fully supported. We propose three techniques supporting the
reuse of models and their respective proof obligations in order to develop specifications
of large systems: composition, generic instantiation and decomposition. Such techniques
are studied and tool support is defined as plug-ins by taking advantage of the extensi-
bility features of the Event-B toolset (Rodin platform).
Composition allows the combination of different sub-components and refinement is
possible. A shared event approach is followed where sub-components events are com-
posed, communicating via common parameters and without variable sharing. By reusing
sub-components, proof obligations required for a valid composition are expressed and
we show that composition is monotonic. A tool is developed reinforcing the conditions
that allow the monotonicity and generating the respective proof obligations.
Generic Instantiation allows a generic model (a machine or a refinement chain) to
be instantiated into a suitable development. Generic model proof obligations are reused,
avoiding re-proof and its refinement comes for free. An instantiation constructor is de-
veloped where the generic free identifiers (variables and constants) are renamed and
carrier sets are replaced to fit the instance.
Decomposition allows the splitting of a model into several sub-components in a
shared event or shared variable style. Both styles are monotonic and sub-components
can be further refined independently, allowing team development. Proof obligations of
the original model are split into the different sub-components which usually results in
simpler and easier to discharge proof obligations. Decomposition is supported by a prac-
tical tool permitting the use of both styles.
We expect to close the gap between the use of formal methods in academia and
industry. In this thesis we address the important aspect of having tools supporting
well-studied formal techniques that are easy to use by model developers.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
This thesis investigates techniques that allow support of formal developments in Event-
B [3, 9]. In particular we focus in reuse of developments, in the avoidance of re-proofs
and respective tool support. We begin by studying other formal languages and the
respective formal support for three techniques: composition, generic instantiation and
decomposition. Afterwards and based on the previous study we apply the use of such
techniques to Event-B. Case studies and respective tool support for each technique are
developed in the Rodin platform, an application targeting developments in Event-B.
1.1 Thesis contribution
1.1.1 Overview
We believe that the development of large, complex and/or critical systems should be
done using formal methodology. The development of such systems usually is complex
and they must be ensured to work as desired avoiding failures that could lead to se-
rious consequences or even life-threatening situations. Formal methods are used to
help the development and modelling of these systems, which itself can be a hard task
to accomplish. Several formal notations can be used for modelling systems. We use
Event-B, a recent formal method with growing popularity used for modelling discrete
systems. Event-B results from an evolution of other formal methods notations like the
B-Method [158] and Action Systems [26]. Event-B is suitable for modelling parallel,
reactive and distributed system and not restricted to software development unlike the
“parent” B-method, including a richer notion of refinement. As we are mostly interested
in distributed systems, this seems a suitable notation to be used.
However as a recent notation, Event-B lacks some features and mechanisms. We address
in particular the lack of reusability mechanisms like avoiding proof obligations (POs)
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re-proof. We believe that reusability is very useful specially in large developments and
we address these missing mechanisms.
1.1.2 Contributions
This thesis contributes to the development of systems, in particular large, distributed
systems. It is necessary to envisage mechanisms that simplify the correct development
of large systems according to their specifications and having tool support eases such a
complex task. We propose three techniques for Event-B that help the development of
these kind of systems: composition, generic instantiation and decomposition. Individual
models can be composed in a shared event style through the composition technique.
Proof obligations in the individual models can be reused to minimise the proof effort on
the resulting composed model. Through generic instantiation an existing model can be
used as generic and instantiated to be used in other developments. The new instances
inherit the generic properties and respective POs. Decomposition allows the partitioning
of a model into several sub-models as an architecture feature and/or to simplify and more
easily discharge POs. The three techniques support reuse of existing sub-components
taking advantage of their properties (reuse of models and avoiding re-proof). Necessary
POs are defined and simplified using the existing POs associated to the individual sub-
components. The Rodin platform serves as a host for the plug-ins developed to give tool
support to each of the techniques. We present the work developed for these techniques
starting from the theory behind each one of them, the application to case studies and
the extension to tool support.
This chapter introduces the contribution of this thesis and the necessary background to
understand the rest of the document. The technical details start with the introduction of
formal methods in Sect. 1.2. Several formal methods relevant to our thesis are introduced
in Sect. 1.3. Refinement is briefly covered including a comparison to different formal
methods in Sect. 1.4. Section 1.5 introduces the formal method that we use for our work
as well as a brief view of the Rodin platform, the toolset for Event-B. We finish this
chapter by covering the background related to our contribution: composition in Sect. 1.6
and decomposition in Sect. 1.7.
Next we describe in more detail what formal methods are and show some examples.
1.2 Formal Methods
Formal Methods use rigorous mathematical techniques to reason about systems’ be-
haviour. It can be applied to software and hardware systems and formal specification
expresses, in precise mathematical terms, whether a future computer based system or
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program is working correctly. Formal methods ensures that a program fulfills its for-
mal specification. This is specially important in the development of critical safety sys-
tems [38]. On a top-down development, the application of formal methods can be divided
into 3 steps [5]:
• Creation of requirement documents
• Development of the Abstraction Model (first model representing a system through
the use of formal notation) and the steps toward the Concrete Model (model which
is closer to what the system will be, but still represented by formal notation)
• Converting the Concrete Model into an Implementation. On a programming soft-
ware project, there already exist tools that automatically do this task.
[5, 7] use some formal methods case studies in industry and discuss how requirement
documents, system models and executable code fit on a project’s life cycle.
Formal methods can differ in several aspects, like syntax (specification language), seman-
tics or applications. Classifications can be drawn from the different notations. A possible
classification is to distinguish formal methods in terms of behaviour, i.e. state-based or
event-based approaches [1, 35, 74]:
• State-Based behaviour: the system is described by a sequence of state changes. A
state is a set of assignments to a set of components (frequently variables). This kind
of systems usually are rooted in logic and close to how imperative programming
languages that deal with state. This approach forces a close examination of how
the real system is represented in the model [1, 31]. Examples of formal methods
with a state-based behaviour are Z [173], VDM [105] or B [4].
• Event-Based behaviour: the system is described by a sequence of operations. The
specification is manipulated algebraically while defining the actions [1]. Event-
based systems are used to develop and integrate systems that are loosely coupled
(suitable for large-scale distributed applications). The integrated systems can
communicate by generating and receiving event notifications [74]. Examples of
formal methods with a event-based behaviour are CSP (Communicating System
Processes) [92] or CCS (Calculus of Communicating Systems) [126].
A state-based system usually changes state through the execution of events. An event-
based approach expresses the evolution of the system by defining the enabled operations.
Event-based view is suitable for message-passing distributed systems while state-based
view is suitable for design of parallel algorithms [42]. Not always it is possible to make
a very clear distinction of these two situations: depending on the viewpoint a formal
notation is seen, it can show both characteristics.
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[112, 113] suggest another classification for formal notations based on common charac-
teristic of modelling languages from a system re-engineering point of view:
• Model based: a system is described by explicitly defining state and operations.
It progresses through the execution of operations that change the system from
one state to another. There is no explicit representation of concurrency and some
functional requirements cannot be expressed (temporal requirements). Several
stated-based formal methods are also model based as are the examples of Z, VDM,
B or Event-B [9].
• Logic based: Logics are used to describe desirable properties of the system such
as specification, temporal or probabilistic behaviour. The validity of these prop-
erties relies on the associated axiom system. The final executable specification
can be used for simulation and prototype construction. Logic can be augmented
with some concrete programming constructs to obtain a wide-spectrum formalism.
In that case, correctness refinement steps are applied during the construction of
such systems. Examples of logic based modelling languages are Hoare Logic [65],
Weakest Precondition Calculus [64], Modal Logic [133] or Temporal Logic [119].
• Algebraic Approach: Explicit definition of operations is given by describing the
behaviour of different operations without any definition of state. Like model-based
notations, concurrency it is not explicitly expressed. Examples are OBJ [84] or
LARCH [86].
• Process Algebra Approach: Concurrent systems are explicitly represented.
The system behaviour is constrained by all observable communication between pro-
cesses. Examples are: CSP, CCS, ACP (Algebra of Communicating Processes) [28]
or LOTOS (Language of Temporal Ordering Specification) [98].
• Net based: Graphical languages are combined with formal semantics, bringing
some advantages to system creation/development. Graphical notation are popular
resulting from the simplicity of defining specifications for systems without requiring
a deep understanding of the underlaying framework. Examples are: Petri Net [143],
StateCharts [95] or UML-B [170].
The classification of the formal notation helps when deciding which formal methods is
suitable for a particular system development. The next section gives an overview of
other formal methods (related to Event-B or) relevant to our developed work.
1.3 Overview of some formal methods
Event-B is a formal method that allows the specification and modelling of reactive sys-
tems (see Sect. 1.5). Nevertheless other formal methods are available for implementing
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different kind of systems. We overview some formal methods related to Event-B and in
particular to our work:
• CSP
• VDM
• Action Systems
• Classical B
• Z
These formal notations are briefly introduced in the following sections.
1.3.1 Communicating Sequential Processes - CSP
CSP is a process algebra formal method that allows modelling of parallel processing and
interaction between systems [91]. The basic concept in CSP considers a process as a
mathematical abstraction of interactions between the system and its environment. The
behaviour of the system is described through independent Processes in an event-based
view. A set of events in which a process P can engage is called its alphabet, written
αP and represents the visible interface between the process and its environment [53].
The processes are constrained in the way they can engage in the events of its alphabet,
using CSP process term language [43]. A process interacts with its environment by
synchronously engaging in atomic events. A sequence of events is described using a
prefix operator ’→’. For instance, a→P describes the process that engages in the event
a and then behaves as process P . The environment can decide between two processes
using the choice operator ’8’. For instance, P 8Q represents the process that offers the
choice to the environment between behaving as process P or as process Q. There is also
a non-deterministic choice operator ’u’: P u Q represents the process that internally
chooses between behaving as P or Q, without any environment control. There are
several operations that can be applied to traces [92] like concatenation, interleaving,
subscripting, reversal among others. We describe here in more detail the concatenation
and interleaving operations as they will be used later on.
Concatenation Let s be a sequence, each of whose elements is itself a sequence.
Then a/s is obtained by concatenating all the elements together in the original order.
A definition can be given by means of the following laws (distributive operator) [92]:
• a/〈〉 = 〈〉
• a/〈s〉 = s
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• a/(sa t) = (a/s)a (a/t)
Interleaving A sequence s is an interleaving of two sequences t and u if it can be split
into a series of subsequences, with alternate subsequences extracted from t and u. For
example s = 〈1, 6, 3, 1, 5, 4, 2, 7〉 is an interleaving of t and u, where t = 〈1, 6, 5, 2, 7〉 and
u = 〈3, 1, 4〉. A recursive definition can be given by means of the following laws [92]:
• 〈〉 interleaves (t, u) ≡ (t = 〈〉 ∧ u = 〈〉)
• s interleaves (t, u) ≡ s interleaves (u, t)
• (〈x〉a s) interleaves (t, u) ≡ (t 6= 〈〉 ∧ t0 = x ∧ s interleaves (t′ , u)) ∨
(u 6= 〈〉 ∧ u0 = x ∧ s interleaves (t, u′)),
where t
′
(same for u
′
) is the tail of sequence t (u).
CSP allows the refinement of models. The refinement depends on the semantic model
of the language which is used [153] and respective granularity:
• Traces refinement: The coarsest used relationship is based on the sequences of
events which a process can perform (the traces of the process). A process Q is
a traces refinement of another, P, if all the possible sequences of communications
which Q can do are also possible for P. The previous trace refinement can be
expressed as P vT Q =̂ traces(Q) ⊆ traces(P ).
• Failures refinement: A finer distinction between processes can be made by con-
straining events. An implementation can constrain events permitted to block as
well as events that can be performed. A failure is a pair (s,X), where s is a
trace of the process and X is a set of events the process can refuse to perform
at that point (refusal). A state of a process is deadlocked if it can refuse to do
every event and STOP is the simplest deadlocked process. Deadlock is also com-
monly introduced when parallel processes do not succeed in synchronising on the
same event. Failures refinement between processes P and Q can be expressed as
P vF Q =̂ failures(Q) ⊆ failures(P ).
• Failures-Divergences refinement: The failures model does not model processes
that might livelock (i.e., perform an infinite sequence of internal actions) and
so may never subsequently engage in a visible event. The failures-divergences
model meets this requirement by adding the concept of divergences. The diver-
gences of a process are the set of traces after which the process may livelock.
This gives two major enhancements: the ability to analyse systems which have
the potential to never perform another visible event and assert this does not oc-
cur in the situations being considered; and use divergence in the specification
to describe “do not care” situations. Formally, after a divergence, a process
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is considered as acting chaotically and is able to do or refuse anything. This
means that processes are considered to be identical after they have diverged. A
failures-divergences refinement between processes P and Q can be expressed as
P vFD Q =̂ failures(Q) ⊆ failures(P ) ∧ divergences(Q) ⊆ divergences(P ).
• Infinite traces refinement: The infinite-traces model of CSP was introduced by
Roscoe [152]. It extends the failures-divergences model by including all possible
infinite behaviours of a process. A process model now has components (A,F,D, I)
where A, F and D are as in the failures-divergences model and I is some subset
of Aw, the set of infinite sequences of elements of A, the alphabet of the process.
An infinite traces refinement between processes P and Q can be expressed as
P vFDI Q =̂ failures(Q) ⊆ failures(P ) ∧ divergences(Q) ⊆ divergences(P ) ∧
infinites(Q) ⊆ infinites(P ).
The semantics of an expression P is written (α(P ),FJP K,DJP K, IJP K), or JP K for short.
The semantics function is used to justify the algebraic laws: for expressions P,Q, P = Q
iff JP K = JQK [53].
There are some tools available for CSP. FDR2 (Failures/Divergence Refinement 2) is a
refinement checker for establishing properties of models expressed in CSP. Also ProBE,
an animator for CSP processes, allows the user to explore the behaviour of models
interactively. These two tools are developed by Formal Systems Europe [80]. Adelaide
Refinement Checker (ARC) [136] is a CSP refinement checker developed by the Formal
Modelling and Verification Group at The University of Adelaide. Occam Transformation
System is an automated tool to assist in carrying out algebraic transformations.
1.3.2 Vienna Development Method - VDM
Vienna Development Method (VDM) is a model-oriented notation developed while a
research group of IBM laboratory in Vienna was working on compiler developments
and language designs. It consists of a formal modelling language,VDM-SL, which is
a combination of data definitions, state variables and a set of operations describing
the specification of systems and state variables invariants verified before and after the
execution of an operation [111]. Unlike other notations like Z or B, VDM has a three
values logic which allows explicit treatment of undefinedness. The VDM syntax can be
described using ASCII or mathematic notation. More recently an extension of VDM
was developed, VDM++, supporting object-oriented design, concurrency and capable of
modelling real-time distributed systems [77].
A VDM development is made up of state descriptions at successive levels of abstraction
and implementation steps which link to the state description. The implementation of
an abstract state description Sa by means of a more concrete one Sc describes [111]:
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• either a data reification, i.e. how the state variables of Sc implement the ones of
Sa;
• or an operation decomposition, i.e. how the operations of Sc implement the ones
of Sa into a computer language algorithm (implementation).
While modelling a specification using VDM, in particular for the operations, predicates
precondition and postcondition are written explicitly. The state of variables before
and after an operation usually is defined. To refer to a before value it is used the “˜”
decoration on the relevant variable [77]. VDM objects must be validated by proof obliga-
tions [111] and for an operation to be valid, the satisfiability rule (a sentence is satisfiable
if there is some interpretation under which it is true) must be met [101]. VDM formal
development uses data reification from abstract to concrete model [equivalent to data
refinement] but also uses operation decomposition to develop (abstract) implicit speci-
fications of operations and functions into algorithms that can be directly implemented
in a computer language of choice. In general operation decomposition it is applied after
the data reification [101].
In terms of tools, VDMTools [59] is the leading commercial tool for VDM-SL and
VDM++ developed by CSK Systems. Overture [134] is a community-based open source
initiative aimed at providing free tool support for VDM++ on top of the Eclipse plat-
form. Its aim is to develop a framework for interoperable tools that may be useful for
industrial application, research and education.
1.3.3 Action Systems
Action Systems was introduced by Back and Kurki-Suonio [26]. It provides a general
description of reactive systems, capable of modelling terminating, aborting and infinitely
repeating systems. Arbitrary sequential programs can be used to describe an atomic
action. A basic action system P = (A, v, Pi, Pa) consists of a list of labels A, a list of
variables v, a set of labelled statements (actions) Pa = {Pα | α ∈ A} and an initialisation
statement Pi. Each action α ∈ A is of the form [26]:
action α : gα(x)→ y := S(x, y). (1.1)
The action guard gα is a condition that the enabling variables x must satisfy for action
α to be enabled. The effect of the action is to assign new values S(x, y) to the update
variables y. Actions are atomic which means that when an action is executing no other
action of the system occurs until the first action is complete. Taking the view that
an action system engages in an action jointly with the surrounding environment allows
the environment to observe the executed actions and not the state of the action system
itself [41].
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Back and von Wright [27] describe how Action Systems can be used on parallel and
distributed systems in a stepwise manner by giving a behavioural semantics in terms of
execution traces. Back [24] suggests that sequential programs could also be implemented
in a parallel fashion: two or more actions can be executed in parallel, as long as the
(atomic) actions do not have variables in common. Butler [41] exposes a composition
using Action Systems from an event-based point of view based on CSP synchronisation.
Woodcock and Morgan [189] give two proof methods which are sound and jointly com-
plete in terms of CSP failure-divergences semantics for state-based concurrent systems
using the weakest precondition wp approach proposed by Morgan [129]. The weakest
precondition is briefly explained below.
Weakest Precondition For guarded command G, command com, and postcondition
Q:
wp(G→ com,Q) =̂ G⇒ wp(com,Q).
Whereas wp(com,Q) characterises the states from which com is certain to establish Q,
we need the states from which com could possibly establish Q. Morgan [129] defined
the conjugate weakest precondition as follows:
¬wp(com,¬Q)
because in those states it is not certain that com will establish ¬Q. Note that we are
taking the view that an aborting command could possibly establish anything. Therefore
we can say that:
wp(com,Q) =̂ ¬wp(com,¬Q) (1.2)
Although wp(com, true) implies termination of com, (1.2) shows that wp(com, true)
does not. For any action α let G be its guard. Then
G ≡ wp(α, true).
Butler [53] augments Back and von Wright [27] and Woodcock and Morgan [189] works
by defining the semantics of Action Systems in terms of the CSP infinite-traces semantic
model:
Definition 1.1. For action system P = (A, v, Pi, Pa),
{[P ]} =̂ (A,F{[P ]},D{[P ]}, I{[P ]})
A failure is a pair of the form (s,X), where s ∈ A∗ (set of finite sequences of elements of
A) is an event-trace and X ⊆ A is a refusal set. If (s,X) is in P after initialisation,then
P could engage in the action trace s and then refuse all actions X. Trace s is a divergence
if P〈i〉s aborts. For an infinite trace u ∈ Aw (Aw is the set of infinite traces for alphabet
A) and Pu =̂ (i | i ∈ N·Pui), I{[P ]}) are those u ∈ Aw in which the execution of all the
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P〈i〉u in sequence is possible. Operationally, for this to be possible in some state it must
be the case that state S0 is enabled and that execution of S0 could result in a state in
which S1 is enabled and so on for each Si [53].
Event-B is inspired by Action Systems and as a consequence several similarities can be
drawn (atomic actions, state based, modelling reactive systems) for these two formal
methodologies. More information regarding composition follows in Sect. 1.6.
1.3.4 Classical B
Classical B (or B-Method) [4] created by Abrial is a formal approach for the specifica-
tion and development of computer software systems [158] and can be seen as a parent
of Event-B. A system specification is defined by machines that have variables defin-
ing the state space. The state progresses with the execution of operations. Operations
can have preconditions, guards (or both) and postconditions. Properties of the sys-
tem can be expressed by means of predicates called invariants. The B-Method can be
seen as both state-based (explicit notion of “state” expressed by variables) or event-
based (operations occurring nondeterministically). The development of models usually
follows a top-bottom style (Event-B inherits this style as seen in Sect. 1.5) where the
most abstract model is simple. More details and complexity are added throughout
stepwise refinements. Classical B defines three basic components: abstract machine, re-
finement and implementation. The last component, implementation, is a special kind of
refinement machine from which code can be produced, respecting the original abstract
specification. The refinement in Classical B is one to one: one abstract operation is re-
fined by one concrete operation and it is not possible to introduce new operations unlike
Event-B. Classical B has been used widely in both academic [169, 17] and industrial
developments [5].
Different ways and different tools exist for generating the output code like the B-
Toolkit [20] or Atelier B [19]. The B-Method focus on software systems and conse-
quently the final result - implementation model - although similar to other refinement
steps, includes programming constructs for common languages (e.g. C and Ada) with
some restrictions on the used syntax.
1.3.5 Z
The Z notation [173] is a state-based formal method, which uses mathematical tech-
niques to represent and describe computing systems: hardware and software. A system
contains a set of state variables and some operations that change the variables values.
A model that is characterised by the operations is called an Abstract Data Type (ADT)
and Z follows this style. Z can be used to describe object-oriented programs since the
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state variables and operations can be compared to instance variables and methods, re-
spectively [100]. Z serves as basis for other notations (for instance, classical B) and
several variants adapted to object-oriented programming (an example is Object-Z [168]
which is an object-oriented extension of Z). Z includes two notations [100]: notation for
ordinary discrete mathematics and notation that provides structure to the mathemat-
ical text - paragraphs. The most important and more used paragraph is a macro-like
abbreviation and naming construct called schema. Z defines the requirements through
the use of mathematic entities such as sets, relations/functions or sequences. A schema
consists of three parts: name which identifies the schema and it is used when composed
with other schemas; signature which is a collection of variables introducing data types
and created by declarations and providing a vocabulary for making mathematical state-
ments; predicate (or constraint) that defines relations between signatures elements using
predicates (describing abstractly the effect of each operation in the proposed system).
One of the ways to represent a schema StateSpace is represented here (the shortest one)
[37]: StateSpace =̂ [x1 : S1; ...;xn : Sn | Inv(x1, ..., xn)]. x1...xn are state variables,
S1...Sn are expressions that represent variable types. Inv(x1, ..., xn) are the state in-
variants. Schemas are used to define the static and dynamic feature of a system. The
static part includes the possible states and rules that should be preserved during the
system execution (invariant clauses). The dynamic part consists of available operations
and changes on the state after the execution of an operation, as well as on relationships
between input and output.
Research has been undertaken to adjust Z to model concurrent systems [37, 76]. Some
of these results are: Fischer’s CSP-OZ [75] developed to combine CSP properties with
Object-Z; Circus [186, 185], developed by Woodcock and Cavalcanti providing formal
support for the specification of data, behaviour aspects of concurrent systems and allow-
ing refinement through the use of a syntactical approach in opposition to a semantic one;
TLZ [109] developed by Lamport that combines Temporal Logic of Actions (TLA) [108]
and Z; Taguchi and Araki [179] combine Z and CCS to specify concurrent systems,
among others.
The Community Z Tools (CZT) project [57] is an open source project providing an
integrated toolset to support Z, with some support for Z extensions such as Object-
Z, Circus, and TCOZ. Another Z tool is Fastest [79] which is a model-based testing
tool. The tool receives a Z specification and generates (almost automatically) test cases
derived from the specification. f uzz [175, 174] is Spivey’s typechecker for the original
Z language. It includes style files for LaTeX and it is available as part of the Z Word
Tools [180].
All the previous formal methods have something in common: the use of refinement to
describe a specification. Refinement plays an important role in formal developments in
particular on a top-down style. Initially we have an initial abstract and simplistic view
of the modelled system. Refinement allows the introduction of more details in the state
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system respecting the initial abstract view. We discuss more about refinement in the
next section.
1.4 Refinement
Refinement allows the construction of a model in a gradual way, making it closer to
an implementation [15]. At same time, the overall correctness of the system should
be preserved. A property P ′ is said to refine a property P if P ′ v P . The initial
model is defined as the abstract model. A model that maintains the properties of the
abstract model and adds more details is defined as a concrete model. The states in the
abstract model are linked to the concrete ones. The refinement process can be repeated
so it can be applied over a concrete model generating an even more concrete model.
All formal notations presented in the previous sections have the notion of refinement
although sometimes named differently (in VDM it is known as reification). Operations
in B, VDM and Z are “refined” on a one-to-one basis: one abstract operation is refined
by only one concrete operation. Event-B, as it will be seen in the Sect. 1.5, is more
flexible as it inherits a refinement property from Action Systems and CSP where it is
possible to introduce new events during the stepwise refinement steps. Gluing invariants
are predicates used to link the abstract and concrete states. In Event-B, refinement can
also be applied to a machine and respective context(s) separately. It is possible to extend
contexts by adding new sets, constants or axioms to an existing context as long as the
abstract context properties are kept [150] (see Sect. 1.5).
Proof obligations are generated and discharged during the refinement process to preserve
the abstract properties in the concrete model: concrete events must keep the behaviour
of the respective abstract ones; the new model should not introduce divergence and
the invariants of the concrete model should be preserved for every event enabled (the
semantic of these proof obligations are described in Sect. 1.5.3). New events refining an
implicit event which does nothing (skip) [15] can be added in a refinement step. All the
abstract events must be refined in the concrete model. A constraint for the refinement
is that the concrete machine should not deadlock before the abstract machine, other-
wise the concrete machine might not achieve what the abstract machine had previously
required. The formalization of the described constraints can be found in [15].
Next section focus on the Event-B language and properties which will help understand
the rest of the document. The refinement POs for Event-B are also described in the
following section.
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1.5 Event-B
Event-B is a formal methodology that uses mathematical techniques based on set theory
and first order logic. It is a notation and method used for modelling discrete systems
resulting from an evolution of other formal methods notations like classical B and Action
Systems. The justifications and explanations for such notation can be found in [87].
Event-B is suitable for modelling parallel, reactive and distributed systems and can be
seen as a state-based formal method due to the close relation to classical B. Event-
B models can be developed in the Rodin modelling tool [151, 71] and we discuss it
briefly in Sect. 1.5.7. The semantics of a model developed in Event-B is given by means
of its proof obligations (cf. Sect. 1.5.3). These obligations have to be discharged to
show consistency of the model with respect to some behavioural semantics. Abrial [9]
expresses these behavioural semantics as state trace semantics.
An abstract Event-B specification is divided into two parts: a static part called context
and a dynamic part called machine. A context Ctx consists of carrier sets s (similar to
types [15]), constants c, axioms (assertions constraining constants and carriers sets) and
theorems A(s, c) . (Identifiers occurring free in a formula are indicated in parentheses).
An example of a context can be seen in Fig. 1.1.
BirthdayBook_C0
context BirthdayBook_C0
constants
p0
d0
sets PERSON DATE
axioms
@axm1 p0 ! PERSON
@axm2 d0 ! DATE
end
Page 1
Figure 1.1: Context BirthdayBook C0
A model is defined by a machine M that sees a context Ctx. A machine usually contains
global state variables v as well as invariants and (machine) theorems I(s, c, v) that define
the dynamic properties of the specification by constraining v. Possible state changes are
described by means of events: when their conditions are satisfied, optional local variables
(parameters) can be used and state variables may be updated. An example of a birthday
book machine can be seen in Fig. 1.2.
An abstract Event-B specification can be refined by adding more details and becoming
more concrete (see Fig. 1.3 where machine N refines machine M).
Refinement allows the introduction of more details in small steps. Otherwise the speci-
fication development would have to be done in one single step with the possible conse-
quence of becoming complicated, hard to reason about (dealing with all the details of
16 Chapter 1 Introduction
BirthdayBook_M0
machine BirthdayBook_M0 sees BirthdayBook_C0
variables birthday
invariants
  @inv1 birthday ! PERSON ! DATE
events
  event INITIALISATION
    then
      @act1 birthday " {p0"d0}
  end
  event AddBirthday
    any p d
    where
      @grd1 p ! PERSON
      @grd2 d ! DATE
      @grd3 p # dom (birthday)
    then
      @act1 birthday " birthday ! {p " d}
  end
end
Page 1
Figure 1.2: Machine BirthdayBook M0
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Figure 3. Machine Refinement and Context Extension
reality are now revealed by the microscope. An even more powerful microscope will reveal more details, etc. A
refined model is thus one which is spatially larger than its previous abstractions.
In correlation to this spatial extension, there is a corresponding temporal extension: this is because the new
variables can be modified by some transitions, which could not have been present in the previous abstractions,
simply, because the concerned variables did not exist in them. Practically this is realized by means of new events
involving the new variables only (they refine some implicit events doing “nothing” in the abstraction). Refinement
will thus result in a discrete observation of reality, which is now performed using a finer time granularity.
We distinguish two principal uses of refinement, superposition [6] refinement and data-refinement [7]. Super-
position refinement corresponds solely to a spatial and temporal extension of a model. Data-refinement is used in
order to modify the state so that it can be implemented on a computer by means of some programming language.
5.1. Machine Refinement and Context Extension
From a given machineM, a new machine N can be built and asserted to be a refinement ofM. MachineM is said to
be an abstraction of N and machine N is said to be a refinement ofM or a concrete version of it. Likewise, context
C, seen by a machineM, can be extended to a context D, which is then seen by N. This is represented in Fig. 3.
Note that it is not necessary to extend context C when refining machine M. In this restricted case, machine N
just sees context C as does its abstractionM. This is illustrated in Fig. 4.
The sets and constants of an abstract context are kept in its extension. In other words, the extension of a
context just consists of adding new sets t and new constants d. These are defined by means of new axioms
Q(s, t, c, d). Consequently, no specific proof obligations are associated with context extension. In this article we
present singleton context extension and context reference to achieve conceptual simplicity. The generalization to
multiple context extension and reference is not difficult and particularly useful in conjunction with decomposition
as presented in Section 6.
The situation is not the same when refining machines. The concrete machine N (which supposedly “sees”
Figur 1.3: Machine and contex refin me t
implementation at once) and most important, hard to understand [88]. Concrete mod-
els are expressed through the refinement of events, introduction of new variables w and
consequently the introduction of gluing invariants: invariants that relate abstract and
concrete states (variables). Therefore abstract variables can exist in a concrete model
or disappear and be replaced by concrete va iabl s. In that case, a glui g invariant
is required to relate the abstract and concrete variable. Abstract contexts can be ex-
tended by concrete contexts allowing the introduction of new carrier sets, constants and
axioms. As an example, see Fig. 1.4 where machine BirthdayBook 0 is refine with
the introduction of a new variable reminder (relation between variable birthday and
a reminding date; he ame birthday can have multiple reminding dates). Not that
we do not change the original abstract event: we only “extend” it; the abstract event
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AddBirthday is extended by appending a concrete guard grd4 and a concrete action
act4.
machine BirthdayBook_M1 refines BirthdayBook_M0   
sees BirthdayBook_C0 
 
variables birthday reminder 
 
invariants 
 @inv1 reminder ! birthday ! DATE 
 
events 
  event INITIALISATION extends INITIALISATION 
  then 
   @act2 reminder !" 
  end 
 
  event AddBirthday extends AddBirthday 
  any r 
  when 
   @grd4 r ! DATE 
  then 
   @act4 reminder(p"d)!r 
  end 
end 
!
Figure 1.4: Machine BirthdayBook M1
Proof obligations arise to verify the consistency of a model. For instance, there are
proof obligations to establish the refinement relationship between two machines, and to
establish invariant preservation by the events. We reason about a system specification
through its proof obligations. The reasoning verifies that the specification is sound wrt
some behavioural semantic and that system properties are always satisfied [88]. The logic
used in Event-B is typed set theory built on first-order predicate logic, and allows the
definition of partial functions. As such, it is necessary that the used proof system handles
well-definedness. In [122], it is shown that it is possible to reason about partiality without
abandoning the well-understood domain of two-valued predicate logic. In that approach,
the reasoning is achieved by extending the standard calculus with derived proof rules
that preserve well-definedness across proofs [116]. The proof calculus outlined in [122]
is the one used to reason in Event-B.
1.5.1 Preliminaries
A full definition of the mathematical language of Event-B may be found in [16]. Here we
give a very brief overview of the structure of the mathematical language to help motivate
the remaining sections and chapters.
Event-B distinguishes predicates and expressions as separate syntactic categories. Pred-
icates are defined in term of the usual basic predicates (>,⊥, A = B, x ∈ S, y ≤ z,
etc), predicate combinators (¬,∧,∨, etc) and quantiers (∀,∃). Expressions are defined
in terms of constants (0, ∅, etc), (logical) variables (x, y, etc) and operators (+, ∪,
etc). Basic predicates have expressions as arguments. For example in the predicate
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E ∈ S , both E and S are expressions. Expression operators may have expressions as
arguments. For example, the set union operator has two expressions as arguments, i.e.,
S ∪ T . Expression operators may also have predicates as arguments. For example, set
comprehension is defined in terms of a predicate P , i.e., { x | P } [11].
1.5.1.1 Notation
The naming conventions that we use throughout this thesis are shown in the following
tables:
Context Ctx
Constant c
Carrier Set s
Axiom/Theorem A(c, s)
(a) Context Elements
Machine M
Abstract Variable v
Concrete Variable w
(Abstract) Invariant/Theorem I(c, s, v)
(Concrete) Invariant/Theorem J(c, s, v, w)
(b) Machine Elements
Event evt
(Abstract) Parameter p
(Concrete) Parameter q
(Abstract) Guard G(c, s, p, v)
(Concrete) Guard H(c, s, q, w)
Parameter Witness W (c, s, p, q, w,w′)
Variable Witness W (c, s, q, v′, w, w′)
(Abstract) Action S(c, s, p, v, v′)
(Concrete) Action T (c, s, q, w,w′)
(c) Event Elements
1.5.1.2 Types
All expressions have a type which is one of three forms:
• a basic set, that is a predefined set (Z or BOOL) or a carrier set provided by the
user (i.e., an identifier);
• a power set of another type, P(α);
• a cartesian product of two types, α× β
These are the types currently built-in to the Rodin tool [11]. User-defined types can be
defines as carrier sets and the only implicit assumption is that they are not empty [156].
An expression E has a type type(E ) provided E satisfies typing rules. Each expression
operator has a typing rule which we write in the form of an inference rule. For example,
the following typing rule for the set union operator specifies that S ∪ T has type (Pα)
provided both S and T have type P(α):
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type(S ) = P(α) type(T ) = P(α)
type(S ∪ T ) = P(α)
This rule is polymorphic on the type variable α which means that union is a polymorphic
operator. It should be noted that an expression of type BOOL is not a predicate. The
type BOOL consists of the values TRUE and FALSE, both of which are expressions.
These are different to the basic predicates > and ⊥. The bool operator is used to
convert a predicate into a boolean expression, i.e., bool(x > y). A boolean expression E
is converted to a predicate by writing E = TRUE. We have that bool(>) = TRUE.
1.5.1.3 Functions
There exists a relation between operators and function application in Event-B. The
type of an Event-B function f is P(type(A)× type(B)). The functionality of a partial
function f ∈ A 7→B is specified with an additional property and a uniqueness condition:
∀x, y, y′ ·x 7→ y ∈ f ∧ x 7→ y′ ∈ f ⇒ y = y′
The domain of f , written dom(f), is the set {x | ∃y ·x 7→ y ∈ f}. Application of f
to x is written f(x) which is well-defined provided x ∈ dom(f). Note that f is not
an operator itself: it is simply an expression. The operator involved here is implicit:
it is the function application operator that takes two arguments, f and x. An explicit
operator for a function application could have been written as apply(f, x), where apply
is the operator and f and x are the arguments. But in the Rodin tool, the shorthand
f(x) must be used.
Variables in the mathematical language are typed by set expressions. This means, for
example, that a variable may represent a function since a function is a special case of
a set (of pairs). Variables may not represent expression operators or predicates in the
mathematical language. This means that, while we can quantify over sets (including
functions), we cannot quantify over operators or predicates.
1.5.1.4 Well-Definedness
Ill-defined terms arise in the presence of partial functions. They result from the applica-
tion of functions to terms outside their domain. When ill-definedness is a concern, the
adopted reasoning framework has to cope with it. Different approaches exist to reason
in the presence of partial functions. Each of these approaches has its own specialised
proof calculus. In [122], it is shown that it is possible to reason about partiality without
abandoning the well-understood domain of two-valued predicate logic. In that approach,
the reasoning is achieved by extending the standard calculus with derived proof rules
that preserve well-definedness across proofs [116].
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Along with typing rules as defined above, all expression operators come with well-
definedness predicates. We write WD(E) for the well-definedness predicate of expres-
sion E. Table 1.1 gives examples of well-definedness conditions for several operators,
including the function application operator.
Expression Well-Definedness Conditions
F (E) WD(F ),WD(E), F ∈ x 7→ y,E ∈ dom(F )
F/E WD(F ),WD(E), E 6= 0
card(E) WD(E), finite(E)
S ∪ T WD(S),WD(T )
F mod E WD(F ),WD(E), E 6= 0
min(S) WD(S), S 6= ∅, ∃x·(∀n·n ∈ S⇒ x ≤ n))
max(S) WD(S), S 6= ∅, ∃x·(∀n·n ∈ S⇒ x ≥ n))
Table 1.1: Some expressions and respective well-definedness conditions
From the Table 1.1, it can be seen that an expression F (E) is well-defined provided
both F and E are well-defined, that F is a partial function and that E is in the do-
main of F . In the Rodin tool, well-definedness conditions give rise to proof obligations
for expressions that appear in models. The well-definedness conditions are themselves
written as predicates in the Event-B mathematical language. [125] gives the full list of
expression, predicates and respective well-definedness conditions available in the Rodin
tool. A well-defined sequent of the form H `D G is defined as follows:
H `D G =̂ D(H), D(G), H ` G.
That is, the well-definedness of H and G is assumed when proving H ` G. Generally
speaking, when proving a sequent H ` G, the approach suggests proving its validity as
well as its well-definedness:
WDD : `D D(H ` G)
V alidityD : H `D G
where D(H ` G) is defined as D(∀x·H⇒G) such that x are the free variables of H and
G [116]. A proof rule is said to preserve well-definedness (WD) iff its consequent and
antecedents only contain well-defined sequents (i.e., `D sequents). For a generic proof
rule where H1 . . . Hn (standing for a conjunction), n > 0, are a sequence of (possible
empty) sequents and G is also a sequent, with an optional name r:
` H1 . . . Hn
` G r
then, the same proof rule can be rewritten including the well-definedness conditions (and
Chapter 1 Introduction 21
the well-definedness operator D [122]) as:
`D D(H1) . . . D(Hn)
`D D(H1 . . . Hn) ∧goalD `D H1 . . . Hn
`D G
rD
Additional details about the use of well-definedness in a first order predicate calculus
can be found in [122].
Other works also study the well-definedness of partial functions: Fitzgerald and Jones [78]
discuss a connection between the classical First-order Predicate Calculus(FoPC) and the
Logic of Partial Functions (LPF). It is claimed that theorems in LPF using weak equality
can be straightforwardly translated into ones that are true in FoPC; translation in the
other direction results, in general, in more complicated expressions but in many cases
these can be readily simplified. [18, 120] discuss the semantics of Z in relation to first
order logic, particularly regarding undefinedness and proofs.
With regard to recursive functions, they are not supported in the Rodin platform. The
theory plug-in [115] that allows the extension of the mathematical language [11, 51],
allows the definition of new (possibly recursive) operators as well as the necessary well-
definedness conditions. Nevertheless this is currently work in progress.
Next we extend this initial description by focusing on the kind of events, the types of vari-
ables assignments and parameters. In the end we outline the existing proof obligations
for Event-B models. These details are necessary further on to explain our contributions.
1.5.2 Events
In Event-B, events specify changes to variables and the conditions under which they
may occur. Events occur as soon, and as long, as its firing condition (guards) are set [3].
An event evt is expressed by parameters (local variables to the event) p, by guards
G(s, c, p, v) and actions S(s, c, p, v, v′):
evt =̂ ANY p WHERE G(s, c, p, v) THEN S(s, c, p, v, v′) END.
When the guard G(s, c, p, v) is true then the event evt is enabled and therefore the action
S(s, c, p, v, v′) can update the set of variables v to v′ (after-state of v). A more general
definition is as follows: events may occur atomically when its guards are true and as
a result the state is updated through the execution of actions. The guard of an event
states the necessary conditions under which an event may occur and an action describes
how the state variables evolve when an event occurs [88]. A mandatory event called
INITIALISATION, with TRUE as guard, defines the initial state of the machine. The
system state progresses when events are enabled and occur. More details about events,
guards and actions can be found in [15].
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We consider three kind of events depending on when they are introduced during the
development of a model:
• convergent: new events introduced after a refinement. These kind of events refine
skip and require a variant (see Section 1.5.3.2) to ensure non-divergence.
• anticipated: event declared in anticipation that does not need to decrease a variant
(but must not increase it either); it only decreases the variant when it becomes
convergent in a further refinement [9].
• ordinary: neither convergent nor anticipated.
The majority of developments use ordinary or convergent events but anticipated events
can be useful when modelling. Anticipated events are used to avoid a technical difficulty
of using abstract variables in a new event during a refinement step. By declaring the
new event in anticipation in an abstract refinement, this technicality is circumvented. As
mentioned, new events can be introduced in a refinement of an abstract model (similar
to CSP hiding operator where some events are hidden from the environment) repre-
senting internal events. These new events may (optionally) be defined as convergent or
anticipated.
For variable assignments in an action, there are three simple forms [13] described in
Table 1.2. v and v1 are some variables, E(. . . ) denotes an expression, p are parameters
Assignment Before-After Predicate (BAP)
v := E(p, v1) v
′ := E(p, v1)
v :∈ E(p, v1) v′ :∈ E(p, v1)
v :| S(p, v1, v′) S(p, v1, v′)
Table 1.2: Event-B assignments
and S(. . . ) is a predicate. The before-after predicate (BAP) denotes the relationship
holding between the state variables of the model just before (denoted by v) and just
after (denoted by v′) applying a substitution. The first row in Tab. 1.2 corresponds to
a deterministic substitution while the other two are non-deterministic substitutions. In
the second row, the assignment is non-deterministic and based on the expression E(. . . )
(for instance, assigning a value to v from a non-empty set). The third row assigns a
value to v according to the predicate defined and it is also considered non-deterministic.
Variables that do not appear on the left-hand side of an assignment of an action are not
changed (variables v1). The last row is the most general form of assignment and all the
other assignments can be expressed in this manner.
Concrete models are expressed through the refinement of events. An abstract event
evt1 is refined by evt2 if the guard H(s, c, q, w) of evt2 is stronger (guard strengthening)
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than the guard G(s, c, p, v) of evt1 and the gluing invariant J(s, c, v, w) establishes a
simulation of evt2 (T (s, c, p, w,w′)) by evt1 (S(s, c, p, v, v′)):
evt1 =̂ ANY p WHERE G(s, c, p, v) THEN S(s, c, p, v, v′) END
evt2 =̂ ANY q WHERE H(s, c, q, w)
WITH p : W1(p, s, c, w, q)
v′ : W2(v′, s, c, w, q, w′)
THEN T (s, c, p, w,w′) END.
The gluing invariant must be preserved by all events: invariants are supposed to hold
whenever a variable value changes in an event (invariant preservation PO). Moreover
the guard strengthening PO is preserved as follows: when a concrete event is enabled,
then so it is the corresponding abstract one. Finally the simulation PO is proved if the
occurrence of the concrete event does not contradict what the corresponding abstract
event does. In addition, for event refinements it must be shown that it is possible to
choose a value for the abstract parameter p such that G(s, c, p, v) holds and the gluing
invariant J(s, c, v, w) is re-established. Possible values of the abstract parameter p are
given as witness predicates W1(p, s, c, q, w) in concrete events [90, 87]. A witness is
necessary for each disappearing abstract parameter of an abstract event in the abstract
event. Moreover a witness W2(v
′, s, c, w, q, w′) is needed for each disappearing abstract
variable v′ that has a non-deterministic assignment (see the third row of Table 1.2) [9].
New events can be introduced in a refinement of an abstract machine. They must
refine the implicit abstract dummy event skip and it may be proved that they do not
collectively diverge by being always enabled and preventing abstract events to occur.
The divergence is avoided if each new event decreases a variant [14]. The variant must
be well-founded, may be an integer or a finite set and it is bounded. One variant per
event that must be decremented by that same event. To preserve refinement, consistency
proof obligations are defined as described in Sect. 1.5.3.
1.5.3 Proof obligations
Proof obligations have a two-fold purpose. On the one hand, they show that a model
is sound with respect to some behavioural semantics. On the other hand, they serve
to verify properties of the model [88]. In Event-B, there are different kind of proof
obligations generated during a model development. A list of standard POs for contexts
and machines is defined in [9, 88, 87]. Here we only cover the relevant POs for our work.
In Event-B, refinement is defined in terms of POs and these correspond to standard
forward simulation [10]. We shall use a generic model illustrated in Fig. 1.5 to describe
the POs. Backward simulation is currently not supported.
Context Ctx is characterised by constants c, carrier sets s and axioms A(s,c). This
context is seen by all the involved machines. The abstract machine M contains a set of
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CONTEXT Ctx
CONSTANTS c
SETS s
AXIOMS A(s, c)
(d) Context Ctx
MACHINE M SEES Ctx
VARIABLES v
INVARIANT I(s, c, v)
EVENT evt =̂
ANY p WHERE
G(p, s, c, v)
THEN
v :| S(p, s, c, v, v′)
END
(e) Machine M
MACHINE N REFINES M
SEES Ctx
VARIABLES w
INVARIANT J(s, c, v, w)
VARIANT n(s, c, w)
EVENT evt1 REFINES evt =̂
ANY q WHERE
H(q, s, c, w)
WITH
p : W1(p, s, c, w, q)
v′ : W2(v′, s, c, w, q, w′)
THEN
w :| T (q, s, c, w,w′)
END
convergent EVENT evt2 =̂
ANY q WHERE
H2(q, s, c, w)
THEN
w :| T2(q, s, c, w,w′)
END
(f) Machine N
Figure 1.5: Context Ctx seen by machine M and respective refinement N
variables v, a list of invariants and local theorems I(s,c,v) and an event evt defined by
the parameter p, guards G(p,s,c,v) and before-after predicates S(p, s, c, v, v′) [considered
in the non-deterministic form as defined in the third row of Table 1.2] over the set of
variables v. Machine N refining M , contains a set of variables w and a set of additional
(concrete) invariants and theorems J(s, c, v, w). Event evt1 refines abstract event evt
and a new convergent event evt2 is introduced in this refinement. We assume that
variables v and w are pairwise disjoint and the same happens to parameters p and q. A
proof obligation is a sequent of the shape:
Hypotheses
` Goal
Hypotheses and goal are defined by predicates such as invariants, theorems, axioms
or guards. Based on the previous, we define the standard proof obligations in Event-
B [9]. These proof obligations are divided into consistency POs and refinement POs as
described below.
1.5.3.1 Consistency POs
Consistency POs are required to be always verified for each machine. Consistency is
expressed by the feasibility and invariant preservation POs for each event [88]. Moreover
well-definedness POs are generated for each potential ill-defined term (such as axioms,
theorems, invariants, variant, guards, actions).
Invariant Preservation (INV): This kind of proof obligation ensures that each in-
variant is preserved by each event. The hypotheses include axioms, invariants,
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local theorems, guards and before-after predicates of that event. The goal is each
individual invariant from the set of existing invariants. In Fig. 1.5(e), for event evt
and each of the invariants i(s, c, v) in I(s,c,v), the respective proof obligation rule
is given by (1.3).
evt/inv/INV :
A(s, c)
I(s, c, v)
G(p, s, c, v)
S(p, s, c, v, v′)
` i(s, c, v′)
(1.3)
i(s, c, v′) is one of the invariants where variables v are modified to v′.
Feasibility (FIS): It ensures that each non-deterministic action is feasible for a partic-
ular event. The hypotheses include axioms, invariants, local theorems and guards
of that event. The goal ensures that values exist for variables v′ such that the
before-after predicate S(p, s, c, v, v′) is feasible. In Fig. 1.5(e), for event evt and
each of the actions act, this proof obligation is given by (1.4).
evt/act/FIS :
A(s, c)
I(s, c, v)
G(p, s, c, v)
` ∃v′ ·S(p, s, c, v, v′)
(1.4)
Well-Definedness (WD) It ensures that any axiom (WD/AXM), theorem (WD/THM),
invariant(WD/INV ), guard(WD/GRD), action(WD/ACT ), variant(WD/VWD)
or witness p in an event evt(evt/p/WWD) is indeed well-defined. It varies with
the potentially ill-defined expression as seen in Table 1.1. An important property
for WD proof obligations is that they are ordered. For example, the WD condi-
tions for an invariant depends only on the previous defined invariants: for the WD
of ik, which is the invariant k from the set of invariants I, the hypotheses that can
be assumed are i1 . . . ik−1.
1.5.3.2 Refinement POs
The refinement POs are required when the an abstract machine is refined by a more
concrete one. Besides the consistency POs, refinement POs are additional obligations
required to be discharged to ensure valid refinements. As mentioned in Section 1.4,
in Event-B refinement requires concrete events to keep the behaviour of the respective
abstract ones. Proof rule (1.5) expresses the refinement PO for each concrete event.
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Refinement (REF): For each concrete event, the refinement PO reinforces that ab-
stract actions are simulated by the concrete ones, that each abstract guard is at
least as weak as the concrete one and that when an abstract variable is data refined
by a concrete one and disappears, gluing invariants exist linking the abstract and
concrete variables.
evt1/REF :
A(s, c)
I(s, c, v)
J(s, c, v, w)
H(q, s, c, w)
T (q, s, c, w,w′)
` ∃v′ ·G(p, s, c, v) ∧ S(p, s, c, v, v′) ∧ J(s, c, v′, w′)
(1.5)
The use of witnesses (cf. Sect. 1.5.2) allows the separation of the previous proof rule
in three parts: proof rules Gluing Invariant Preservation (1.7), Guard Strengthen-
ing (1.8) and Simulation (1.9). In practice, when discharging POs, it is simpler to
deal with one part of the refinement PO at a time instead of dealing with all at
once. We do not address the technical parts about the partition of the refinement
POs but more details can be found in [10]. When non-deterministic witnesses are
used, a proof obligation is generated to ensure that the witness is feasible.
Non-Deterministic Witness (WFIS): It ensures that each witness proposed in the
concrete event indeed exists, in particular when the witness is a non-deterministic
predicate. Witness are used when an abstract parameter is refined and disappears
(being replaced by another parameter, a variable or an expression) or when an
abstract variable that is assigned non-determistically is refined and disappears.
In both cases, witnesses should related the refined element with a concrete repre-
sentation (parameter, variable, expression) and this proof obligation ensures that
the substitution is indeed feasible. The hypotheses include axioms, invariants and
theorems (abstract and concrete), concrete guards and before-after predicate for
witness. The goal is to confirm that the witness indeed exists. In Fig. 1.5(f), for
convergent event evt2 and witness p, this proof obligation is given by (1.6).
evt2/p/WFIS :
A(s, c)
I(s, c, v)
J(s, c, v, w)
H2(q, s, c, w)
T (q, s, c, w,w′)
` ∃p·W1(p, s, c, w, q)
(1.6)
With the use of witnesses, the refinement PO (1.5) can be split in three parts
(which in practice makes the POs easier to manage and discharge). These three
proof rules are presented below.
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Gluing Invariant Preservation (INV): In a refinement, concrete invariants must
be preserved for each concrete event. The hypotheses include axioms, abstract
invariants and theorems plus concrete invariants and theorems, concrete guards,
witnesses predicates for variables and concrete before-after predicates. The goal is
each concrete invariant from the set of invariants in the refinement. In Fig. 1.5(f),
for event evt1 and each of the invariants j(s, c, v, w) in J(s,c,v,w), the respective
proof obligation rule is given by (1.7).
evt/inv/INV :
A(s, c)
I(s, c, v)
J(s, c, v, w)
H(q, s, c, w)
W2(v
′, s, c, w, q, w′)
T (q, s, c, w,w′)
` j(s, c, v′, w′)
(1.7)
Guard Strengthening (GRD): It ensures that each abstract guard is at least as weak
as the concrete one in the refining event. As a consequence, when a concrete event
is enabled, the corresponding abstract one is also enabled. The hypotheses include
axioms, abstract invariants and theorems, concrete invariants and theorems, con-
crete guards and witness predicates for parameters. The goal is each individual
abstract guard from the set of abstract guards. In Fig. 1.5(f), for event evt1 and
each of the abstract guards g(p,s,c,v), this proof obligation is given by (1.8).
evt1/grd/GRD :
A(s, c)
I(s, c, v)
J(s, c, v, w)
H(q, s, c, w)
W1(p, s, c, w, q)
` g(p, s, c, v)
(1.8)
Simulation (SIM): It ensures that each action in a concrete event simulates the corre-
sponding abstract action. When a concrete action is executed, the corresponding
abstract one should not be contradicted. The hypotheses include axioms, abstract
invariants and theorems, concrete invariants and theorems, concrete guards, wit-
ness predicates for refined parameters, witness predicate for refined abstract vari-
ables and the concrete before-after predicate for each concrete event. The goal
is each individual abstract before-after predicate from the set of abstract assign-
ments. In Fig. 1.5(f), for event evt1 and one of the respective actions act, this
proof obligation is given by (1.9).
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evt1/act/SIM :
A(s, c)
I(s, c, v)
J(s, c, v, w)
H(q, s, c, w)
W1(p, s, c, w, q)
W2(v
′, s, c, w, q, w′)
T (q, s, c, w,w′)
` S(p, s, c, v, v′)
(1.9)
When dealing with convergency and divergency, a variant is required to ensure
that new events are not enabled forever. Otherwise, that possibly would not allow
abstract events to occur resulting in the introduction of divergency to the model.
The solution for this situation is the addition of a variant as described below.
Numeric Variant (NAT): It ensures that under the guards of each convergent or
anticipated event, a proposed numeric variant is indeed a natural number. Also
applicable to finiteness of set variants (FIN). The hypotheses include axioms, in-
variants and theorems (abstract and concrete) and guards for each convergent (or
anticipated) event. The goal is to prove that the numeric variant is a natural
number. In Fig. 1.5(f), for convergent event evt2, this proof obligation is given by
(1.10).
evt2/NAT :
A(s, c)
I(s, c, v)
J(s, c, v, w)
H2(q, s, c, w)
` n(s, c, w) ∈ N
(1.10)
Numeric Variant Decreasing (VAR): It ensures that convergent events decrease
the proposed numeric variant. Also applicable to finiteness of set variants (FIN).
The hypotheses include axioms, invariants and theorems (abstract and concrete)
and guards for each convergent (or anticipated) event. The goal is to prove that
after the assignments the numeric variant decreases. In Fig. 1.5(f), for convergent
event evt2, this proof obligation is given by (1.11).
evt2/VAR:
A(s, c)
I(s, c, v)
J(s, c, v, w)
H2(q, s, c, w)
T (q, s, c, w,w′)
` n(s, c, w′) < n(s, c, w)
(1.11)
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1.5.3.3 Enabledness PO
All the previous proof obligations are supported by the Event-B tool (Rodin platform
described in Sect. 1.5.7). Nevertheless there is another proof obligation that is not
supported by Rodin but it can be important when modelling a system: enabledness.
Following the CSP notation for channels [153], we distinguish between parameters with
an input (represented in CSP as “!”) or output (represented in CSP as “?”) behaviour.
This distinction is important in particular for the generation of enabledness proof obli-
gations during refinements. The enabledness proof obligation is given by [41] (described
in that work as the progress condition):
G ∧ J ⇒H ∨HN (1.12)
where G are the abstract guards, J are the gluing invariants, H are the concrete guards
of refined events and HN are the guards of the new events. The guards of the abstract
event imply the guards of the concrete event or any of the new events guards. If an event
is disabled in the concrete model, it should be disabled in the abstract model. Reducing
the nondeterminism of individual events may result in reducing internal nondeterminism.
The choice between a range of output values may be reduced during a refinement because
the external choice is preserved. But the range of input values in a refinement must be
preserved [41]. Using an example, let us consider event Add1 in machine M illustrated
by Fig. 1.6(a).
MACHINE M
VARIABLES s
INVARIANT s ⊆ N
EVENT Add1 =̂
ANY p WHERE
p ∈ 0..9
THEN
s := s ∪ {p}
END
(a) Machine S and event Add1
EVENT Add2 =̂
ANY pWHERE
p ∈ 0..5
THEN
s := s ∪ {p}
END
(b) Event Add2
EVENT Add3 =̂
ANY pWHERE
p ∈ ∅
THEN
s := s ∪ {p}
END
(c) Event Add3
Figure 1.6: Machine M and events Add1, Add2 and Add3
If we consider that parameter p is an input parameter and that event Add2 refines Add1,
the enabledness PO resulting from (1.12) is given by:
p ∈ 0..9 ∧ s ⊆ N⇒ p ∈ 0..5
The previous PO cannot be proved and therefore the enabledness is violated. The
concrete guard is strengthened and some abstract conditions (x ∈ 6..9) are not accepted
in the concrete event. If we consider p as an output parameter and again Add2 refining
Add1, the enabledness proof obligations is:
p ∈ 0..9 ∧ s ⊆ N⇒∃p·p ∈ 0..5
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which can be easily proved as there exists a value for p between 0..5 from the hypotheses
(p ∈ 0..9). But if we consider Add3 as a refinement of Add2, the enabledness proof
obligation is:
p ∈ 0..5 ∧ s ⊆ N⇒ (∃p·p ∈ ∅).
The enabledness is violated because we cannot prove this PO: there is no value of p that
satisfies the concrete guard.
1.5.4 Feasibility and Initialisation
Contexts contain the static part of an Event-B model. It may contain carrier sets,
constants, axioms and theorems. Carrier sets, that are user-defined types, only have a
built-in assumption that they are not empty. Other assumptions about it can be added
as axioms (e.g. carrier set s is finite: finite(s)).
An Event-B model is initialised by an event initialisation with no guards. This event
does not have guards because the initialisation must always be possible. Moreover the
expressions on the right-hand side of the initialisation actions cannot refer to any variable
of the model, since the model is being initialised [9]. Returning to the birthday book
example in Sect. 1.5, this action is a valid initialisation:
• birthday :| birthday′ = {p0 7→ d0}
and this is an invalid initialisation:
• birthday :| birthday′ = birthday ∪ {p0 7→ d0}, because the right-hand side of the
assignment refers to state birthday that have not been initialised yet.
The initialisation event cannot preserve the invariants because before that event, the
system state does not exist ; the initialisation event must establish the invariant for
the first time. Thus, the other events, that are only possible after initialisation has
taken place, can be enabled when the invariants hold. The invariant proof obligation
for this invariant establishment is almost identical to the proof obligation rule INV
(see Sect. 1.5.3) except that the invariants are not mentioned in the hypotheses of the
sequent as described by PO rule (1.13) [9]. The initialisation provides a witness for the
satisfiability of the invariants.
INITIALISATION/inv/INV :
A(s, c)
S(s, c, v′)
` i(s, c, v′)
(1.13)
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Note that axioms in contexts do not generate proof obligations. Consequently they
can introduce false assumptions and in that case, anything can be proved. To tackle
this issue, sanity tests such as checking if a predicate that is clearly false can be dis-
charged (e.g., (1 = 0)) can be used. If yes, a false predicate exists in the model and
the properties and assertions may not hold. Note that this situation is different from
introducing an invariant or a theorem that are clearly false: the corresponding PO for
that invariant/theorem should not be found provable.
Events have feasibility proof obligations for non-deterministic actions as seen in Sect. 1.5.3.
Moreover, the introduction of a guard that is always false results in that event being
always disabled. Currently proof obligations are only generated for safety properties.
Because the enabledness property is a liveness property, no proof obligation is generated
to verify that situation. Nevertheless ProB [141], that is a model checker for the Rodin
platform (see Sect. 1.5.7) allows the verification of enabledness considering small finite
sets.
1.5.5 Event-B and Action Systems
In Event-B a system is specified as an abstract machine consisting of some state vari-
ables and some events (guarded actions) acting on that state. This is essentially the
same structure as an action system which describes the behaviour of a parallel reactive
system in terms of the guarded actions that can take place during its execution. As
described in Sect. 1.3.3, an action in Action Systems is a predicate transformer that
maps postconditions to preconditions. Event-B events are similar but from a more spe-
cific view where guards correspond to preconditions and the occurrence of the event
lead to postconditions. We can compare both by defining the weakest preconditions (as
described in Sect. 1.3.3) for events and actions respectively. We write wpM (α,Q) for
the weakest precondition guaranteeing that the event with label α ∈ A (A being the
finite set of labels of machine M) will establish postcondition Q. An event labelled α
from machine M has a canonical form in terms of a guard and a before-after predicate
as follows [9]:
event α =̂ WHEN G(v) THEN v :| BA(v, v′) END.
The weakest precondition of this canonical form is [48]:
wpM (α,Q) =̂ G(v)⇒ (∀v′ ·BA(v, v′)⇒Q[v′/v]). (1.14)
An action α from a basic action system P = (A, v, Pi, Pa), where α ∈ A has a canonical
form in terms of a guard and a before-after predicate as follows [26]:
action α : G(v)→ v := BA(v, v′).
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The weakest precondition of this canonical form is [128, 129]:
wp(G(v)→ BA(v, v′), Q) =̂ G(v)⇒ wp(BA(v, v′), Q[v′/v])
≡ G(v)⇒∀v ·BA(v, v′)⇒Q[v′/v]). (1.15)
The weakest precondition semantics (1.14) and (1.15) are equivalent. This occurs be-
cause Event-B can be seen as a realisation of the generic Action Systems formalism:
both are predicate transformers mapping preconditions to postconditions.
1.5.6 CSP Semantics for Event-B Machines
Morgan’s CSP semantics for Action Systems [129] allows traces, failures and divergences
to be defined for action systems in terms of sequences of actions that can and cannot
engage in. Butler [53] extends that work to include unbounded nondeterminism and
defines the infinite traces for Action Systems. Schneider et al [159] developed a CSP
viewpoint of Event-B refinement for traces, divergences and infinite traces (TDI). The
notion of traces here refers to a finite sequence of events from a machine’s alphabet (e.g.
tr ∈ αM∗), where alphabet are the observations of possible occurrences of events of M .
The CSP semantics is also based on the weakest precondition semantics of events. The
syntax used is slightly different from Sect. 1.3.3. For example, a sequence of actions
〈act1, act2〉 occurs in exactly those states satisfying wp(act1; act2, true). That could be
also expressed as [129, 159]:
¬[act1, act2]false ≡ wp(act1; act2, true).
Let S be a statement (of an event). Then [S]Q denotes the weakest precondition for
statement S to establish postcondition Q. Observe that for the case Q = true we have
[when G(v) then v : |BA(v, v′) end]true = true. The semantics of machine M can be
defined in terms of:
Traces The traces of a machine M are those sequences of events tr = 〈a1, ..., an〉 which
are possible for M (after initialisation init): those that do not establish false:
traces(M) = {tr | ¬[init; tr]false} (1.16)
Divergences A sequence of events tr is a divergence if the sequence of events is not
guaranteed to terminate, i.e. ¬[init; tr]true. Thus
divergences(M) = {tr | ¬[init; tr]true} (1.17)
Any Event-B machine M with events of the form given above in Sect. 1.5.2 is
divergence-free (use of anticipated, convergence clause). This is because [evt]true =
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true for such events (and for init), and so [init; tr]true = true. Thus no potential
divergence tr meets the condition ¬[init; tr]true.
Infinite Traces An infinite sequence of events u = 〈u0, u1, ...〉 is an infinite trace of M
if there is an infinite sequence of predicates Pi such that ¬[init](¬P0) (i.e. some
execution of init reaches a state where P0 holds), and Pi⇒¬[ui](¬Pi+1) for each
i (i.e. if Pi holds then some execution of ui can reach a state where Pi+1 holds).
infinites(M) = {u | ∃〈Pi〉i∈N ·¬[init](¬P0) ∧ ∀i·Pi⇒¬[ui](¬Pi+1) (1.18)
Moreover, the failures semantics of machine M can also be defined.
Failures A failure is a pair comprising a trace and a refusal; a refusal is a set of actions.
Let R be a refusal. The behaviour (tr, R) is observed whenever the process first
engages in all the actions in tr and then may refuse any action in R. The failures
tr : A∗;R : A of the action system (A, init) are those for which
failures(M) = {tr | ¬[init; tr]gd(R)} (1.19)
is true initially, where A∗ is a set of sequences with elements in A and gd(R) is the
disjunction of the guards of the actions in R. Thus R can be refused if init then
tr can reach a state in which no guard of any action in R is true [129].
Like some other formal notations, Event-B has tool support. The tool is called Rodin
and it is briefly described below.
1.5.7 Rodin Platform
The Rodin platform [151] is the result of an EU research project1. It is a software tool,
based on modern software programming tools developed to use Event-B notation [49, 13].
DEPLOY2 is a continuation of this project and addresses scaling methodologies in re-
quirements validation, requirements evolution, reuse, resilience, and scaling tooling in
simulation, analysis and verification of formal models. Rodin was created to help the
development of specifications based on the idea that a large complex or critical project
should be started by modelling and reasoning about the specification. Moreover, formal
reasoning is achieved through the generation of proof obligations. The (ambitious) pur-
pose is to give more options to the industry when using formal methods and decrease
the criticism that affects the formal methods [6]. Rodin strives to be a high usabil-
ity tool showing that modelling does not have to be cumbersome nor hard to achieve.
1RODIN - Rigorous Open Development Environment for Open Systems: EU IST Project IST-511599
2DEPLOY - Industrial deployment of system engineering methods providing high dependability and
productivity (2008 - 2011): FP VII Project 214158 under Strategic Objective IST-2007.1.2. Further
information and downloadable tools are available at http://www.deploy-project.eu/
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Besides formally validating the specifications according to some user defined proper-
ties (invariants), the main idea is to increase the understanding of the system that is
being modelled. Therefore discharging the proof obligations correspond to the formal
validation that the created system matches the requirements [49].
Rodin is an open source tool, based on the Eclipse Platform [66] and a complement
for a rigorous modelling development [49]. The intention is to allow the tool to be
customised according to the industry requirements by permitting the integration of
functionalities considered necessary. Rodin supports a Static Checker that validates
model properties. A Proof Generator is used to generate proofs obligations and these
proofs can be discharged by an Automatic Prover (which is a theorem prover that
discharges automatically as many proofs as possible as seen in Fig. 1.7). Proofs that are
not automatically discharged have to be proved interactively. Another Rodin feature
is the high level of extensibility reflected by, for instance, the ability to extend the
default theorem prover (B4free provers provided by ClearSy [21]), model checking (ProB
provided by University of Du¨sserdorf [141]) or even animate models (Brama provided by
ClearSy [39] and ProB). Applying the UML framework using Event-B, it is also another
approach developed using plug-in technology, where the concept of object oriented and
classes are introduced and “merged” with Event-B notation [182, 170, 169, 171]. Figure
1.8 shows a screenshot of the user interface for Rodin Platform.
Figure 1.7: The Proof Obligation Perspective: on the left, it is shown the proof tree
of the selected PO; on the middle, on the top window are the hypotheses of the selected
PO and just below the respective goal. Below the goal window are the buttons used
to interactively discharge a PO; on the right, are the list of generated POs. Having all
the POs green, it means that all the POs are discharged.
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Figure 1.8: The Event-B Perspective: on the left, the list of projects where the last
one is expanded, showing several machines and a context; in the middle window, a view
of a machine cm1 where the sections of variables, invariants and events are expanded
and can be edited.
Next we cover the background of some of our contributions: composition and decompo-
sition.
1.6 Composition
Composition has several definitions depending on the context. In a computer science
context, (functional) composition can be defined as the act or mechanism of combining
simple functions to build more complicated ones. It derives from a usual mathematical
step of composing functions where the result of each function is passed as the argu-
ment of the next, and the result of the last one is the result of the whole. Engineering
suggests another perspective of composition: ability to interact with sub-components.
It is possible to represent concurrently-executing systems. In the formal methods con-
text, in particular specifications, composition is the capacity to model the interaction
of sub-components generating larger and more concrete specifications. Several formal
methods define the interaction of specifications based on shared state or shared events
(operations) [53]. Another possibility is a combination of the previous two approaches
(sometimes called fusion composition [25]). The next sub-sections describe these differ-
ent kind of interactions in different formal methodologies.
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1.6.1 Shared State Composition
Shared state composition allows the interaction of sub-components by state sharing.
Because variables usually define the state of a system, this composition is also known
as shared variable. Back [23] using Action Systems applies the interaction of sub-
components through external variables sharing. In that work, local variables are kept
distinct and the global variables are shared among the processes in the parallel com-
position. Composing action systems P = (v, PAi, PA, ) and Q = (w,QBi, QB) can be
represented as follows:
P ‖ Q =̂ ((v, w), PAi ∪QBi, PA ∪QB)
The set of variables v and w are merged and the actions of both action systems (PAi and
QBi for the initialisation plus PA and QB) are executed in parallel. The actions of P ‖ Q
are the union of both sets of actions and the interaction occurs when global variables
are shared. Furthermore, under certain conditions parallel composition is considered
monotonic w.r.t. data refinement [24]. If P ′ is a refinement of P , then P ′ ‖ Q is a
refinement of P ‖ Q under a condition R (abstraction relation) as long as the interleaved
execution of actions from Q preserves R.
Abadi and Lamport in [1] propose a shared variable composition as a conjunction of
properties. Composition of systems means interaction within their environments and a
system behaves properly only if its environment does. A system guarantees the prop-
erties M and L only under the environment assumption E. This can be described as
E⇒M ∩ L, where M and L are the safety and liveness properties of the system respec-
tively.
There are some approaches for the development of composition using VDM [111, 77, 101].
One of the approaches is based on rely/guarantee conditions [104] where two state pred-
icates are added as pre and postconditions of a specification, allowing interference be-
tween systems. This extension of VDM developed by Jones [103] permits the specifica-
tion and development of concurrent shared-variable systems [187]. In this approach, a
specification can then be described as:
(P,R,G,Q)
where P corresponds to the precondition and is a condition describing a set of states,
while R,G,Q are rely-condition, guarantee-condition and postcondition respectively.
The last three are conditions of state-transitions (predicates of two states: before and
after state). A rely-condition states the postcondition that the rest of the system may
achieve for any atomic step. Similarly, the guarantee-condition is the postcondition for
any atomic step made by the operation itself [187]. The guarantee condition of parallel
Chapter 1 Introduction 37
processes should imply the guarantee condition of the overall operation. [183] describes
further work for composition using VDM combining ideas in concurrent separation logic
and the rely/guarantee formalism. Assume-guarantee [81] is a similar style to rely-
guarantee.
The B-Method includes a syntax for composition. There are some keywords that can be
used to compose models like Includes, Imports, Sees and Uses. [158] describes the use
of such keywords and restrictions. When a machine has a number of included machines
(using the Includes keyword), several operations from different machines can be called
in parallel. Combining operations results in the conjunction of the preconditions and
the body of the parallel combination will be the parallel combination of all the bodies.
This can be expressed as follows:
PRE P1 THEN S1 END ‖ PRE P2 THEN S2 END
= PRE P1 ∧ P2 THEN S1 ‖ S2 END
where P1, P2 are preconditions and S1, S2 are operation statements. The preconditions
are conjoined and the postconditions are called in parallel. Potet and Rouzaud [140] use
some of these keywords to prove the correctness of composed specifications under certain
restrictions. Blazy et al [33] use classical B to define specification patterns to be used
as reuse mechanisms. One of the reuse mechanisms is composition where two patterns
can be associated using the keyword Extends and proof obligations are generated when
necessary for each kind of composition: juxtaposition (patterns are composed without
defining any link between them), composition with inter-pattern links (relations between
variables of the composed patterns can be added) and unification (some variables of the
composed patterns can be merged and shared).
More recently, Abrial et al [124, 15] proposed a state-based decomposition for Event-B
where the splitting of a system in sub-components (machines) is achieved using vari-
ables. In this case, decomposition is considered the inverse operation of composition
and one can go from one to another and vice-versa. Figure 1.9 shows the decomposition
of machine M(Fig. 1.9(a)) into machines M1(Fig. 1.9(b)) and M2(Fig. 1.9(c)). In a
shared variable decomposition, just like the name suggests, variables can be shared as
a consequence of the events’ decomposition. Therefore, the events evt1 and evt2 from
machine M are allocated to machine M1 and the rest of the events (evt3 and evt4) are
allocated to machine M2. Variable v2 (Fig. 1.9(a)) is shared by events evt2 and evt3
that belong to different sub-components after decomposition (Figs. 1.9(b) and 1.9(c)
respectively). Therefore v2 is considered a shared variable. In addition to the events
allocated to each sub-component, it is necessary to introduce additional external events
to each sub-component, to simulate how the shared variable is handled in the other sub-
component. An external event is created based on the original event but only referring
to shared variables. They have to be refined by the original events [15]. Other variables
become parameters in that same event. evt3 ext is added to machine M1 and evt2 ext
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is added to machine M2, respectively. Sub-components M1 and M2 can be refined
independently but shared variables must always be present and cannot be data-refined.
The re-composition of the (refined) sub-components should always be possible (although
not necessary) resulting in a refinement of the original system [124].
(a)
(b) (c)
Figure 1.9: Shared Variable Decomposition of Machine S in Machines T and W with
shared variable v2
While studying the several approaches for the composition of systems, we realised that
there is a strong similarity between the rely/guarantee approach proposed by Jones
and the shared variable decomposition for Event-B proposed by Abrial. The constraint
originated by the shared variables and external events corresponds to the rely condition
while the internal events correspond to the guarantee conditions as depicted in Fig. 1.10.
Figure 1.10: Shared Variable Decomposition Result
From M1 viewpoint (similar for M2), evt3 ext is the rely condition that modifications
in the state in event evt3 are preserved in M1 and consequently evt2 is guaranteed to
behave as the original one. Thus it is possible to make a correlation between these two
approaches. Further study is required to use the developed worked on rely/guarantee
for VDM in the shared variable decomposition for Event-B and we intend to do it in the
future.
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1.6.2 Shared Event Composition
The shared event approach is suitable for the development of distributed systems [42]:
sub-components interact through synchronised events in parallel. Even for formal no-
tation where the models have an explicit state space, the communication occurs at
the event/operation level. CSP is an event-based methodology used for modelling dis-
tributed systems. Because of CSP’s stateless approach, several works try to combine
state-based and event-based approaches, as are the examples of combining CSP and
B [43, 50, 181] or combining CSP with object oriented classes [75, 131]. The parallel
composition of two processes P and Q is expressed as P ‖ Q. Events for process P are
represented by their alphabet αP (similar to Q). The interaction happens by synchro-
nising common events in αP ∩αQ, while events not in αP ∩αQ can occur independently.
An example of a synchronisation between events is represented as follows [53]:
(a →P ) ‖ (a→Q) = a →(P ‖ Q)
Events common to P and Q become single events in P ‖ Q. In CSP there exists a special
class of events known as communication which is an event described by a pair c.v: c is
the name of the channel on which the communication occurs and v is the value of the
message to be communicated. A process ready to input (receives) any value x on the
channel c, and then behave like Q can be described as: c?x →Qx. Similarly a process
that outputs (sends) a value v on the channel c and then behaves like P can be defined
as: c!v →P [153]. Channels can be considered members of the alphabet of the process
and used for communication in only one direction and between two processes [92]. If
two processes P and Q are composed in parallel and both have a common channel
c, interaction happens whenever both processes are ready to engage in the common
channel. If P is ready for c!v and process Q is ready for c?x, v can be passed from P to
Q [41]:
(c!v →P ) ‖ (c?x →Qx) = c!v →(P ‖ Qv)
As expected the result is an output channel and the process Q receives the value v. This
can also be applied for channels with input-input behaviour. The laws that govern the
behaviour of P ‖ Q are simple and regular. Some of these laws are described below
although there are more properties defined in [92]:
• Commutativity: P ‖ Q = Q ‖ P , there is a logical symmetry between a process
and its environment.
• Associativity: (P ‖ Q) ‖ R = P ‖ (Q ‖ R), so when three processes are assembled,
it does not matter in which order they are put together.
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• Monotonicity: If P v P ′ then P ‖ Q v P ′ ‖ Q′, for any Q. Components that are
part of the parallel operation can be refined independently while preserving the
parallel relationship.
In Z, it is possible to create big schemas based on small ones. That can be seen as compo-
sition, where specifications are reused, creating more complex systems. Since Z permits
the refinement of specifications, composition and refinement can be applied at the same
time to a model. [173] describes how the combination of schemas can be achieved, as-
suming that overloading - possibility that two distinct variables in the same scope might
have identical names - is forbidden. The piping operator () is used to describe op-
erations that have almost independent effects on two disjoint sets of state variables. If
we compose the schemas Op1 and Op2 using the piping operator: Op1  Op2, the
output parameters of Op1 are matched with the inputs of Op2 and hidden, while the
other components are merged as they would be in Op1∧Op2. Another approach for the
composition is through the use of views [34, 99]. A view is a partial specification of the
entire system and can be evaluated directly from the requirements. Partial means that
unnecessary details of the system’s behaviour tackled by other views should be omit-
ted. An advantage of views is that they can be constructed and analysed independently
of other views. The interaction between views uses the schema calculus and standard
logic operators. Views can be connected by an invariant relating their state (state-based
approach), or connected by synchronising their operations (event-based approach) or
a mix of both. [34] discusses a similar approach using views, but the composition is
through coupling schemas (relation between different state spaces). By relating several
state schemas and respecting some properties, it is described how the composition can
be achieved based on three techniques: data refinement, view composition and viewpoint
unification. Circus (that combines Z and CSP) programs are sequences of paragraphs:
channel declarations, channel set definitions, Z paragraphs, or process definitions. A
system is defined as a process that encapsulates some state and communicates through
channels. The generic channel declaration channel[T ]c : T declares a family of channels
c and [T ] determines the type of the values that are communicated through channel c.
An action can be a schema, a guarded command, an invocation of another action, or a
combination of these constructs using CSP operators. The CSP operators of sequence,
external and internal choice, parallelism, interleaving, their corresponding iterated op-
erators, and hiding can be used to compose actions [54, 155]. The prefixing operator
is standard, but a guard construction may be associated with it. For instance, given
a Z predicate p , if the condition p is true , the action p & c?x→ A inputs a value
through channel c and assigns it to the variable x , and then behaves like A, which has
the variable x in scope. If, however, the condition p is false , the same action blocks.
Such enabling conditions like p may be associated with any action. The CSP operators
of sequence, external and internal choice, parallelism, interleaving, their corresponding
iterated operators, and hiding may also be used to compose actions.
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Butler [45] proposes a shared event composition for Event-B inspired by CSP and Action
Systems with event sharing as seen in Fig. 1.11. In this kind of composition, machines
with independent state spaces (variable sharing is not permitted) can be composed by
sharing events. Since it is based on CSP synchronisation, this composition also inher-
its the CSP properties for the channel communication described above. As aforemen-
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Figure 1.11: Shared Event Composition of machines M1 and M2 into M with com-
position of events e2 and e3
tioned in Sect. 1.5.5, Action Systems and Event-B are related. Based on that relation,
Butler [42, 45] defined the relation between the parallel composition of actions (includ-
ing composition with Value-Passing) in Action Systems and the B operations/Event-B
events. This definition is described by Definition 1.2 as described below. In Fig. 1.11,
machine M1 has events e1 and e2 and variable v1. Machine M2 has events e3, e4 and
e5 and variables v2 and v3. These two machines can be composed originating machine
M. In particular, events e2 and e3 can be composed. Moreover, in case both events
have a common parameter p, this can be used for message passing between machines
M1 and M2. The composition of synchronised Action Systems actions ( using Event-B
syntax for actions) generates a new action whose guard is the conjunction of the original
guards and the actions are executed in parallel [42]:
Definition 1.2. If both events evt1 and evt2 have a parameter p:
evt1 =̂ ANY p?, x WHERE p? ∈ C ∧G(p?, x,m) THEN S(p?, x,m) END
evt2 =̂ ANY p!, y WHERE H(p!, y, n) THEN T (p!, y, n) END
then:
evt1 ‖ evt2 =̂
ANY p!, x, y WHERE p! ∈ C ∧G(p!, x,m) ∧ H(p!, y, n)
THEN S(p!, x,m) ‖ T (p!, y, n) END
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where x, y, p are sets of parameters from each of the actions evt1 and evt2. Action evt1
has p? as an input parameter and evt2 has p! as an output parameter and the resulting
composition is p! itself an output parameter (like in CSP). This property can be used to
model value-passing systems: the parameter p! is written in evt2 and its value is used as
input for parameter p? to be used in G(p?, x,m) and S(p?, x,m). An interpretation of
this composition is that the value p is sent from evt2 and received in evt1. The fusion of
parameters in only possible if the types of the shared parameter match or are a subset
of each other:
p! ∈ C ∧ p? ∈ D⇒ C ∩ D 6= ∅ (1.20)
where C and D are types (carrier sets). Actions with shared parameters of type input
can also be composed and the shared parameter has input behaviour. Actions with
shared parameters of type output cannot be composed since this could lead to a deadlock
state [42].
A relation between the infinite-traces semantics of CSP and Action Systems is defined in
Definition 1.1. Based on that definition, the event-based parallel composition of action
systems can be shown to correspond to the CSP parallel-composition of processes as
described by Theorem 1.1 and proved in [53]: the infinite-traces semantic of syntactic
parallel composition of actions is equal to the infinite-traces semantic composition of
individual actions.
Theorem 1.1 (see [53, Theorem 5.17]). Let {[M ]} represent the infinite-traces semantics
of action system M ( similar for {[N ]} and action system N). Then the infinite-traces
semantics of CSP can be applied to Action Systems according to Definition 1.1: the
infinite-traces semantics of action system M in parallel with N , M ‖ N is given as 3:
{[M ‖ N ]} = {[M ]} ‖ {[N ]} (1.21)
In order to give a CSP semantics to Event-B we simply treat an Event-B machine as
an action system. Doing this just requires treating an Event-B event as a predicate
transformer as shown previously in Section 1.5.5. Therefore with respect to infinite-
traces semantics, the parallel composition of action systems corresponds to the parallel
composition of Event-B events. Moreover the properties of the parallel composition
of action systems are also inherited in the parallel composition of machines. The most
relevants are commutativity along with monotonicity : if M and N are Event-B machines
and M v M ′ then M ‖ N v M ′ ‖ N , for any N . Therefore machines M and N can
be refined independently while the properties of the parallel composition M ‖ N are
still preserved. This is one of the most important and powerful properties that shared
event composition in Event-B inherits from Action Systems and CSP. The monotonicity
property for the shared event composition in Event-B is proved by means of proof
3This theorem is shown and proved in [53], theorem 5.17 on page 67.
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obligations in Sect. 2.3.4.
1.6.3 Fusion Composition
Fusion composition is another kind of composition which can be seen as a combination
of the previous two approaches. Back and Butler [25] extend the notion of a product
operator for refinement calculus of Back [22]. The fusion operator is introduced as a
generalisation of the product operator preserving the monotonicity and conjunctivity
properties. The fusion operator can be used to conjoin two specifications into a larger
specification that refines both specifications within their combined termination condi-
tion. As a result the non-determinism is reduced on the termination behaviour of both
specifications. Poppleton [138] follows the previous work by proposing a composition
using the fusion operator as a way to reuse existing models for Event-B. A proposal for
development of feature oriented specifications [139, 70] uses the fusion operator. Con-
sider machines M1 and M2 in Fig. 1.12 which are fused by combining variables and
events, generating machine M. Machine M1 has a set of variables v (variables x are
assigned in the event e and variables y are kept unchanged), a context defined by carrier
sets s, constant c, axioms A1 and invariant I1. Similarly, machine M2 has variables z
(divided in a and b) and same context properties except the axioms A2 and invariant I2.
The union of the variables of each model corresponds to the set of variables of machine
M . The common events (we consider that events e and f are common) are composed
similarly to shared event composition described in Sect. 1.6.2.
Machine M1
v = x ∪ y / ∗ variables ∗ /
s, c, A1(s, c) / ∗ context ∗ /
I1(s, c, v) / ∗ invariant ∗ /
event : e =̂
ANY p1 WHERE G1(p1, v)
THEN x := S1(p1, v) END
(a)
Machine M2
z = a ∪ b / ∗ variables ∗ /
s, c, A2(s, c) / ∗ context ∗ /
I2(s, c, z) / ∗ invariant ∗ /
event : f =̂
ANY p2 WHERE G2(p2, z)
THEN a := S2(p1, z) END
(b)
Machine M
v, z = x ∪ y ∪ a ∪ b / ∗ variables ∗ /
s, c, A1(s, c) ∧A2(s, c) / ∗ context ∗ /
I1(s, c, v) ∧ I2(s, c, z) / ∗ invariant ∗ /
event : e f =̂
ANY p1, p2 WHERE G1(p1, v) ∧G2(p2, z)
THEN x := S1(p1, v) ‖ a := S2(p1, z) END
(c)
Figure 1.12: Fusion Composition of machines M1 and M2 into machine M
Event fusion preserves the refinement properties of the model [138] and as a requirement,
shared variables should be refined in the same functional manner in both machines.
Decomposition, that can be seen as the inverse operation of composition, is briefly
discussed in the next section.
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1.7 Decomposition
The development of specifications in a “top-down” style starts with an abstract model of
the envisaged system. Throughout refinements the initial model becomes less abstract
and more concrete, closer to an implementation. As a consequence, there is a better view
of the system as a whole and design decisions can be taken. Nonetheless refinements of
a system bring complexity and tractability problems when the model augments in a way
that becomes cumbersome to manage [124]. Decomposition is precisely the process by
which a single model can be split into various sub-components in a systematic fashion.
The complexity of the whole model is decreased by studying, and thus refining, each
sub-component independently of the others [124]. The independent sub-components
can be developed in parallel which is attractive in an industrial environment. As a
result of the attractive benefits of decomposition, it is a topic of interest that has been
explored in several areas like mathematics, in different areas of engineering and also
in different formal methodologies. There is a strong relation between composition and
decomposition: they can be seen as the inverse operation of each other. Therefore the
related work is very often interleaved as we present below.
Abadi and Lamport [2] suggest a decomposition of concurrent systems (interleaving
and non-interleaving representation) in the style of “composition is conjunction” using
TLA [108]. The goal is to facilitate the decomposition of complete systems and respective
proofs by reasoning about the sub-components when the environment conditions are
safety properties.
Moore [127] suggests a decomposition of system requirements and respective proofs us-
ing the CSP Trace Model. The method emphasizes the decomposition of high-level
requirements and reasons about the safety of non-divergent processes. The only way a
process can communicate with another process executing concurrently is through CSP-
like communication channels; no shared variables are permitted. The method proceeds
iteratively, until the appropriate requirements for the component processes and the min-
imal set of synchronization requirements are found.
Jian [101] uses a combination of data reification and operation decomposition in VDM
(DD-VDM) to reason about data decomposition. Data decomposition is based on the
ideas of model splitting, modularisation and operation decomposition. The operations
in the sub-models are viewed as the operations working on the whole model and rules
are added in DD-VDM concerning the interaction of several sub-models. [102] is the
continuation of that work by developing parallel object-oriented programs in the VDM
framework.
Butler [40] suggests a decomposition approach for Action Systems with value-passing,
internal actions and parallel composition as described in Sect. 1.6.2. As a continuation
of that approach, Butler and Walde´n [52] combine Action Systems and classical B to
Chapter 1 Introduction 45
derive parallel and distributed systems.
Two methods have been identified for the Event-B decomposition: shared variable
(Fig. 1.9) and shared event (Fig. 1.13). The shared event decomposition can be seen as
the inverse operation of the shared event composition described in Sect. 1.6.2. In this
case, the decomposition requires the definition of which variables are allocated to which
sub-component (in Fig. 1.13, v1 is allocated to machine M1 and variables v2, v3 are
allocated to machine M2). Event evt2 is shared since uses variables v1 and v2 allocated
to different sub-components. During the decomposition, evt2 is decomposed into evt2′
(containing only guards and actions related to v1) and evt2′′ (containing only guards
and actions related to v2). We follow the shared event decomposition approach and in a
pragmatic way, we aim to study and specify a decomposition tool. Because shared-event
decomposition is monotonic [45], the generated sub-components can be further refined
independently. So M1 and M2 can be refined independently into M11, M12. . . and
M21, M22. . . respectively . Therefore we can introduce team development: several de-
velopers share parts of the same model and can work independently in parallel (we show
this option is our case study in Chapter 6). Besides alleviating problems when dealing
with complex specifications, decomposition also partition the proof obligations which are
expected to be easier to be discharged in the sub-components. Next we discuss in more
detail the shared event decomposition before introducing our contribution in Chapter 4.
1.7.1 Shared Event Decomposition
In Event-B, decomposition of a component (specification) corresponds to distributing
events and variables among the sub-components. Shared event decomposition does not
permit variable sharing and an event can be split into different sub-components as seen
in Fig. 1.13. The sub-components can be further refined independently according to the
monotonicity property of decomposition [45].
(a)
(b) (c)
Figure 1.13: Shared event decomposition of machine M into machines M1 and M2
with shared event evt2
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The decomposition can be seen as syntactic and semantic: syntactic because the sub-
components are a consequence of the syntactic partition of the component ; semantic in
the sense that the sub-components can lose some information (invariants that relate sub-
components) but the behaviour of the recomposed sub-components is the same as the
non-decomposed component (i.e. the recomposition is a valid refinement of the abstract
component).
Figure 1.14 shows the decomposition of machines M1 into M3 0 and M4 0. M3 0 and
M4 0 are refined independently until M3 m and M4 n are reached. It should be possible
to recompose M3 m and M4 n into cM2 and proved that cM2 is a refinement of M1.
This is equivalent to express the monotonicity property of decomposition as:
M1 v (M3 0 ‖M4 0) v (M3 m ‖M4 n)
The shared event parallel composition of M3 0 and M4 0 refines M1. Also the par-
allel composition of the individual refinements of M3 0 and M4 0 (M3 m and M4 n
respectively) are a refinement of the M1.
Figure 1.14: Decomposition, Recomposition and Refinement
Consider machine M in Fig. 1.15(a) containing variables v, z and events evt1, evt2 and
evt3. Each event has a parameter pi, guards Gij and assignments to variables using
predicates Sij , where i and j are indexes corresponding to events elements. Machine M
is decomposed into machines M1 and M2 as seen in Fig. 1.15. Variable v is allocated to
machine M1 and variable z is allocated to machine M2 meaning that event evt1 (that
only depends on that variable) is part of M1 and event evt2 (only dependent on z) is
part of M2. Event evt3 uses both variables so the event is split in two parts: guards
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MACHINE M
VARIABLES v, z
EVENT evt1 =̂
ANY p1 WHERE
G1(v, p1)
THEN
v := S1(v, p1)
END
EVENT evt2 =̂
ANY p2 WHERE
G2(z, p2)
THEN
z := S2(z, p2)
END
EVENT evt3 =̂
ANY p3 WHERE
G31(v, p3)
G32(z, p3)
THEN
v := S31(v, p3)
z := S32(z, p3)
END
(a) Machine M
MACHINE M1
VARIABLES v
EVENT evt1 =̂
ANY p1 WHERE
G1(v, p1)
THEN
v := S1(v, p1)
END
EVENT evt3 =̂
ANY p3 WHERE
G31(v, p3)
THEN
v := S31(v, p3)
END
(b) Machine M1
MACHINE M2
VARIABLES z
EVENT evt2 =̂
ANY p2 WHERE
G2(z, p2)
THEN
z := Sz(z, p2)
END
EVENT evt3 =̂
ANY p3 WHERE
G32(z, p3)
THEN
z := S32(z, p3)
END
(c) Machine M2
Figure 1.15: Machines M1 and M2 resulting from the shared event decomposition of
machine M
and actions related with variable v are decomposed into machine M1 and guards and
actions related to variable z are stored in machine M2.
Event evt3 from machine M has a parameter p3. During the decomposition p3 is shared
between the sub-events and allows the interaction between the sub-components M1 and
M2. This correspond to modelling value-passing systems as described in [40, 41] for
Action Systems or in [42] for B and in [45] for Event-B.
1.7.2 Shared Variable Decomposition
In Event-B, the shared variable decomposition allows variable sharing and external
events are introduced in the sub-components to ensure that the behaviour of the shared
variables is maintained in all sub-components. Such approach is suitable for designing
parallel algorithms [42] (an example can be found in [90]). The re-composition of the
(refined) sub-components should always be possible resulting in a refinement of the orig-
inal system. Therefore what was described in Fig. 1.14 can also be applied to the shared
variable decomposition and it is proved in [8].
Consider again machine M in Fig. 1.16(a) containing variables v, z and events evt1,
evt2 and evt3. Machine M is shared variable decomposed into machines M1 and M2.
Event evt1 is allocated to machine M1 and events evt2, evt3 are allocated to machine
M2. Consequently variable v is shared. Event evt3 ext must be added to machine M1
to ensure that the behaviour of (shared) variable v in the machine M is preserved in
that sub-component. Similarly, in machine M2, event evt1 ext is added to simulate
the behaviour of v from the machine M2. Machines M1 and M2 can be further refined
48 Chapter 1 Introduction
MACHINE M
VARIABLES v, z
EVENT evt1 =̂
ANY p1 WHERE
G1(v, p1)
THEN
v := S1(v, p1)
END
EVENT evt2 =̂
ANY p2 WHERE
G2(z, p2)
THEN
z := S2(z, p2)
END
EVENT evt3 =̂
ANY p3 WHERE
G31(v, p3)
G32(z, p3)
THEN
v := S31(v, p3)
z := S32(z, p3)
END
(a) Machine M
MACHINE M1
VARIABLES v /*shared var*/
EVENT evt1 =̂
ANY p1 WHERE
G1(v, p)
THEN
v := S1(v, p)
END
EVENT evt3 ext =̂
ANY p3 WHERE
G31(v, p3)
THEN
v := S3(v, p3)
END
(b) Machine M1
MACHINE M2
VARIABLES z
v /*shared var*/
EVENT evt1 ext =̂
ANY p1 WHERE
G1(v, p1)
THEN
v := S1(v, p1)
EVENT evt2 =̂
ANY p2 WHERE
G2(z, p2)
THEN
z := S2(z, p2)
END
EVENT evt3 =̂
ANY p3 WHERE
G31(v, p3)
G32(z, p3)
THEN
v := S31(v, p3)
z := S32(z, p3)
END
(c) Machine M2
Figure 1.16: Machines M1 and M2 resulting from the shared variable decomposition
of machine M
independently as long as the external events and shared variables are present. Moreover,
the shared variables and the external events cannot be refined.
The following chapters describe our work applied to three reuse mechanisms: composi-
tion, generic instantiation and decomposition. Each chapter contains a small case study
applying the respective mechanism. A more complex case study is presented in the end
to illustrate the use of the reuse mechanisms when developing models.
Chapter 2
Shared Event Composition for
Event-B
The development of a system can start with the creation of a specification. Following
this viewpoint, we claim that often a specification can be constructed from the combi-
nation of specifications. The combination of specifications can be seen as composition.
Event-B is a formal method that allows modelling and refinement of systems. The com-
bination, reuse and validation of component specifications is not currently supported
in Event-B. We extend the Event-B formalism using shared event composition as an
option for developing distributed systems. Refinement is used in the development of
specifications using composed machines and we prove that properties and proof obliga-
tions of specifications can be reused to ensure valid composed specifications. The main
contribution of this work is the Event-B extension to support shared event composition
including the definition of static checks and proof obligations (POs) for a composed
machine. Composition and refinement are coupled to gradually develop a model in a
stepwise manner. Moreover, composition is the preliminary work towards decomposition
(described in Chapter 4) as it defines a methodology for (de)composing specifications.
We explore the composition of specifications by defining properties and (reuse of) proof
obligations. These contributions are supported by a tool developed in the Rodin plat-
form (parallel composition plug-in [162]). This chapter is based on papers accepted for
the B workshop running in parallel with FM 2011 (International Symposium on Formal
Methods) [161] and in FMCO 2010 (International Symposia on Formal Methods for
Components and Objects) [164].
2.1 Introduction
In a “top-down” style, the initial model abstracts the most important behaviour and
state of the system. Systems can often be seen as a combination and interaction of sev-
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eral sub-specifications (hereafter called sub-components) where each sub-component has
its own functionality aspect. This view introduces modularity in the system: different
sub-components represent a particular functionality and changes in the sub-components
are accommodated more gracefully [99] in the system specification. We use composition
to structure specifications through the interaction of sub-components seen as indepen-
dent modules. This use of composition is not new in other formal notations: exam-
ples are [191, 106, 138] as described in Sect. 1.6. Here we express how we can (re)use
composition for building specifications in Event-B through sub-components (modules)
interaction, benefiting from their properties and proof obligations inspired by views in
Z [99]. The interesting part of composition involves the interaction of sub-components
which occurs by shared state, shared operations or a combination of both (for exam-
ple, fusion composition) as discussed in Chapter 1. Although sub-components usually
have states, in our approach we mainly focus on their (visible) operations similar to the
CSP view [129, 53]. Therefore we follow a shared event composition approach where
events/operations from different sub-components are synchronised in parallel. We con-
strain sub-components to have independent state spaces and consequently avoid dealing
with sub-components that have intersecting states like it happens in a shared state
approach [144, 145].
This chapter is structured as follows: Sect. 2.2 introduces the notion and properties for
shared event composition. The notion of composed machine, respective static checks,
proof obligations and the monotonicity property are introduced in Sect. 2.3. Section 2.4
illustrates the application of the shared event composition to a distributed system case
study: file transfer system. Related work is described in Sect. 2.5. Conclusions and
future work are drawn in Sect. 2.6.
2.2 Shared Event Approach
Sub-component specifications, that are part of a full system specification, deal with a
particular aspect of the system being modelled. Sub-component interaction must be
verified to comply with the desired behavioural semantic of the system. The interaction
usually occurs as a shared state, shared event or a combination of both as described in
Sect. 1.6. The kind of interaction usually depends on the characteristics of the specified
system. For instance, when specifying an automated teller machine (ATM) system, user
and cashMachine can have separate specifications. Both specifications can define vari-
ables to describe the used debit/credit cards for the transactions and the composition of
these two specifications can interact through shared variables: the variables representing
the cards. On the other hand, a shared event composition allows sub-components to
interact through synchronised events. The specification user can have an event that
defines the personal identification number (PIN) of the card: user defines PIN. cashMa-
chine can contain an event that changes the card PIN: change PIN card. Furthermore an
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additional sub-component serverBankValidation can have events defining when a bank
operation is enabled. One of these events can be validate user operation card. A shared
event composition of these specifications results in a new event user change PIN that
allows the introduction of a new PIN for a particular card when the conditions defined
in validate user operation card are enabled. Such event could be specified by composing
events user define PIN, change PIN card and validate user operation card.
Here we focus on the developments using shared event composition only, where com-
position is treated as the conjunction of individual elements’ properties: conjunction
of individual invariants, union of variables and synchronisation of events. Events when
synchronised are composed as described in Def. 1.2. Machine properties are merged by
the conjunction of invariants as seen in Def. 2.1.
Definition 2.1. Let machines M1 . . .Mm have variables v1 . . . vm respectively. Then
if machines M1 . . .Mm are composed in parallel, the invariant of the composed machine
M1 ‖ . . . ‖ Mm is given as:
I(M1 ‖ · · · ‖Mm) =̂ I1(s, c, v1) ∧ · · · ∧ Im(s, c, vm). (2.1)
When sub-components are composed it is desirable to define properties that relate the in-
dividual sub-components allowing interactions. These properties are expressed by adding
composition invariants ICM (s, c, v1, . . . , vm) to the composed machine constraining the
variables of all machines being composed. Therefore a more complete version of the
conjunction of invariants is described in Def. 2.2.
Definition 2.2. The invariant of the parallel composition of machines M1 to Mm with
variables v1 to vm respectively is the conjunction of the individual invariants (Def. 2.1)
and the composition invariant ICM (s, c, v1, . . . , vm):
I(M1 ‖ · · · ‖Mm) =̂ I1(s, c, v1) ∧ · · · ∧ Im(s, c, vm) ∧ ICM (s, c, v1, . . . , vm). (2.2)
In Fig. 1.11, composed machine M can have as invariant the conjunction of the individual
invariants as defined by Def. 2.2: I(M1 ‖ M2) =̂ IM1(s, c, v1) ∧ IM2(s, c, v2, v3) plus
possible composition invariant ICM (s, c, v1, v2, v3).
2.3 Composed Machines: Composition and Refinement
We define a new construct composed machine, representing the shared event composi-
tion of Event-B machines. We aim to have a construct that remains reactive to changes
in the sub-components in a way that has a minimal effect on the entire specification.
Consequently this representation of the composition is structural. The interaction of
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sub-components, following a “top-down” approach, can represent a refinement of an
existing abstraction. In that case, to formalise the composition, it is necessary to de-
fine composition POs plus refinement POs. In the following sections, we introduce the
structure of a composed machine, respective POs, prove the monotonicity property for
shared event composition and describe the required static checks.
2.3.1 Structure of Composed Machines
A shared event composed machine is expressed as the parallel conjunction of sub-
component properties. Composed machine CM defined by machines M1, . . . ,Mm can
be seen in Fig. 2.1. Machines are composed in parallel including their properties and
events: CM =̂ M1 ‖ · · · ‖Mm. Moreover:
• The composed machine variables are all the sub-component variables (v1 from M1,
v2 from M2, . . . , vm from Mm) and are state-space disjoint.
• The invariants of the composed machine are defined as Def. 2.2.
• The composed events are defined according to Def. 1.2.
COMPOSED MACHINE CM SEES Ctx
INCLUDES M1, . . . , Mm
VARIABLES v1, . . . , vm
INVARIANTS ICM (s, c, v1, v2, . . . , vm)
EVENTS
INITIALISATION =̂ M1.INITIALISATION ‖ . . .Mm.INITIALISATION
evt11 =̂ M1.evt11 ‖ . . .Mm.evtm1
. . .
evt1p =̂ M1.evt1p ‖ . . .Mm.evtm1 evt1p
END
Figure 2.1: Composed machine CM composing machines M1 to Mm seeing context
Ctx
ICM (s, c, v1, v2, . . . , vm) expresses the properties relating the states of sub-components.
When a composed machine is used as a combination of composition and refinement, it
refines an abstract model and just like in an ordinary machine, abstract events must be
refined. For instance, a composed machine CM refining abstract machine M0 can be
expressed as (M0 v CM) ≡ (M0 vM1 ‖ · · · ‖Mm). The next section discusses static
checks that are required in order to implement a tool for composition.
2.3.2 Static Checks
For the implementation of a tool for composition (Sect. 5.2), composed machines need
to be validated against some well-formedness conditions. The shared event composition
relies on these definitions:
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• The state space of the composed machine is defined as the composition of the
sub-components’ state space.
• The invariant of the composed machine is defined as the conjunction of the indi-
vidual invariants plus possible additional composition invariants.
• Sub-components can communicate via shared parameters during the parallel oc-
currence of events (composed events).
We distinguish between necessary technical conditions for the composition and method-
ological conditions (convenient and for simplicity). The technical conditions are as
follows:
• Sub-component variables cannot be shared.
• A composed event is defined by events of the different sub-components.
• The same event can be composed more than once. It corresponds to different
events’ synchronisations.
The methodological conditions are:
• A composed machine is defined by at least one sub-component.
• Composed machines refining an abstraction do not introduce new events. For
simplicity we restrict the introduction of new events during the composition since
adding new events before or after the composition has a similar outcome to adding
them during the composition.
• Variants are not required for composed machines. Only new events require variants
and they are not allowed, as justified in the previous point.
• A composed event is defined by at least one event.
• When the composed machine refines an abstraction, the rules and refinement POs
are applied similarly to standard machines.
These are the required conditions to build a valid composed machine. Next we present
the required POs to verify composed machines.
2.3.3 Proof Obligations
POs play an important role in Event-B developments. For simplicity we define POs in
terms of a composition of two machines M1(v1) and M2(v2) that refine machine M0(v0),
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but the rules generalise easily to the composition of n machines. Furthermore context
elements in the formulas (s, c, A(s, c)) are not considered. The same proof obligations
defined for standard machines (invariant preservation, well-definedness, refinement, etc)
are defined for composed machines. We simplify the composed machines POs by assum-
ing that the POs of the individual machines already hold. We just define the additional
POs necessary to ensure that the composed machine satisfies all the standard POs.
Therefore we consider that the POs of the machines to be composed (M1 and M2)
hold. The same applies for the abstract machine M0. Following the POs described
in Sect. 1.5.3 for standard machines, the respective composition POs are described as
follows.
2.3.3.1 Consistency
Consistency POs are required to be always verified. Consistency is expressed by the
feasibility and invariant preservation POs for each composed event. In the composed
machine, feasibility PO FISCM corresponds to the feasibility of all events from the
individual machines that are composed. To show the feasibility proof obligation for a
composed event, we compose event evt1 from machine M1 and event evt2 from machine
M2: evt1 ‖ evt2. The feasibility proof obligation for the composed event evt1 ‖ evt2 is
FISevt1‖evt2.
Theorem 2.1. Let FISevt1 and FISevt2 be the feasibility proof obligations for two dif-
ferent events evt1 and evt2 operating on disjoint variables v1 and v2 respectively. Then
FISevt1‖evt2 holds if both FISevt1 and FISevt2 also hold.
From (1.4):
FISevt1 : FISevt1H ` FISevt1G ≡ I1(v1) ∧G1(p1, v1) ` ∃v′1 ·(S1(p1, v1, v′1)) (2.3)
FISevt2 : FISevt2H ` FISevt2G ≡ I2(v2) ∧G2(p2, v2) ` ∃v′2 ·(S2(p2, v2, v′2)) (2.4)
FISevt1‖evt2 : FISevt1‖evt2H ` FISevt1‖evt2G ≡ (2.5)
ICM (v1, v2) ∧ I1(v1) ∧ I2(v2)
∧G1(p1, v1) ∧G2(p2, v2)
` ∃v′1, v′2 ·(S1(p1, v1, v′1) ∧ S2(p2, v2, v′2)).
Assume: FISevt1 and FISevt2.
Prove: FISevt1‖evt2.
Proof. Assume the hypotheses of FISevt1‖evt2 (FISevt1‖evt2H):
ICM (v1, v2)
I1(v1) ∧G1(p1, v1) (2.6)
I2(v2) ∧G2(p2, v2). (2.7)
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Prove:
∃v′1, v′2 ·(S1(p1, v1, v′1) ∧ S2(p2, v2, v′2)).
The proof proceeds as follows:
∃v′1, v′2 ·(S1(p1, v1, v′1) ∧ S2(p2, v2, v′2))
≡ ∃v′1 ·(S1(p1, v1, v′1))
∧ ∃v′2 ·(S2(p2, v2, v′2)) {disjoint v1 and v2}
⇐ (FISevt1G ∧ FISevt2G). {(2.3)+(2.6),(2.4)+(2.7)}
Another consistency PO is invariant preservation. In the composed machine, invariant
preservation PO INVCM corresponds to the invariant preservation in all events from
the individual machines that are composed. The invariant preservation proof obligation
for the composed event evt1 ‖ evt2 is INVevt1‖evt2. Note that i(v′) denotes the result of
the substitution of variable v by the corresponding before-after predicate v′ in invariant
i.
Theorem 2.2. Let INVevt1 and INVevt2 be the invariant preservation proof obligations
for two different events evt1 and evt2. Then for each individual predicate i1, i2 and iCM
from the set of invariants I in a composed machine, INVevt1‖evt2 holds if both INVevt1
and INVevt2 also hold plus the composition invariant ICM (v1, v2) holds.
From (1.3):
INVevt1 : INVevt1H ` INVevt1G ≡ I1(v1) ∧G1(p1, v1) ∧ S1(p1, v1, v′1) ` i1(v′1) (2.8)
INVevt2 : INVevt2H ` INVevt2G ≡ I2(v2) ∧G2(p2, v2) ∧ S2(p2, v2, v′2) ` i2(v′2) (2.9)
INVevt1‖evt2 : INVevt1‖evt2H ` INVevt1‖evt2G ≡ (2.10)
ICM (v1, v2) ∧ I1(v1) ∧ I2(v2)
∧G1(p1, v1) ∧G2(p2, v2)
∧ S1(p1, v1, v′1) ∧ S2(p2, v2, v′2)
` i1(v′1) ∧ i2(v′2) ∧ iCM (v′1, v′2).
Assume: INVevt1 and INVevt2.
Prove: INVevt1‖evt2.
Proof. Assume the hypotheses of INVevt1‖evt2:
ICM (v1, v2)
I1(v1) ∧G1(p1, v1) ∧ S1(p1, v1, v′1) (2.11)
I2(v2) ∧G2(p2, v2) ∧ S2(p2, v2, v′2) (2.12)
Prove:
i1(v
′
1) ∧ i2(v′2) ∧ iCM (v′1, v′2).
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The proof proceeds as follows:
i1(v
′
1) ∧ i2(v′2) ∧ iCM (v′1, v′2)
⇐ INVevt1G
∧ INVevt2G
∧ iCM (v′1, v′2). {(2.8)+(2.11),(2.9)+(2.12)}
In other words, composition invariants ICM (v1, v2) need to be verified but the invariant
POs of the individual machines hold without having to be re-verified.
Well-definedness POs are also applicable to the composed machines. Nevertheless in
practice, well-definedness POs are only generated for ICM (v1, v2). Other expressions
(guards, actions, etc) are verified in the individual machines [10].
2.3.3.2 Refinement
The refinement POs are only required when the composed machine refines an abstract
machine. Machine M0 with variables v0, invariant I0(v0) and abstract event evt0 is
refined by composed machine CM defined by abstract machines M1 with variables
w1, invariant I1(w1), event evt1, M2 (w2 ; I2(w2); evt2) and composition invariant
JCM (v0, w1, w2). The composed event evt1 ‖ evt2 refines the abstract event evt0. The
refinement PO for a composed machine REFCM results from the verification of the com-
position invariant preservation JCM (v
′
0, w
′
1, w
′
2), the verification of guard strengthening
for G0(p0, v0) and simulation S0(p0, v0, v
′
0) for each refined event.
Theorem 2.3. Let composed event evt1 ‖ evt2 refine abstract event evt0. Then the
refinement REF PO for evt1 ‖ evt2 consists in proving the guard strengthening of
abstract guards, proving the simulation of the abstract variables (v′0) and preserving the
gluing invariant (JCM (v
′
0, w
′
1, w
′
2)) in the composed machine.
From (1.5):
INVevt1 : I1(w1) ∧H1(q1, w1) ∧ T1(q1, w1, w′1) ` i1(w′1) (2.13)
INVevt2 : I2(w2) ∧H2(q2, w2) ∧ T2(q2, w2, w′2) ` i2(w′2) (2.14)
REFevt0v(evt1‖evt2) : I0(v0) ∧ I1(w1) ∧ I2(w2) ∧ JCM (v0, w1, w2)
∧H1(q1, w1) ∧H2(q2, w2)
∧ T1(q1, w1, w′1) ∧ T2(q2, w2, w′2)
` ∃v′0 ·G0(p0, v0) ∧ S0(p0, v0, v′0) ∧ i1(w′1) ∧ i2(w′2) ∧ JCM (v′0, w′1, w′2).
(2.15)
Assume: INVevt1 (2.13) and INVevt2 (2.14).
Prove: REFevt0v(evt1‖evt2).
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Proof. Assume the hypotheses of REFevt0v(evt1‖evt2):
I0(v0) ∧ JCM (v0, w1, w2)
I1(w1) ∧H1(q1, w1) ∧ T1(q1, w1, w′1)
I2(w2) ∧H2(q2, w2) ∧ T2(q2, w2, w′2)
Prove:
` ∃v′0 ·G0(p0, v0) ∧ S0(p0, v0, v′0) ∧ I1(w′1) ∧ I2(w′2) ∧ JCM (v′0, w′1, w′2).
The proof proceeds as follows:
∃v′0 ·G0(p0, v0) ∧ S0(p0, v0, v′0)
∧ I1(w′1) ∧ I2(w′2) ∧ JCM (v′0, w′1, w′2)
≡ G0(p0, v0) ∧ I1(w′1) ∧ I2(w′2)
∧ ∃v′0 ·(S0(p0, v0, v′0) ∧ JCM (v′0, w′1, w′2)) {∧ goal; v0, w′1, w′2 are free variables}
⇐ G0(p0, v0)
∧ ∃v′0 ·(S0(p0, v0, v′0) ∧ JCM (v′0, w′1, w′2)) {from (2.13) and (2.14)}
As mentioned in Sect. 1.5.3, the refinement POs can be slit into separated POs using wit-
nesses: guard strengthening, simulation and gluing invariant preservation. We separate
the above refinement proof into these three kind of proof obligations.
Guard Strengthening For each composed event evt1 ‖ evt2, the guard strengthening
PO GRDCM refers to the relation between the conjunction of the guards of the composed
event H1(q1, w1) ∧H2(q2, w2) and the guard of the abstract event evt0: G0(p0, v0).
For each abstract guard g0 from the set of guards G0 in an abstract machine, the GRD
PO for each event requires verification that the concrete guards H1(q1, w1)∧H2(q2, w2)
are stronger than the abstract ones G0(p0,v0).
From (1.8), the proof rule to be verified is:
GRDevt0v(evt1‖evt2) : I0(v0) ∧ I1(w1) ∧ I2(w2) ∧ JCM (v0, w1, w2)
∧H1(q1, w1) ∧H2(q2, w2)
∧W1(p0, w1, w2, q1, q2)
` g0(p0,v0).
Gluing Invariant Preservation For composed events, the gluing invariant preserva-
tion PO INVCM requires that all the gluing invariants are preserved for each composed
event (similar to the invariant preservation described in Sect. 2.3.3.1).
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Theorem 2.4. Let the invariant in the composed machine be I1(w1)∧I2(w2)∧JCM (v0, w1, w2).
Then for each composed event evt1 ‖ evt2, only each predicate from the set of gluing
invariants JCM (v0, w1, w2) needs to be verified if INVevt1 and INVevt2 hold.
From (1.7):
INVevt1‖evt2 : I0(v0) ∧ I1(w1) ∧ I2(w2) ∧ JCM (v0, w1, w2)
∧H1(q1, w1) ∧H2(q2, w2)
∧W2(v′0, w1, w2, q1, q2, w′1, w′2)
∧ T1(q1, w1, w′1) ∧ T2(q2, w2, w′2)
` i1(w′1) ∧ i2(w′2) ∧ jCM (v′0, w′1, w′2). (2.16)
Assume: INVevt1 (2.13) and INVevt2 (2.14).
Prove: INVevt1‖evt2.
The proof proceeds as follows:
i1(w
′
1) ∧ i2(w′2) ∧ jCM (v′0, w′1, w′2)
≡ jCM (v′0, w′1, w′2)) {from (2.13) and (2.14)}
Simulation To verify the simulation PO SIMCM , each action executed in a composed
event evt1 ‖ evt2 must not contradict the corresponding actions in the abstract event
evt0.
For a concrete composed event evt1 ‖ evt2 refining event evt0, the simulation PO re-
quires that each concrete action T1(q1, w1, w
′
1) ∧ T2(q2, w2, w′2) simulates the abstract
ones S0(p0, v0, v
′
0).
From (1.9), the proof rule that needs to be verified is:
SIMevt0v(evt1‖evt2) : I0(v0) ∧ I1(w1) ∧ I2(w2) ∧ JCM (v0, w1, w2)
∧H1(q1, w1) ∧H2(q2, w2)
∧W1(p0, w1, w2, q1, q2, w′1, w′2)
∧W2(v′0, w1, w2, q1, q2, w′1, w′2)
∧ T1(q1, w1, w′1) ∧ T2(q2, w2, w′2)
` S0(p0, v0, v′0).
These are the required POs to verify composed machines. Next we show that composed machines
are monotonic which allows further refinements of sub-components while preserving refinement
of the composition.
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2.3.4 Monotonicity of Shared Event Composition for Composed Ma-
chines
An important property of the shared event composition in Event-B is monotonicity. Here we
prove by means of refinement POs that the composition is monotonic confirming the result
described by Butler [53] using actions systems and CSP. Figure 2.2 shows abstract specification
M1 composed with other specification N1, creating a composed model M1 ‖ N1. M1 is refined
by M2 and N1 by N2 respectively:
• M1 is characterised by variables vM , invariants IM (vM ) and event evtM1.
• M2 is characterised by variables wM , gluing invariants JM (vM , wM ) and event evtM2.
• N1 is characterised by variables vN , invariants IN (vN ) and event evtN1.
• N2 is characterised by variables wN , gluing invariants JN (vN , wN ) and event evtN2.
Monotonicity allows us to say that CM1 is refined by CM2. In other words, once we compose
specifications M1 and N1, discharge the required composed POs, M1 and N1 can be refined
individually while the composition properties are preserved without the need to recompose re-
finements M2 and N2. We want to formally prove the monotonicity property through refinement
Figure 2.2: Refinement of composed machine CM1 =̂ M1 ‖ N1 by CM2 =̂ M2 ‖ N2
POs between composed machines (in Fig. 2.2 between CM1 and CM2). Therefore if the refine-
ment POs hold between CM1 and CM2, we can say that CM2 refines CM1: CM1 v CM2.
An event evtM1 in machine M1 is represented as:
evtM1 =̂ANY pM WHERE GM (pM , vM )THEN SM (pM , vM , v
′
M ) END.
An event evtM2 in machine M2 refining abstract event evtM1 is represented as:
evtM2 =̂ANY qM WHERE HM (qM , wM )THEN TM (qM , wM , w
′
M ) END.
The gluing invariant of the refinement between M1 and M2 is expressed as JM (vM , wM )
relating the states ofM1 andM2: M1 vJM M2. From (1.5) we can derive the refinement
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PO between M2 and M1 for the concrete event evtM2 refining abstract event evtM1.
REFevtM1vevtM2 : REFevtM1vevtM2H ` REFevtM1vevtM2G
≡ IM (vM ) ∧ JM (vM , wM )
∧GM (pM , vM ) ∧HM (qM , wM )
∧ SM (pM , vM , v′M ) ∧ TM (qM , wM , w′M )
` ∃v′M ·GM (pM , vM ) ∧ SM (pM , vM , v′M ) ∧ JM (v′M , w′M ). (2.17)
Similarly for machines N1 and N2, the gluing invariant is expressed as JN (vN , wN )
relating the states of N1 and N2: N1 vJN N2. Furthermore, the refinement PO for
concrete event evtN2 refining abstract event evtN1 is expressed as:
REFevtN1vevtN2 : REFevtN1vevtN2H ` REFevtN1vevtN2G
≡ IN (vN ) ∧ JN (vN , wN )
∧GN (pN , vN ) ∧HN (qN , wN )
∧ SN (pN , vN , v′N ) ∧ TN (qN , wN , w′N )
` ∃v′N ·GN (pN , vN ) ∧ SN (pN , vN , v′N ) ∧ JN (v′N , w′N ). (2.18)
We refine an abstract event in CM1 by a concrete one in CM2 and verify that the
refinement POs for each individual machine hold for the composition. Event evtM1
from machine M1 and event evtN1 from machine N1 are composed, resulting in the
abstract composed event evtM1 ‖ evtN1 in CM1 from Fig. 2.2. Such abstract composed
event is represented as:
evtM1 ‖ evtN1 =̂ANY pM , pN WHERE GM (pM , vM ) ∧GN (pN , vN )
THEN SM (pM , vM , v
′
M ) ‖ SN (pN , vN , v′N ) END.
A concrete composed event between M2 and N2 in CM2 (evtM2 ‖ evtN2), refining the
abstract event evtM1 ‖ evtN1, is represented as:
evtM2 ‖ evtN2 =̂ANY qM , qN WHERE HM (qM , wM ) ∧HN (qN , wN )
THEN TM (qM , wM , w
′
M ) ‖ TN (qN , wN , w′N ) END.
The gluing invariant relating the states of CM1 and CM2 is expressed as the conjunction
of the gluing invariants between M1/M2 and N1/N2:
JCM (vM , vN , wM , wN ) = JM (vM , wM ) ∧ JN (vN , wN ) (2.19)
Theorem 2.5. Let composed machine CM1 be defined by machines M1 and N1 and
composed event evtM1 ‖ evtN1. Then composed machine CM2 is a valid refinement of
CM1 if the refinement proof obligations between machines M2 and N2 and machines
M1 and N1 hold respectively for each concrete composed event evtM2 ‖ evtN2 that
refines abstract composed event evtM1 ‖ evtN1.
From (2.15), the refinement PO between concrete composed event evtM2 ‖ evtN2 and
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abstract composed event evtM1 ‖ evtN1 is:
REF(evtM1‖evtN1)v(evtM2‖evtN2) : IM (vM ) ∧ IN (vN ) ∧ JCM (vM , vN , wM , wN )
∧HM (qM , wM ) ∧HN (qN , wN )
∧ TM (qM , wM , w′M ) ∧ TN (qN , wN , w′N )
` ∃v′M , v′N ·GM (pM , vM ) ∧GN (pN , vN )
∧ SM (pM , vM , v′M ) ∧ SN (pN , vN , v′N ) ∧ JCM (v′M , v′N , w′M , w′N ).
Assume: REFevtM1vevtM2 and REFevtN1vevtN2 .
Prove: REF(evtM1‖evtN1)v(evtM2‖evtN2).
Proof. Assume the hypotheses of REF(evtM1‖evtN1)v(evtM2‖evtN2):
JCM (vM , vN , wM , wN ) ≡ JM (vM , wM ) ∧ JN (vN , wN ) {expanding JCM from (2.19)}
IM (vM ) ∧HM (qM , wM ) ∧ TM (qM , wM , w′M ) (2.20)
IN (vN ) ∧HN (qN , wN ) ∧ TN (qN , wN , w′N ) (2.21)
Prove:
∃v′M , v′N ·GM (pM , vM ) ∧GN (pN , vN ) ∧ SM (pM , vM , v′M ) ∧ SN (pN , vN , v′N )
∧ JCM (v′M , v′N , w′M , w′N ).
The proof proceeds as follows:
∃v′M , v′N ·GM (pM , vM ) ∧GN (pN , vN )
∧ SM (pM , vM , v′M ) ∧ SN (pN , vN , v′N )
∧ JCM (v′M , v′N , w′M , w′N )
≡ ∃v′M , v′N ·GM (pM , vM ) ∧GN (pN , vN )
∧ SM (pM , vM , v′M ) ∧ SN (pN , vN , v′N )
∧ JM (v′M , w′M ) ∧ JN (v′N , w′N ) {expanding JCM from (2.19)}
≡ ∃v′M ·GM (pM , vM ) ∧ SM (pM , vM , v′M ) ∧ JM (v′M , w′M )
∧ ∃v′N ·GN (pN , vN ) ∧ SN (pN , vN , v′N ) ∧ JN (v′N , w′N ) {disjoint v′M ,v′N}
⇐ REFevtM1vevtM2G
∧REFevtN1vevtN2G {(2.17)+(2.20),(2.18)+(2.21)}
The refinement POs for composed machines is expressed as the conjunction of the re-
finement POs for the individual machines. Therefore the monotonicity property holds
if the refinement POs of individual machines hold.
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2.3.4.1 Monotonicity of Non-Composed Events for Composed Machines
We also need to prove the monotonicity for non-composed events that appear at both
levels of abstraction. We shall prove it using machines M1 and CM2 as seen in Fig. 2.3
(similar for N1 and CM2).
Figure 2.3: Refinement of composed machine CM1 =̂ M1 by CM2 =̂ M2 ‖ N2
Theorem 2.6. Let an event evtM1 in machine M1 be refined by a composed event evtM2 ‖
evtN2 in composed machine CM2. Assuming that machine M1 is refined by machine
M2 and INVevtN2 holds, then the monotonicity is preserved and event M1 is refined by
the composed event M2 ‖ N2.
Assume: REFevtM1vevtM2 and INVevtN2 .
Prove: REFevtM1v(evtM2‖evtN2).
In this case, the gluing invariant described in (2.19) does not use neither the variables
(vN ) neither the invariants (IN ). Therefore it can be simplified and rewritten as:
JCM (vM , wM , wN ) = JM (vM , wM ) ∧ JN (wN ) (2.22)
From (2.15), the refinement PO between concrete composed event evtM2 ‖ evtN2 and
abstract event evtM1:
REFevtM1v(evtM2‖evtN2) : IM (vM ) ∧ JCM (vM , wM , wN )
∧HM (qM , wM ) ∧HN (qN , wN )
∧ TM (qM , wM , w′M ) ∧ TN (qN , wN , w′N )
` ∃v′M ·GM (pM , vM ) ∧ SM (pM , vM , v′M ) ∧ JCM (v′M , w′M , w′N ).
Proof. Assume the hypotheses of REFevtM1v(evtM2‖evtN2):
JCM (vM , wM , wN ) ≡ JM (vM , wM ) ∧ JN (wN ) {expanding JCM from (2.22)}.
IM (vM ) ∧HM (qM , wM ) ∧ TM (qM , wM , w′M )
HN (qN , wN ) ∧ TN (qN , wN , w′N )
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And assume INVevtN2 :
INVevtN2 : INVevtN2H ` INVevtN2G
≡ JN (wN ) ∧HN (qN , wN ) ∧ TN (qN , wN , w′N )
` jN (w′N ). (2.23)
The proof proceeds as follows:
∃v′M ·GM (pM , vM ) ∧ SM (pM , vM , v′M ) ∧ JCM (v′M , w′M , w′N )
≡ ∃v′M ·GM (pM , vM ) ∧ SM (pM , vM , v′M )
∧ JM (v′M , w′M ) ∧ JN (w′N ) {expanding JCM from (2.22)}
⇐ REFevt M1vevt M2G
∧ JN (w′N ) { (2.17)}
⇐ REFevt M1vevt M2G
∧ INVevt N2G { (2.23)}
2.3.4.2 New Events
New events must refine event skip and their state space include only new variables
w; abstract variables v do not change state. Nevertheless new composed events must
respect the refinement POs.
Theorem 2.7. Let evtM2 be a new (composed) event in CM2 refining skip. If we assume
that the invariant proof obligation for event evtM2 holds, then the monotonicity property
is preserved (i.e. REFskipvevtM2 holds).
From (2.15), the refinement PO for new event evtM2 is necessary to be verified to ensure
that monotonicity is preserved. It can be expressed as:
REFskipvevtM2 : REFskipvevtM2H ` REFskipvevtM2G
≡ IM (vM ) ∧ JCM (vM , wM , wN )
∧HM (qM , wM ) ∧ TM (qM , wM , w′M )
` ∃v′M ·GM (pM , vM ) ∧ SM (pM , vM , v′M ) ∧ JCM (v′M , w′M , w′N ).
And assume INVevtM2 :
INVevtM2 : INVevtM2H ` INVevtM2G
≡ JM (vM , wM ) ∧HM (qM , wM ) ∧ TM (qM , wM , w′M )
` jM (vM , w′M ). (2.24)
Moreover, since evtM2 is a new event refining skip (event with guard always TRUE and
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without actions), then:
JCM (vM , wM , wN ) = JM (vM , wM ) (2.25)
GM (pM , vM ) = TRUE (2.26)
SM (pM , vM , v
′
M ) = ∅. (2.27)
Assume: INVevtM2
Prove: REFskipvevtM2 .
The proof proceeds as follows:
Proof.
∃v′M ·GM (pM , vM ) ∧ SM (pM , vM , v′M ) ∧ JCM (v′M , w′M , w′N )
≡ ∃v′M ·JCM (v′M , w′M , w′N ) {(2.26) and (2.27)}
≡ ∃v′M ·JM (v′M , w′M ) { (2.25)}
⇐ INVevt M2G { (2.24)}
Next section presents the application of the shared event composition to a more complex
case study whose architecture is a distributed system: file transfer system.
2.4 File Access Management case study
A distributed system is presented where two component specifications are composed in
the style defined in Fig. 1.11. A specification of a file management system is developed:
files containing DATA can be created, read, overwritten, deleted and sent to other users.
Another separated specification deals with the access management of files in which each
file has an owner. The owners are users with clearance level from 1 to 10 where 10 is
the highest level. A super user exists with clearance level 10. Moreover, files have a
classification level varying from 1 to 10. Permission is needed in order to read, modify
or delete a file. When the permission is granted, the requested action can take place.
The first specification is defined as machine FileManagement M0 and variables user,
file, fileData and fileStatus (defines the status of a file operation and can have the states
SUCCESS or FAILED) as depicted in Fig. 2.4. After a file is created or sent, variable
fileStatus is updated accordingly to the result of the operation. In order to allow a new
operation in the same file, the state of that file must be reset in event clearFileStatus. The
file operations are defined by events createF ile, readF ile, overwriteF ile, deleteF ile,
sendFile and clearF ileStatus as seen in Fig. 2.4. The access management specifica-
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FileManagement
machine FileManagement_M0
sees FileManagement_C0 User_C0
variables user file fileData fileStatus
invariants
  @inv1 file ! FILE
  @inv2 user ! USER
  @inv3 fileData " file ! DATA
  @inv4 fileStatus " file ! STATUS
  @inv5 ran(fileStatus) ! {SUCCESS, FAILED}
events
  event INITIALISATION
    then
      @act1 user # {super}
      @act2 file # $
      @act3 fileData # $
      @act4 fileStatus # $
  end
  event addUser
    any uu
        masterUser // user that creates uu
    where
      @grd1 uu % user
      @grd2 masterUser " user
    then
      @act1 user # user & {uu}
  end
  event createFile
    any " // file to be added
        dd // content DATA of the file
        fStatus
        u // file owner
    where
      @grd1 " " FILE#file
      @grd2 dd " DATA
      @grd3 fStatus "  {SUCCESS}
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  event createFile
    any ! // file to be added
        dd // content DATA of the file
        fStatus
        u // file owner
    where
      @grd1 ! ! FILE"file
      @grd2 dd ! DATA
      @grd3 fStatus !  {SUCCESS}
      @grd4 u ! user
    then
      @act1 file"file # {!}
      @act2 fileData(!)"dd
      @act3 fileStatus(!) " fStatus
  end
  event readFile
    any ! // file to be read
        dd // data of the file
        u // user that reads the file
    where
      @grd1 ! ! file
      @grd2 dd = fileData(!)
      @grd3 u ! user
  end
  event overwriteFile
    any ! dd
    where
      @grd1 ! ! file
      @grd2 dd ! DATA
      @grd3 dd # fileData(!)
    then
      @act1 fileData(!)"dd
  end
  event deleteFile
    any ! // file to be deleted
        u // user that will execute the action
    where
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  event deleteFile
    any ! // file to be deleted
        u // user executes the action
    where
      @grd1 ! ! file
      @grd2 u ! user
    then
      @act1 file"file"{!}
      @act2 fileData"{!}#fileData
      @act3 fileStatus"{!}#fileStatus
  end
  event sendFile
    any ! recipient u fs
    where
      @grd1 ! ! file
      @grd2 u ! user
      @grd3 recipient ! user
      @grd4 ! $ dom(fileStatus)
      @grd5 fs ! {SUCCESS,FAILED}
      @grd6 u # recipient
    then
      @act1 fileStatus(!) " fs
  end
  event clearFileStatus
    any !
    where
      @grd1 ! ! dom(fileStatus)
      @grd2 fileStatus(!)!{SUCCESS,FAILED}
    then
      @act1 fileStatus " {!}#fileStatus
  end
end
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Figure 2.4: Machine FileManageme t M0
tion is defined by machine AccessManagement M0 and variables userClearanceLevel,
permission, fileClassification and fileOwner as seen in Fig. 2.5. A user can change the
clearance of another user as long as the former has a clearance level superior to the lat-
ter as described in event changeClearance (guard grd5 ). For all the other operations,
permission is needed given by the non-deterministic action in event requestPermission.
With permission granted, a file can be read, modified or deleted. Moreover, only users
with a clearance level superior to the file classification can modify a file (guard grd7 in
event modifyFile). To delete a file, described in event deleteFile, the user must be the
owner of the file or the super user as described by guard grd5.
These two specifications were developed in two different machines as they deal with dif-
ferent contexts: machine FileManagement M0 handles the physical creation and modi-
fication of files and respective data. Machine AccessManagement M0 handles the con-
ditions in which a reading and a modification can occur. By composing these two
specifications and respective events, we explore the development of a composed specifi-
cation that is constrained by the other. The composed machine FileAccessManagement
can be seen in Fig. 2.6. Modifying, overwriting, sending or deleting a file must be au-
thorised (request permission) and only a defined set of users are allowed to do it (in
opposition to what happens in machine FileManagement M0 ); events corresponding to
the creation of users and change of clearance are synchronised and occur in parallel. The
conjunction of the guards of each event (Def. (1.2)) restrains the conditions to enable the
composed event. Nevertheless some events are not composed such as requestPermission
or clearFileStatus. Moreover, additional invariants are added allowing the interaction of
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machine AccessManagement_M0 
sees User_C0 AccessManagement_C0 FileManagement_C0 
 
variables userClearanceLevel permission fileClassification fileOwner 
 
invariants 
  @inv1 userClearanceLevel ! USER ! ClearanceLevel 
  @inv2 permission ! PERMISSION 
  @inv3 fileClassification ! FILE ! Classification 
  @inv4 fileOwner ! FILE ! USER 
  @inv5 dom(fileClassification) = dom(fileOwner) 
 
events 
  event INITIALISATION 
    then 
      @act1 userClearanceLevel " {super#10} 
      @act2 permission " OFF 
      @act3 fileClassification " " 
      @act4 fileOwner " " 
  end 
 
  event changeClearance 
    any uu // changed user 
        masterUser // user who will make the change to uu 
        newUserClearanceLevel // new user ClearanceLevel 
    where 
      @grd1 masterUser ! USER 
      @grd2 uu ! USER 
      @grd3 uu ! dom(userClearanceLevel) 
      @grd4 newUserClearanceLevel ! ClearanceLevel 
      @grd5 newUserClearanceLevel < userClearanceLevel(masterUser) 
      @grd6 uu ! super 
     then 
      @act1 userClearanceLevel(uu)" newUserClearanceLevel 
  end 
 
  event readOperation 
    any u // user that wants to modify the file 
        ff 
    where 
      @grd1 permission = ALLOWED 
      @grd2 u ! USER 
      @grd3 u!dom(userClearanceLevel) 
      @grd4 ff!dom(fileClassification) 
      @grd5 ff ! FILE 
      @grd6 userClearanceLevel(u)"fileClassification(ff) 
    then 
      @act1 permission " OFF 
  end 
 
 
  event requestPermission 
    where 
      @grd1 permission ! ALLOWED 
  event requestPermission 
    where 
      @grd1 permission ! ALLOWED 
    then 
      @act1 permission:! PERMISSION"{OFF} 
  end 
 
  event modifyFile 
    any ff cl 
        u // owner of the file 
    where 
      @grd1 u!dom(userClearanceLevel) 
      @grd2 ff ! FILE 
      @grd3 cl ! Classification 
      @grd4 permission = ALLOWED 
      @grd5 ff ! dom(fileClassification) " cl = fileClassification(ff) 
      @grd6 u ! USER 
      @grd7 userClearanceLevel(u)>cl 
    then 
      @act1 fileClassification(ff)! cl 
      @act2 permission ! OFF 
      @act3 fileOwner(ff)! u 
  end 
 
  event deleteFile 
    any ff u 
    where 
      @grd1 ff ! FILE 
      @grd2 permission = ALLOWED 
      @grd3 u ! USER 
      @grd4 ff ! dom(fileOwner) 
      @grd5 u ! {super,fileOwner(ff)} 
    then 
      @act1 fileClassification!{ff}"fileClassification 
      @act2 permission ! OFF 
      @act3 fileOwner!{ff}"fileOwner 
  end 
end 
!
Figure 2.5: Machine AccessManagement M0
states but still without possibility to share variables. Among the added invariants, the
most important is the one that requires the classification of a file to be lower than the
clearance level of its owner (@inv4 ).
As aforementioned in a shared event composition, the composed events communicate
through value passing. The value passing is allowed when composed events have param-
eters with the same name and compatible types (cf. (1.20)). For instance, the composed
event createFile results from the composition of events AccessManagement M0.modifyFile
and FileManagement M0.createFile. AccessManagement M0.modifyFile has parame-
ters ff of type FILE, u of type USER and cl of type Classification. FileManage-
ment M0.createFile has parameters ff of type FILE, dd of type DATA, u of type USER
and fStatus of type STATUS. When these two events are synchronised, parameters ff
and u are shared as seen in Fig. 2.7 (the labels of the guards and actions, starting with
’@’, define their source). Although not explicitly defined, parameter ff inputs an element
of FILE (guards FileManagement M0\grd1 and AccessManagement M0\grd2 ) that will
be added to the variable file in action FileManagement M0\act1. Similarly, parameter
u behaves as an input parameter. The respective actions occur in parallel: when a file is
created, its content is defined by parameter dd and the resulting state of the operation
is updated by fStatus; also the file is classified according to the parameter cl and has an
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COMPOSED MACHINE FileAccessManagement
INCLUDES
AccessManagement M0, FileManagement M0
INVARIANTS
@inv1: dom(userClearanceLevel) = user
@inv2: dom(fileClassification) = file
@inv3: fileOwner ∈ file→ user
@inv4: ∀f ·f ∈ file⇒ userClearanceLevel(fileOwner(f)) > fileClassification(f)
EVENTS
addUser
Combines Events AccessManagement M0.changeClearance ‖ FileManagement M0.addUser
modifyUser
Combines Events AccessManagement M0.changeClearance
createFile
Combines Events AccessManagement M0.modifyF ile ‖ FileManagement M0.createF ile
readFile
Combines Events AccessManagement M0.readOperation ‖ FileManagement M0.readF ile
overwriteFile
Combines Events AccessManagement M0.modifyF ile ‖ FileManagement M0.overwriteF ile
deleteFile
Combines Events AccessManagement M0.deleteF ile ‖ FileManagement M0.deleteF ile
sendFile
Combines Events AccessManagement M0.modifyF ile ‖ FileManagement M0.sendF ile
requestPermission
Combines Events AccessManagement M0.requestPermission
clearFileStatus
Combines Events FileManagement M0.clearF ileStatus
Figure 2.6: Composed machine FileAccessManagement
owner u. The others composed events behave similarly.
  event createFile 
    any ff // file to be added 
        dd // content DATA of the file 
        fStatus 
        u // file owner 
        cl 
    where 
      @FileManagement_M0\grd1 ff ! FILE!file 
      @FileManagement_M0\grd2 dd ! DATA 
      @FileManagement_M0\grd3 fStatus !  {SUCCESS} 
      @FileManagement_M0\grd4 u ! user 
      @AccessManagement_M0\grd1 u!dom(userClearanceLevel) 
      @AccessManagement_M0\grd2 ff ! FILE 
      @AccessManagement_M0\grd3 cl ! Classification 
      @AccessManagement_M0\grd4 permission = ALLOWED 
      @AccessManagement_M0\grd5 ff ! dom(fileClassification) " cl =fileClassification(ff) 
@AccessManagement_M0\grd6 u ! USER      
@AccessManagement_M0\grd7 userClearanceLevel(u)>cl 
    then 
      @FileManagement_M0\act1 file!file ! {ff} 
      @FileManagement_M0\act2 fileData(ff)!dd 
      @FileManagement_M0\act3 fileStatus(ff) ! fStatus 
      @AccessManagement_M0\act1 fileClassification(ff)! cl 
      @AccessManagement_M0\act2 permission ! OFF 
      @AccessManagement_M0\act3 fileOwner(ff)! u 
  end 
 
  event readFile 
    any ff // file to be read 
        dd // data of the file 
        u // user that reads the file 
 
    where 
      @[FileManagement]FileManagement_M0\grd1 ff ! file 
      @[FileManagement]FileManagement_M0\grd2 dd = fileData(ff) 
      @[FileManagement]FileManagement_M0\grd3 u ! user 
      @[FileManagement]AccessManagement_M0\grd1 permission = ALLOWED 
      @[FileManagement]AccessManagement_M0\grd2 u ! USER 
      @[FileManagement]AccessManagement_M0\grd3 u!dom(userClearanceLevel) 
      @[FileManagement]AccessManagement_M0\grd4 ff!dom(fileClassification) 
      @[FileManagement]AccessManagement_M0\grd5 ff ! FILE 
      @[FileManagement]AccessManagement_M0\grd6 
userClearanceLevel(u)"fileClassification(ff) 
    then 
      @[FileManagement]AccessManagement_M0\act1 permission ! OFF 
  end 
 
  event overwriteFile 
    any ff dd cl 
        u // owner of the file 
 
    where 
      @[FileManagement]FileManagement_M0\grd1 ff ! file 
Figure 2.7: “Expanded” vent createFile from composed machine FileAccessManage-
ment
The composed machine needs to be verified to ensure that the properties of the model
are preserved. The verification is accomplished by discharging the proof obligations as
described in Sect. 2.3.3. Moreover, the additional invariants must also be preserved by all
the events in the composed machine. After the generation of the proof obligations for the
composed machine ileAccessManagem nt only on pro f obligation is not automatically
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discharged: it is a composition gluing invariant preservation PO referring to inv4 in
event modifyUser. After analysing the event, it is easy to understand why the PO
cannot be discharged: there is no information in the event that guarantees that the
files owned by uu have a classification that is inferior to the new user’s clearance. To
discharge this PO, it is necessary to add a guard to the composed event modifyFile that
guarantees that all the files owned by uu have a classification that is inferior than the
new clearance. But the composition of machines is structural and therefore no guards
can be added directly to the composed machine. Instead a new guard needs to be added
to the original event changeClearance in the included machine AccessManagement M0
from where the composed event modifyUser comes from (cf. Fig. 2.6). Guard grd8 is
added in event changeClearance of machine AccessManagement M0 as seen in Fig. 2.8.
After changing the event changeClearance, the proof obligations can be re-generated
event changeClearance 
    any uu // changed user 
        masterUser // user who will make the change to uu 
        newUserClearanceLevel // new user ClearanceLevel 
    where 
      @grd1 masterUser ! USER 
      @grd2 uu ! USER 
      @grd3 uu ! dom(userClearanceLevel) 
      @grd4 newUserClearanceLevel ! ClearanceLevel 
      @grd5 newUserClearanceLevel < userClearanceLevel(masterUser) 
      @grd6 uu ! super 
      @grd7 "f·f ! dom(fileClassification) ! fileOwner(f)=uu  
          # newUserClearanceLevel>fileClassification(f) 
  then 
      @act1 userClearanceLevel(uu)! newUserClearanceLevel 
  end 
 
!
Figure 2.8: Event changeClearance from machine AccessManagement with added
guard grd8
for the composed machine and as expected, all the POs are automatically discharged.
Moreover, no changes were made directly in the composed machine. In this manner,
there is more flexibility in the interaction of specifications as the changes in the individual
sub-components are directly reflected in the composed machines.
One of the properties of the shared event composition is monotonicity. Therefore sub-
components can be further refined independently preserving the verified properties while
composed. For instance, machine AccessManagement M0 can be refined by defining a
more deterministic event requestPermission based on the kind of operation and the user
that intends to execute the operation. For machine FileManagement M0, the event
sendFile can be further refined by introducing a queue where events would be stored
before being processed (creating a new file own by the file recipient). The independent
refinement of the sub-components results in a separation of behaviours and properties
that can be verified without the interference of other sub-components.
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2.5 Related Work
Composition allows the interaction of sub-components and usually occurs through vari-
able sharing, event sharing or a combination of both. Back [23], Abadi and Lamport[1]
studied the interaction of components through shared variable composition. Jones [187]
also proposes a shared variable composition for VDM by restricting the behaviour of the
environment and the operation itself in order to consider the composition valid using
rely-guarantee conditions.
CSP [92] allows the specification of distributed systems from an event-based viewpoint.
Processes and environment behaviours can be composed using the parallel composition
operator ‖. They interact by synchronisation of common events within the respective
alphabets (interaction) and stop if any of the involved processes deadlocks. Another
option is to have processes with different alphabets: concurrency exists when inde-
pendent events occur in parallel. On the one hand, when the alphabets of processes
P and Q do not have common events, αP ∩ αQ = {}, then the alphabet is given as
α(P ‖ Q) = αP ∪ αQ and the traces of P ‖ Q are pure interleavings between events of
both processes: traces(P ‖ Q) = {s | ∃ t : traces(P );u : traces(Q)·s interleaves(t, u)}.
On the other hand, when the alphabets of P and Q are exactly the same, αP = αQ,
then traces(P ‖ Q) = traces(P ) ∩ traces(Q). Communication is a special class of event
described by a pair c.v where c corresponds to the name of the channel and v corre-
sponds to the value of the message which passes. Channels can be considered members
of the alphabet of the process and used for communication in only one direction and
between two processes [92]. If two processes P and Q are composed in parallel and both
have a common channel c, interaction happens whenever both processes are ready to
engage in the common channel. If P is ready for c!v and process Q is ready for c?x, v
can be passed from P to Q [41]: (c!v →P ) ‖ (c?x →Qx) = c!.v →(P ‖ Qv). The result
is an output channel and the process Q receives the value v. This can also be applied
for channels with input-input behaviour. Our approach is similar to CSP concurrency
where events from different machines can be composed and interact, similar to what
happens between events of different processes.
In Z, composition can be achieved by combining schemas. Two signatures of different
schemas can be combined if they are type compatible: each variable common to the two
has the same type in both of them. The result is a larger signature which contains
all the variables of each of them. The properties of each of the schemas can be con-
nected through logical connectives such as ∨, ∧, ⇒ or ≡ [173]. Still combining schemas,
views [34, 99] allow the development of partial specifications that can interact through
invariants that relate their state or by operations’ synchronisation. Views are similar
to our composition as it allows the exploration of sub-components interaction without
variable sharing.
In Circus [186, 155] (that combines Z and CSP), processes may be defined explicitly
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or in terms of other processes (compound processes). Compound processes are defined
using the CSP operators of sequence, external and internal choice, parallelism and in-
terleaving, or their corresponding iterated operators, event hiding, or indexed operators,
which are particular to Circus specifications. An action can be a schema, a guarded
command, an invocation of another action, or a combination of these constructs using
CSP operators. Communication is achieved by parallelism and interleaving of actions
declaring a synchronisation channel set and two sets that partition all the variables. In
the parallelism A1Jns1|cs|ns2KA2 , the actions A1 and A2 synchronise on the channels
in set cs. Both A1 and A2 have access to the initial values of all variables in both ns1
and ns2. However, A1 and A2 may modify only the values of the variables in ns1 and
ns2, respectively. The changes made by A1 in variables in ns1 are not seen by A2,
and vice-versa. Oliveira et al [132] make use of the Circus communication system to
specify a distributed fire protection system divided into fire detection and gas discharge
covering two different separate zones. In our composition machine, the included ma-
chines communicate by synchronised events similar to channels in Circus. Similarly, the
included machines can only modify their own variables but can read the other variables
in a composed event.
CSP-OZ [167] (CSP combined with Object-Z) and TCOZ [142, 118, 117] (Timed Com-
municating Object-Z that is an integration of Object-Z and Timed CSP) use Object-Z
data structure and the CSP structure for the control flow of a system. The Z math-
ematical toolkit is extended with object oriented structuring techniques. Timed CSP
has strong process control modelling capabilities. The multi-threading and synchro-
nisation primitives of CSP are extended with timing primitives. In CSP-OZ, classes
in Object-Z and processes in CSP are given an identical failure divergence semantics
(history of class objects corresponds to traces of processes in CSP) which allows the
development of communication through synchronised operations with the same name in
a similar style as it happens with channels in CSP: local parameters to operations can be
passed via message passing [167, 75]. The sequencing of operation events is determined
by the preconditions of the individual events, at each time the object participates in
any event which is currently enabled [117]. Nevertheless such an approach is not well
suited for considering multi-threading and real-time due to the restriction of operations
to atomic events. TCOZ identifies operation schemas with terminating CSP processes
that perform only state updates: rather than treating operation as atomic events, they
are treated as sequences of abstract state-update events [117]. TCOZ specifications have
the same strcuture as Object-Z ones except in the structure of the class definition that
may include CSP channels and processes definitions. The Z operation schema is the only
way to describe a state change in TCOZ and it is not responsible for communicating
inputs and outputs. Composition occurs using communicating CSP-style channels be-
tween class objects: state, initialisation schemas are conjoined; operation schemas with
the same name are also conjoined resulting in compositive objects. The behaviour of an
(active) compositive is defined by the construct MAIN along with the channel construct
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chan. Active objects are modelled as pure (non-terminating) CSP processes, using the
basic infinite timed failures semantics [117]. For synchronisation, channel renaming may
be required where input and output parameters can be passed similar to the original
CSP. Intermediate channels can be introduced as internal interfaces between objects.
The internal interfaces are protected from environment by hiding them [118]. Another
approach for describing the semantics of TCOZ is given by Qin et al [142]: using uni-
fying theories of programming (UTP), a unified semantic model for both channel and
sensor/actuators based communications in TCOZ is defined. Unlike our approach, we
do not blend different formalisms and define the corresponding semantics: we keep the
Event-B semantics and inspired by the CSP, we build a correspondence between events’
composition with possible value-passing communication and the synchronisation of pro-
cesses using CSP channels. Just like in CSP, there is different semantics between input
and output channels. For our composition, input and output parameters also have dif-
ferent semantics expressed by enabledness POs (cf. Definition 1.20 and Sect. 1.5.3.3).
Note that these POs are currently not implemented in the Rodin platform.
In classical B the composition [4, 140, 158] uses keywords like Includes to extend a
machine, not allowing writing access to variables in the included machine or keyword
Sees used to complement machines. Although systems are developed in single machines
in classical B, Bellegarde et at [32] suggest a composition by rearranging the separated
machines and synchronising their operations under feasibility conditions. The behaviour
of a component composition is seen as a labelled transition system using weakest precon-
ditions, where a set of authorised transitions are defined. The objective is to verify the
refinement of synchronised parallel composition between components but it is limited to
finite state transitions and a finite number of components. This work differs from ours
as it uses a labelled transition system while we use synchronisation and communication
in the CSP style. Variable sharing is also possible unlike our shared event composition.
Butler and Walden [52] discuss a combination of action systems and classical B by com-
posing machines using parallel systems in an action systems style and preserving the
invariants of the individual machines. This approach allows the classical B to derive
parallel and distributed systems and since the parallel composition of action systems
is monotonic, the sub-systems in a parallel composition may be refined independently.
This work is closely related to our work as it follows a CSP style to compose actions
with similar underlying semantics and notion of refinement. Combining state machine
diagrams and classical B, Papatsaras and Stoddart [135] manually decompose a global
a system into sub-components. The sub-components are then composed in classical B
using the Includes keyword. Similarly to our approach, sub-components communicate
via shared parameters. Since there is not a formal methodology to follow, the resulting
composition needs to be proved to be a valid refinement of the global system which is
not the case in our work, where we prove the monotonicity of our composition. Abrial et
al [124, 15] propose a state-based decomposition for Event-B introducing the notion of
shared variables and external events as described in Sect. 1.6.1. Although this approach
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and our work are both monotonic and sub-components can be refined independently,
their respective nature is suitable for different kind of systems: parallel programs for
shared variable and distributed systems for shared event [42]. Sorge et al [172] propose
a feature composition in Event-B and define composition proof obligations to ensure its
consistency. In the feature composition approach, exploration of specifications’ compo-
sition with possible variable sharing (similar to the shared variable style) is allowed but
no refinement is defined which differs from our work. Nevertheless similar to our work,
sub-components POs are reused to avoid re-proving composition POs.
2.6 Conclusions
Based on the close relation between action systems and Event-B plus the correspon-
dence between action systems and CSP [53], we define our Event-B composition with an
event-based behaviour. Shared event composition is proved to be monotonic by means of
proof obligations. Consequently sub-components can be further refined independently.
Refinement in a “top-down” style for developing specifications is allowed including the
generation of POs. During composition, sub-components interact through event parame-
ters by value-passing. We extend Event-B to support shared event composition, allowing
combination and reuse of existing sub-components through the introduction of composed
machines. Required static checks are developed and POs are generated to validate the
composition. Such an approach seems suitable for modelling distributed systems, where
the system can be seen as a combination of interacting parts (sub-components). This
work is the result of the exploration of specifications’ composition in a shared event style.
A methodology for the composition is defined including the verification of properties
through the generation of proof obligations. We do not address the step corresponding
to the translation of this composition exploration to an implementation and it is a study
that needs to be carried out in the future. A tool was developed to support composition
in the Rodin platform. Although we have defined the required POs for composition,
currently they are not implemented in the tool. At the moment, the generation of a
new machine (that is the expansion of the sub-components) is required to validate the
composition. A file transfer case study defined as a distributed system is modelled using
the composition tool. We intend to carry on developing the shared event composition
approach by adding the enabledness POs when available for the Rodin platform. With
the developed work, we have the necessary conditions to develop another reuse technique
that can be seen as the inverse operation of composition: decomposition. This is further
discussed in Chapter 4.
Chapter 3
Generic Instantiation
It is believed that reusability in formal development should reduce the time and cost
of formal modelling within a production environment. Along with the ability to reuse
formal models, it is desirable to avoid unnecessary re-proof when reusing models. Event-
B supports generic developments through the context construct. However Event-B lacks
the ability to instantiate and reuse generic developments in other formal developments.
We propose a methodology to instantiate generic models and extend the instantiation to
a chain of refinements. We define sufficient proof obligations to ensure that the proofs
associated to a generic development remain valid in an instantiated development thus
avoiding re-proofs. This chapter is based on the paper [163] that appeared in the ICFEM
(International Conference in Formal Engineering Methods) 2009.
3.1 Introduction
Reusability has always been sought in several areas as a way to reduce time, cost and
improve the productivity of developments [176]. Examples can be found in areas such
as software, mathematics and even formal methods. Generic instantiation can be seen
as a way of reusing components and solving difficulties raised by the construction of
large and complex models [124, 15]. The goal is to reuse generic developments (single
model or a chain of refinements) and create components with similar properties instead
of starting from scratch. Reusability is applied through the use of a pattern as the basic
structure and afterwards each new component is generated through parameterisation.
We propose a generic instantiation approach for Event-B by instantiating machines. The
instances inherit properties from the generic development (pattern) and afterwards are
parameterised by renaming/replacing those properties to more specific names according
to the instance. Proof obligations are generated to ensure that assumptions used in the
pattern are satisfied in the instantiation. In that sense our approach avoids re-proof of
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pattern proof obligations in the instantiation. The models are developed in the Rodin
platform. A simple case study modelling a protocol communication is described to
illustrate the use of instantiation.
Section 3.2 defines how generic instantiation is interpreted by us. In Sect. 3.3 instan-
tiated machines are introduced. Section 3.4 gives an application of instantiation in
combination with shared event composition. The application of instantiation to a chain
of refinements is described in Sect. 3.5. Section 3.6 discusses an open question that
arises when instantiating theorems and invariants in a pattern. Conclusions are drawn
in Sect. 3.7.
3.2 Generic Instantiation
In order to explain our approach for Generic Instantiation we use a simple case study. A
protocol is modelled between two entities, Source and Destination which communicate
by sending messages through a channel. The content of the channel has a maximum
dimension. To send a message it is necessary to add the content of the message to the
channel. Based on the proposed requirements it is possible to create a context Chan-
nelParameters to model the channel as seen in Fig. 3.1(b). The content of the message
!Channel
!1 !machine Channel sees ChannelParameters
!2 !
!3 !variables channel
!4 !
!5 !invariants
!6 !  @inv1 channel ! Message
!7 !  @inv3 finite(channel)
!8 !  @inv2 card(channel) " max_size
!9 !
!10 !events
!11 !  event INITIALISATION
!12 !    then
!13 !      @act1 channel ! "
!14 !  end
!15 !
!16 !  event Send
!17 !    any m
!18 !    where
!19 !      @grd1 m # Message
!20 !      @grd2 card(channel) < max_size
!21 !    then
!22 !      @act1 channel ! channel # {m}
!23 !  end
!24 !
!25 !  event Receive
!26 !    any m
!27 !    where
!28 !      @grd1 m # channel
!29 !    then
!30 !      @act1 channel ! channel${m}
!31 !  end
!32 !end
!33 !
!Page 1
(a)
!ChannelParameters
!1 !context ChannelParameters
!2 !
!3 !constants max_size 
!4 !
!5 !sets Message 
!6 !
!7 !axioms
!8 !  @axm1 max_size ! !
!9 !end
!10 !
!Page 1
(b)
Figure 3.1: Machine Channel and respective context ChannelParameters
is of type Message and has a maximum dimension max size. Figure 3.1(a) represents
the machine side where a variable channel stores all the sent/received messages. The
channel messages have type Message and the number of messages in the channel is
limited. Messages are introduced in the channel to be sent as seen in event Send. The
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event Receive models the reception of the message in the destination by extracting the
messages from the channel. Elements in ChannelParameters context are the parameters
(type and constant) for the Channel machine.
Now suppose we wish to model a bi-directional communication between two entities using
two channels. Both channels are similar so an option is to instantiate machine Channel
twice to create two instances: one channel called Request and the other Response. The
protocol, represented in Fig. 3.2 starts by a message being sent from the Source. After
arriving at the Destination, the reception of the message is acknowledged in the Source.
Then a response is sent from the Destination and after arriving at the Source, it is also
acknowledged in the Destination.
Figure 3.2: Protocol diagram
The instantiation of Channel is achieved by applying machine instantiation. An instance
of the pattern Channel is created with more specific properties. A detailed description
of the machine instantiation is described in Sect. 3.3. Moreover, a context containing
the specific instances properties is required to model the protocol. In our case study we
use the context ProtocolTypes in Fig. 3.3, where types Request and Response replace the
more generic type Message and constants qmax size and pmax size replace max size.
This context must be provided by the modeller/developer.
!ProtocolTypes
!1 !context ProtocolTypes
!2 !
!3 !constants qmax_size pmax_size 
!4 !
!5 !sets Request Response 
!6 !
!7 !axioms
!8 !  @axm1 qmax_size ! !
!9 !  @axm2 pmax_size ! !
!10 !end
!11 !
!Page 1
Figure 3.3: ProtocolTypes Context
Abrial and Hallerstede [15] and Me´tayer et al [124] propose the use of generic instan-
tiation for Event-B. It is suggested that the contexts of a development (equivalent to
the pattern) can be merged and reused through instantiation in other developments.
That proposal lacks a mechanism to apply the instantiation from the pattern to the in-
stances. Therefore our work proposes a mechanism to instantiate machines and extend
the instantiation to a refinement chain. The reusability of a development is expressed
by instantiating a development (pattern) according to a more specific problem.
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3.3 Generic Instantiation and Instantiated Machines
Inspired by the previous case study and having the ability to compose machines (Shared
Event Composition plug-in [162]) and rename elements (Refactory plug-in [160] and
Sect. 5.4) on the Rodin platform, we propose an approach to instantiate machines. As
mentioned the context plays an important role while instantiating since this is where the
specific properties of the instance are defined (parameterisation). The use of context is
briefly discussed before instantiated machines are introduced.
3.3.1 Contexts
As aforementioned, contexts in Event-B are the static part of a model containing prop-
erties of the modelled system through the use of axioms and theorems. Having a closer
look at the possible usage of contexts, there are two possible viewpoints:
Parameterisation : the context is seen only by one machine (or one chain of machine
refinements) and defines specific properties for that machine (sets, constants, ax-
ioms, theorems). These properties are unique for that machine and any other
machine would have different properties.
Sharing : a context is seen by several machines and there are some properties (sets,
constants, axioms, theorems) shared by the machines. Therefore the context is
used to share properties.
Several model developments mix the usage for the same context. For the ordinary
modeller this distinction is not very clear and perhaps not so important. Our approach
of generic instantiation reuses components and personalises each instance implying the
use of Parameterisation .
3.3.2 Example of Instantiated Machine
An instantiated machine instantiates a generic machine (pattern). If the generic machine
sees a context, then the context elements (sets and constants) have to be replaced by
instance elements. The instance elements must already exist in a context seen by the
instantiated machine (in our case study, this corresponds to ProtocolTypes - see Fig. 3.3).
In the case study, the instantiated machine QChannel, that is an instance of the machine
Channel for requests, is represented in Fig. 3.4. Note that ChannelParameters elements
(sets and constants) are replaced because the replacement elements are already defined
in ProtocolTypes. Machine elements (variables, parameters and events) are renamed
since they did not exist before. The instantiated machine PChannel, an instance of
Channel for responses, is similar.
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INSTANTIATED MACHINE QChannel
INSTANTIATES Channel VIA ChannelParameters
SEES ProtocolTypes /* context containing the instance properties*/
REPLACE /* replace parameters in ChannelParameters*/
SETS Message := Request
CONSTANTS max size := qmax size
RENAME /* rename variables and events in machine Channel*/
VARIABLES channel := qchannel
EVENTS Send := QSend
m := q /*optional:rename parameter m in event Send */
Receive := Receive
m := q /*optional:rename parameter m in event Receive */
END
Figure 3.4: Instantiated Machine: QChannel instantiates Channel
Pattern Assumptions and Instance Theorems: Axioms in contexts are assump-
tions about a system and are used to help discharge proofs obligations. When instanti-
ating, we need to show that assumptions in the pattern are satisfied by the replacement
sets and constants. A possible solution is to convert the pattern axioms into instantiated
machine theorems after the replacement is applied. A theorem has a proof obligation
associated with it. By ensuring that a proof obligation related to each axiom is gener-
ated and discharged when instantiating a machine, we are confirming the correctness of
the instantiation by satisfying the pattern assumptions (see Theorem thm1 in Fig. 3.5).
In this manner, the theorem is automatically generated in the instantiated machine
and does not need to be manually added in the pattern context. “Expanded” machine
QChannel can be seen in Fig. 3.5.
!QChannel
!1 !machine QChannel sees ProtocolTypes
!2 !
!3 !variables qchannel
!4 !
!5 !invariants
!6 !  @inv1 qchannel ! Request
!7 !  @inv3 finite(qchannel)
!8 !  @inv2 card(qchannel) " qmax_size
!9 !  theorem @thm1 qmax_size ! !
!10 !
!11 !events
!12 !  event INITIALISATION
!13 !    then
!14 !      @act1 qchannel " #
!15 !  end
!16 !
!17 !  event QSend
!18 !    any q
!19 !    where
!20 !      @grd1 q ! Request
!21 !      @grd2 card(qchannel) < qmax_size
!22 !    then
!23 !      @act1 qchannel " qchannel # {q}
!24 !  end
!25 !
!26 !  event Receive
!27 !    any q
!28 !    where
!29 !      @grd1 q ! qchannel
!30 !    then
!31 !      @act1 qchannel " qchannel${q}
!32 !  end
!33 !end
!34 !
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!QChannel
!1 !machine QChannel sees ProtocolTypes
!2 !
!3 !variables qchannel
!4 !
!5 !invariants
!6 !  @inv1 qchannel ! Request
!7 !  @inv3 finite(qchannel)
!8 !  @inv2 card(qchannel) " qmax_size
!9 !  theorem @thm1 qmax_size ! !
!10 !
!11 !events
!12 !  event INITIALISATION
!13 !    then
!14 !      @act1 qchannel " #
!15 !  end
!16 !
!17 !  event QSend
!18 !    any q
!19 !    where
!20 !      @grd1 q ! Request
!21 !      @grd2 card(qchannel) < qmax_size
!22 !    then
!23 !      @act1 qchannel " qchannel # {q}
!24 !  end
!25 !
!26 !  event Receive
!27 !    any q
!28 !    where
!29 !      @grd1 q ! qchannel
!30 !    then
!31 !      @act1 qchannel " qchannel${q}
!32 !  end
!33 !end
!34 !
!Page 1
Figure 3.5: Expanded version of instantiated machine QChannel
The instance QChannel sees the context ProtocolTypes (provided by the modeller/de-
veloper) that contains the context information for the instances. The type Message
in context ChannelParameters is replaced by Request in ProtocolTypes, the constant
max size is replaced by qmax size, the variable channel in Channel is renamed qchannel
and event Send is renamed QSend. The axiom that exists in ChannelParameters is
converted into a theorem in QChannel (but easily discharged by the axioms in Proto-
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colTypes). We convert the axiom axm1 from the generic context ChannelParameters:
@axm1 max size ∈ N
into the theorem thm1 in the instance QChannel :
@thm1 qmax size ∈ N
This results from the replacement of the constant max size by qmax size. For a machine
theorem, the respective proof obligation is [9]:
Axioms
Invariants
`
Theorem
For theorem thm1, the proof obligation to be generated is the following:
qmax size ∈ N /*axiom from ProtocolTypes */
pmax size ∈ N /* axiom from ProtocolTypes */
qchannel ⊆ Request /*invariant from QChannel */
. . .
`
qmax size ∈ N
The first axiom of ProtocolTypes easily discharges this proof obligation. Note the ex-
pansion of QChannel is not required in practice. We use it to show the meaning of an
instantiated machine.
3.3.3 Definition of Generic Instantiation of Machines
Based on the instantiated machine QChannel, a general definition for generic instanti-
ation of machines can be drawn. Considering Context Ctx and machine M in Fig. 3.6
together as a pattern, we can create a generic instantiatiated machine IM as seen in
Fig. 3.7.
CONTEXT Ctx
SETS S1...Sm
CONSTANTS C1...Cn
AXIOMS Ax1...Axp
(a)
MACHINE M
SEES Ctx
VARIABLES v1...vq
EVENTS ev1...evr
(b)
Figure 3.6: Generic view of a context and a machine
The context D contains the replacement properties (sets DS1, . . . , DSm and constants
DC1, . . . , DCn) for the elements in context Ctx. The variables, events and parameters
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INSTANTIATED MACHINE IM
INSTANTIATES M VIA Ctx
SEES D /* context containing the instance properties */
REPLACE /* replace parameters defined in context C */
SETS S1 := DS1, . . . , Sm := DSm /* Carrier Sets */
CONSTANTS C1 := DC1, . . . , Cn := DCn /* Constants */
RENAME /*rename elements in machine M */
VARIABLES v1 := nv1, . . . , vq := nvq /* optional */
EVENTS ev1 := nev1 /* optional */
p1 := np1, . . . , ps := nps /* parameters: optional */
:
evr := nevr
END
Figure 3.7: An Instantiated Machine
are also renamed by new variables nv1, . . . , nvq, new events nev1, . . . , nevr and new
parameters np1, . . . , nps. From the pattern we are able to create several instances that
can be used in a more specific problem. During the creation of instances validity checks
are required:
1. A static validation of replaced elements is required, e.g., a type must be replaced
by a type and a constant with a constant.
2. All sets and constants should be replaced, i.e., no uninstantiated parameters.
3. Renaming the constants, variables, events must be injective (not introducing name
clashes) in order to reuse all the existing proof obligations.
4. Replacing sets does not have to be injective. Different sets in the pattern can be
replaced by the same instance set.
5. Only given sets (defined by the user) can be replaced. Built-in types such as integer
numbers Z and boolean BOOL cannot be replaced.
3.3.4 Avoiding re-proofs
As described above, a proof obligation is a sequent of the form H ` G (where H
represents some hyphoteses and G represents a goal). Renaming variable (or replacing
constant) v with w and type (carrier set) S to T results in instantiated POs as follows:
[v := w] (H ` G) (variable/constant instantiation)
[S := T ] (H ` G) (type instantiation)
H ` G is valid means that the proof has been constructed. We must ensure if H `
G is valid, then any instantiation of H ` G that avoids name clashes is also valid.
Instantiation of variables and constants maintains validity since a sequent is implicitly
universally quantified over its free variables and quantified variables may be renamed
provided there are no name clashes.
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Schmalz [156, 157], inspired by term rewriting in the Rodin platform, describe a theoret-
ical foundation of term rewriting for logics of partial functions as well as the semantics
of Event-B logic based on Isabelle/HOL [85, 130]. [157] describes the rewriting and in-
stantiation of proof rules as redundant inference rules that may be derived from a given
valid proof rule while preserving soundness. Existing generic proofs can be reused in the
instances following some side-conditions as described below. A general inference rule is
written as:
` H1 . . . Hn
` G r (x fresh) (3.1)
where H1 . . . Hn, n > 0, are a sequence of (possible empty) sequents called antecedents, G
is a sequent called consequent, has an optional name r and x are possible empty freshness
conditions (the variables introduced as part of a proof rule step like ∀goal). Variables
in x are pairwise distinct and do not occur free in G. Furthermore, by convention, type
variables are considered free in the sequents in Event-B [156]. Two kind of substitution
are considered:
Ordinary (bound variable) Substituition: σ1 replaces ordinary variables y by vari-
ables u (called the right-hand side of σ1). It is denoted as: σ1 = [y := u] where
y is a sequence of pairwise distinct variables and u a sequence of variables of the
same length and type as y.
Type Substitution: σ2 substitutes type variables µ for type variables α. It is denoted
as: σ2 = [α := µ] where α is a sequence of pairwise distinct type variables and
µ a sequence of types having the same length as α.
The instantiation of inference rule r for ordinary and type substitution can be expressed
as:
` H1σ . . . Hnσ
` Gσ r (xσ fresh) (3.2)
where σ is a substitution over Σ (type signature containing the set of all types). In
an ordinary substitution, the right-hand side of σ corresponds to ordinary variables.
Moreover, the instantiation is possible if the following side-conditions on σ hold [156]:
• The variables in xσ are pairwise distinct. Moreover, for type substitution, variables
in x cannot have the same name and different types.
• If a variable x is free in one of H1 . . . Hn and xσ belongs to xσ, then x belongs to
x.
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POs in the generic model (pattern) are sequents of the form:
A, I,H `D G (3.3)
where A represents the axioms, I represents the invariants and H represents the guards.
The substitution σ results in A being replaced by B, where B is the specific axioms and
we have that
B `D Aσ (3.4)
From (3.3) and [157], we have that
Aσ, Iσ,Hσ `D Gσ (3.5)
i.e, variable and type substitution preserves validity. Then from (3.4) and (3.5), we have:
B, Iσ,Hσ `D Gσ (3.6)
(3.3) is the form that a PO takes in the pattern machine, (3.6) is the form a PO takes
in the specific machine and we have shown that (3.6) follows from (3.3).
3.4 Example of Instantiation and Composition
The creation of the instances is an intermediate step in the overall model development.
In our case study we model a protocol between entities that sends and receives messages.
By using the created instances and the shared event composition plug-in, we share events
between Request and Response and model the protocol. A composed machine Protocol
modelling this system can be seen in Fig. 3.8.
COMPOSED MACHINE Protocol
REFINES -
INCLUDES
QChannel
PChannel
EVENTS
SendRequest
Combines Events QChannel.QSend
RecvReq SendResp
Combines Events QChannel.Receive ‖ PChannel.Send
RecvResp
Combines Events combines PChannel.Receive
END
Figure 3.8: Composed Machine Protocol
As seen in Fig. 3.2, while composing the instance machines QChannel and PChannel we
add the events that are unique for each entity (SendRequest and RecvResp). In Fig. 3.8,
event SendRequest sends a message through the channel from Source to Destination.
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RecvResp models the reception of the response in the Source after being sent by Des-
tination. Moreover the event that relates the communication between the two entities
is also modelled (RecvReq SendResp). The request is received and acknowledged and
the response to that request is sent in parallel (from this combined event, a possible
refinement is processing the request message before sending the response). We opt not
to refine an abstract machine in Fig. 3.8 (REFINES clause is empty: “-”) although it
is possible. The composed machine Protocol corresponds to the expanded machine in
Fig. 3.9.
!Protocol
!1 !machine Protocol sees ProtocolTypes
!2 !
!3 !variables qchannel pchannel
!4 !
!5 !invariants
!6 !  @inv1 qchannel ! Request
!7 !  @inv2 pchannel ! Response
!8 !  @inv3 card(pchannel) " pmax_size
!9 !  @inv4 card(qchannel) " qmax_size
!10 !  theorem @QChannel/thm1 qmax_size ! !
!11 !  theorem @PChannel/thm2 pmax_size ! !
!12 !
!13 !events
!14 !  event INITIALISATION
!15 !    then
!16 !      @act1 qchannel " #
!17 !      @act2 pchannel " #
!18 !  end
!19 !
!20 !  event SendRequest
!21 !    any q
!22 !    where
!23 !      @grd1 q ! Request
!24 !      @grd2 card(qchannel) < qmax_size
!25 !    then
!26 !      @act1 qchannel " qchannel # {q}
!27 !  end
!28 !
!29 !  event RecvReq_SendResp
!30 !    any q p
!31 !    where
!32 !      @grd1 q ! qchannel
!33 !      @grd2 p ! Response
!34 !      @grd3 card(pchannel) < pmax_size
!35 !    then
!36 !      @act1 pchannel " pchannel # {p}
!37 !  end
!38 !
!39 !  event RecvResp
!40 !    any p
!41 !    where
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!Protocol
!42 !
!43 !  event SendRequest
!44 !    any q
!45 !    where
!46 !      @grd1 q ! Request
!47 !      @grd2 card(qchannel) < qmax_size
!48 !    then
!49 !      @act1 qchannel " qchannel ! {q}
!50 !  end
!51 !
!52 !  event RecvReq_SendResp
!53 !    any q p
!54 !    where
!55 !     @grd1 q ! l
!56 !     @grd2 p ! e
!57 !      @grd3 card(pchannel) < pmax_size
!58 !    then
!59 !      @act1 pchannel " pchannel ! {p}
!60 !      @act2 qchannel " qchannel"{q}
!61 !  end
!62 !
!63 !  event RecvResp
!64 !    any p
!65 !    where
!66 !      @grd1 p ! pchannel
!67 !    then
!68 !      @act1 pchannel " pchannel"{p}
!69 !  end
!70 !end
!71 !
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!Protocol
!42 !
!43 !  event SendRequest
!44 !    any q
!45 !    where
!46 !      @grd1 q ! Request
!47 !      @grd2 card(qchannel) < qmax_size
!48 !    then
!49 !      @act1 qchannel " qchannel ! {q}
!50 !  end
!51 !
!52 !  event RecvReq_SendResp
!53 !    any q p
!54 !    where
!55 !      @grd1 q ! qchannel
!56 !      @grd2 p ! Response
!57 !      @grd3 card(pchannel) < pmax_size
!58 !    then
!59 !      @act1 pchannel " pchannel ! {p}
!60 !      @act2 qchannel " qchannel"{q}
!61 !  end
!62 !
!63 !  event RecvResp
!64 !    any p
!65 !    where
!66 !      @grd1 p ! pchannel
!67 !    then
!68 !      @act1 pchannel " pchannel"{p}
!69 !  end
!70 !end
!71 !
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Figure 3.9: “Expanded” machine Protocol
The two instances of machine Channel model a bi-directional communication channel
between two entities. This allows us to express the applicability of generic instantiation
for modelling distributed systems. Nevertheless generic instantiation is not restricted to
this kind of systems. When modelling a finite number of similar components with some
specific individual p operties, instantiated machines are a suitable option (as described
in our case study in Chapter 6).
3.5 Generic Instantiation applied to a chain of refinements
The above sections describe generic instantiation applied to individual machines. Al-
though it is already an interesting way of reusing, the instantiation of a chain of machines
in a large model would be more interesting. In other words, we instantiate a chain of
refinements. Suppose we have a development Dv containing several refinement levels
(Dv1, Dv2, . . . , Dvn). The most concrete model Dvn matches a generic model (pattern)
P1 that is part of a chain of refinements P1, P2, . . . , Pm as seen in Fig. 3.10. By applying
generic instantiation we instantiate the pattern P1 according to Dvn. That instantiation
is a refinement of Dvn and it is called Dvn+m abs (the suffix abs stands for abstract). In
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Figure 3.10: Instantiation of a generic chain of refinements
addition we can extend the instantiation to one of the refinement layers of the pattern
and apply it to the development Dv. The outcome is a further refinement layer for Dvn
for free ( Dvn+m abs corresponds to the instantiation of P1 and Dvn+m corresponds to
the instantiation of Pm). The refinement between Dvn+m abs and Dvn+m does not in-
troduce refinement proof obligations since the proof obligations were already discharged
in the pattern chain. This follows from the instantiated machines where the re-proof
of pattern proof obligations is avoided. Afterwards Dvn+m can be further refined to
Dvn+m+z. For a better understanding of this approach, we will refine our case study
and apply an instantiation over the pattern chain.
3.5.1 Refinement of the Channel case study
We refine the Channel machine. For the first refinement, the requirement is to include
buffers before and after adding a message to the channel. A second refinement specifies
the type Message. In particular, Message will be divided in two parts: header and
body. The header of the Message contains the destination identification and the body
represents the content of the message (data). header and body are based on the records
proposal for Event-B suggested by Evans and Butler [69] and also in work developed by
Rezazadeh et al. [150].
The first refinement requires the introduction of two new variables sendingBuffer and
receivingBuffer and a new event addMessageBuffer that loads the message to sending-
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Buffer before being introduced in the channel in the Send event. The latter event reflects
the introduction of the buffers. In the event Receive, messages in channel are extracted
and loaded to receivingBuffer as seen in Fig. 3.11.
!Channel_M1
!1 !machine Channel_M1 refines Channel
!2 !sees ChannelParameters
!3 !
!4 !variables channel sendingBuffer
!5 ! ! !  receivingBuffer
!6 !
!7 !invariants
!8 !  @inv1 sendingBuffer " Message
!9 !  @inv2 receivingBuffer " Message
!10 !
!11 !events
!12 !  event INITIALISATION
!13 !    then
!14 !      @act1 channel ! "
!15 !      @act2 sendingBuffer ! "
!16 !      @act3 receivingBuffer ! "
!17 !  end
!18 !
!19 !  event addMessageBuffer
!20 !    any m
!21 !    where
!22 !      @grd1 m # Message
!23 !      @grd2 m $ sendingBuffer
!24 !    then
!25 !      @act1 sendingBuffer!sendingBuffer#{m}
!26 !  end
!27 !
!28 !  event Send refines Send
!29 !    any m
!30 !    where
!31 !      @grd1 sendingBuffer $ "
!32 !      @grd2 m # sendingBuffer
!33 !      @grd3 card(channel) < max_size
!34 !    then
!35 !      @act1 channel ! channel # {m}
!36 !      @act2 sendingBuffer!sendingBuffer%{m}
!37 !  end
!38 !
!39 !  event Receive refines Receive
!40 !    any m
!41 !    where
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!Channel_M1
!42 !
!43 !  event Send refines Send
!44 !    any m
!45 !    where
!46 !      @grd1 sendingBuffer ! !
!47 !      @grd2 m " sendingBuffer
!48 !      @grd3 card(channel) < max_size
!49 !    then
!50 !      @act1 channel # channel " {m}
!51 !      @act2 sendingBuffer#sendingBuffer#{m}
!52 !  end
!53 !
!54 !  event Receive refines Receive
!55 !    any m
!56 !    where
!57 !      @grd1 m " channel
!58 !      @grd2 m $ receivingBuffer
!59 !    then
!60 !      @act1 channel # channel#{m}
!61 !      @act2 receivingBuffer#receivingBuffer"{m}
!62 !  end
!63 !end
!64 !
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Figure 3.11: Channel M1 : refinement of Channel
The second refinement is a data refinement over the type Message by dividing it into
header and body. The header contains the destination identification and the body con-
tains the data of the message. Constants header and body are defined in the context
ChannelParameters C2 a in Fig. 3.12.
!ChannelParameters_C2
!1 !context ChannelParameters_C2 extends ChannelParameters 
!2 !
!3 !constants header body 
!4 !
!5 !sets DATA DESTINATION 
!6 !
!7 !axioms
!8 !  @axm3 header ! Message ! DESTINATION
!9 !  @axm4 body ! Message ! DATA
!10 !end
!11 !
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Figure 3.12: Context ChannelParameters C2
In Fig. 3.13 the machine Channel M2 data refines the variable channel and introduces
a new event, processMessage that processes the received message after being retrieved
from the receiving buffer. A variable storeDATA is also introduced to store the data
that each destination receives.
3.5.2 Instantiation of a chain of refinements
We can consider the chain of refinements of Channel as a pattern. In that case, having all
the proof obligations discharged we can reuse this pattern in a more specific development.
The chain of refinements is seen as a single entity where it is possible to choose an initial
and a final refinement level. Using our case study, we intend to instantiate and refine
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!Channel_M2
!1 !machine Channel_M2 refines Channel_M1
!2 !sees ChannelParameters_C2
!3 !
!4 !variables channel sendingBuffer
!5 ! ! !  receivingBuffer storeDATA
!6 !
!7 !invariants
!8 !  @inv1 storeDATA ! DESTINATION ! "(DATA)
!9 !
!10 !events
!11 !  event INITIALISATION
!12 !    then
!13 !      @act1 channel " #
!14 !      @act2 sendingBuffer " #
!15 !      @act3 receivingBuffer " #
!16 !      @act4 storeDATA " DESTINATION " {#}
!17 !  end
!18 !
!19 !  event addMessageBuffer
!20 !  refines addMessageBuffer
!21 !    any h b m
!22 !    where
!23 !      @grd1 header(m) = h
!24 !      @grd2 body(m) = b
!25 !      @grd3 m $ sendingBuffer
!26 !    then
!27 !      @act4 sendingBuffer"sendingBuffer#{m}
!28 !  end
!29 !
!30 !  event send refines Send
!31 !    any m
!32 !    where
!33 !      @grd1 sendingBuffer $ #
!34 !      @grd2 m ! sendingBuffer
!35 !      @grd3 card(channel) < max_size
!36 !    then
!37 !      @act1 channel " channel # {m}
!38 !      @act2 sendingBuffer"sendingBuffer%{m}
!39 !  end
!40 !
!41 !  event receive refines Receive
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!Channel_M2
!42 !
!43 !
!44 !  event send refines Send
!45 !    any m
!46 !    where
!47 !      @grd1 sendingBuffer ! !
!48 !      @grd2 m " sendingBuffer
!49 !      @grd3 card(channel) < max_size
!50 !    then
!51 !      @act1 channel # channel " {m}
!52 !      @act2 sendingBuffer#sendingBuffer#{m}
!53 !  end
!54 !
!55 !  event receive refines Receive
!56 !    any m
!57 !    where
!58 !      @grd1 m " channel
!59 !      @grd2 m $ receivingBuffer
!60 !    then
!61 !      @act1 channel # channel#{m}
!62 !      @act2 receivingBuffer#receivingBuffer"{m}
!63 !  end
!64 !
!65 !  event processMessage
!66 !    any m dest d
!67 !    where
!68 !      @grd1 m " receivingBuffer
!69 !      @grd3 header(m) = dest
!70 !      @grd4 d = body(m)
!71 !      @grd5 dest " dom(storeDATA)
!72 !    then
!73 !      @act1 storeDATA(dest)#storeDATA(dest)"{d}
!74 !  end
!75 !end
!76 !
!Page 2
Figure 3.13: Channel M2 : refinement of Channel M1
QChannel with the chain of refinements of machine Channel, selecting Channel and
Channel M2 as our initial and final refinement levels respectively. In Fig. 3.14 the
shaded chain of refinement is seen as a single entity. After the selection of the two
refinement levels to be instantiated, QChannel M2 abs and QChannel M2 are created.
QChannel M2 is treated as a refinement of QChannel M2 abs as a consequence of the
instantiation. Subsequently, QChannel M2 can be further refined to QChannel Mz.
Figure 3.14: Instantiation of a chain of refinements: Channel to Channel M2
The refinement relationship between Channel and Channel M2 is ensured by discharg-
ing all the proof obligations in the chain of refinement (all the proofs are discharged
automatically in the Rodin platform). By instantiating Channel and Channel M2 im-
plicitly we are also referring to Channel M1. Some of the properties of Channel M2 are
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inherited from Channel M1 (for instance the buffers) but for the instantiation purpose
it is not necessary to incorporate Channel M1 explicitly. The instantiation of a chain of
refinements follows the instantiation of a single machine as seen in Fig. 3.15.
INSTANTIATED REFINEMENT QChannel M2
INSTANTIATES Channel M2 VIA ChannelParameters C2
REFINES -
SEES ProtocolTypes C2
REPLACE
SETS Message := Request
CONSTANTS max size := qmax size
header := qHeader
body := qBody
RENAME
VARIABLES channel := qchannel
receivingBuffer := qReceivingBuffer
sendingBuffer := qSendingBuffer
EVENTS Send := QSend
m := q
receive := Receive
m := q
END
Figure 3.15: Instantiation of a chain of refinements
The initial refinement level corresponds to the most abstract machine of the pattern.
Therefore it is not necessary to explicitly refer to it. The final refinement level is any
of the other refinement levels in the chain. The replacement and renaming is applied to
the occurrences in both instances whenever applicable. Once again it is not necessary to
“expand” QChannel M2 but that can be seen in Fig. 3.16. In an instantiation of a chain
of refinements, the pattern context is seen as a flat context comprising all the properties
seen by the refinements until the selected final refinement level is reached. Therefore
context ProtocolTypes C2 is the parameterisation context for QChannel M2 and extends
ProtocolTypes, similarly to the relation between contexts ChannelParameters C2 and
ChannelParameters. As before, axioms in ProtocolTypes C2 must be respected in the
instance, so axioms are converted in theorems in QChannel M2.
3.5.3 Definition of Generic Instantiation of Refinements
From the case study it is possible to draw a generic definition for the instantiation of a
chain of refinements. If we consider a pattern that consists of a chain of refinements M1,
M2, . . . Mt, we can create a generic instantiated refinement IR as seen in Fig. 3.17. The
instantiated refinement IR instantiates one of the refinements of the pattern Mt via the
parameterisation context Ctxt. IR refines an abstract machine IR0 and sees the context
Dw containing the instance properties. The replacement and renaming are similar to
the machine instantiation but apply to both M1 and Mt. The initial level does not
need to be explicitly defined since the most abstract level of the chain is automatically
considered. Therefore M1 is automatically defined as the initial level. In addition to the
validity checks for instantiated machines, instantiated refinements require:
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!QChannel_M2
!1 !machine QChannel_M2 refines QChannel_M1
!2 !sees ProtocolTypes_C2
!3 !
!4 !variables qchannel qReceivingBuffer
!5 ! ! !  qSendingBuffer qStoreDATA
!6 !
!7 !invariants
!8 !  @inv1 qStoreDATA ! DESTINATION ! "(DATA)
!9 !  theorem @theo1 qHeader ! Request " DESTINATION
!10 !  theorem @theo2 qBody ! Request " DATA
!11 !
!12 !events
!13 !  event INITIALISATION
!14 !    then
!15 !      @act1 qchannel " #
!16 !      @act2 qSendingBuffer " #
!17 !      @act3 qReceivingBuffer " #
!18 !      @act4 qStoreDATA " DESTINATION # {#}
!19 !  end
!20 !
!21 !  event AddMessageBuffer
!22 !  refines qAddMessageBuffer
!23 !    any h b m
!24 !    where
!25 !      @grd1 qHeader(m) = h
!26 !      @grd2 qBody(m) = b
!27 !      @grd3 m $ qSendingBuffer
!28 !    then
!29 !      @act1 qSendingBuffer " qSendingBuffer${m}
!30 !  end
!31 !
!32 !  event QSend refines QSend
!33 !    any q
!34 !    where
!35 !      @grd1 qSendingBuffer % #
!36 !      @grd2 q ! qSendingBuffer
!37 !      @grd3 card(qchannel) < qmax_size
!38 !    then
!39 !      @act1 qchannel " qchannel $ {q}
!40 !      @act2 qSendingBuffer"qSendingBuffer&{q}
!41 !  end
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!QChannel_M2
!42 !
!43 !  event QSend refines QSend
!44 !    any q
!45 !    where
!46 !      @grd1 qSendingBuffer ! !
!47 !      @grd2 q " qSendingBuffer
!48 !      @grd3 card(qchannel) < qmax_size
!49 !    then
!50 !      @act1 qchannel # qchannel " {q}
!51 !      @act2 qSendingBuffer#qSendingBuffer#{q}
!52 !  end
!53 !
!54 !  event Receive refines Receive
!55 !    any q
!56 !    where
!57 !      @grd1 q " qchannel
!58 !      @grd2 q $ qReceivingBuffer
!59 !    then
!60 !      @act1 qchannel # qchannel#{q}
!61 !      @act2 qReceivingBuffer#qReceivingBuffer"{q}
!62 !  end
!63 !
!64 !  event processMessage
!65 !    any m dest d
!66 !    where
!67 !      @grd1 m " qReceivingBuffer
!68 !      @grd2 qHeader(m) = dest
!69 !      @grd3 d = qBody(m)
!70 !      @grd4 qHeader(m) " dom (qStoreDATA)
!71 !    then
!72 !      @act1 qStoreDATA(dest)#qStoreDATA(dest)"{d}
!73 !  end
!74 !end
!75 !
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(a)!ProtocolTypes_C2
!1 !context ProtocolTypes_C2 extends ProtocolTypes 
!2 !
!3 !constants qHeader qBody pHeader pBody 
!4 !
!5 !sets DATA DESTINATION 
!6 !
!7 !axioms
!8 !  @axm3 qHeader ! Request ! DESTINATION
!9 !  @axm4 qBody ! Request ! DATA
!10 !  @axm5 pHeader ! Response ! DESTINATION
!11 !  @axm6 pBody ! Response ! DATA
!12 !end
!13 !
!Page 1
(b)
Figure 3.16: Expanded version of instantiated machine QChannel M2 (a) and context
ProtocolTypes C2 (c)
1. A static validation for the existence of a chain of refinements for M
(M1,M2, . . . ,Mt).
2. The types and constants in the contexts seen by the initial and final level of
refinement should be instantiated.
The instantiation of refinements reuses the pattern proof obligations in the sense that
the instantiation renames and replaces elements in the model but does not change the
model itself (nor the respective properties). The correctness of the refinement instantia-
INSTANTIATED REFINEMENT IR
INSTANTIATES Mt VIA Ctxt
REFINES IR0 /* abstract machine */
SEES Dw /* context containing the instance properties */
REPLACE /* replace parameters defined in context C */
SETS S1 := DS1, . . . , Sm := DSm /* Carrier Sets */
CONSTANTS C1 := DC1, . . . , Cn := DCn /* Constants */
RENAME /*rename variables, events and params in M1 to Mt */
VARIABLES v1 := nv1, . . . , vq := nvq
EVENTS ev1 := nev1 / ∗ optional ∗ /
p1 := np1, . . . , ps := nps / ∗ parameters :optional ∗ /
. . .
evr := nevr
END
Figure 3.17: An Instantiated Refinement
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tion relies in reusing the pattern proof obligations and ensuring the assumptions in the
context parameterisation are satisfied in the instantiation.
3.6 Instantiating Theorems and Invariants
Theorems in contexts and machines are assertions about characteristics and properties
of the system. Theorems have associated proof obligations that are discharged based
on the model assumptions (axioms and invariants) . Once the theorems are discharged,
they can be used as hypotheses for discharging other proof obligations in the model,
since they work as a consequence of the assumptions.
An interesting question arises when a pattern is instantiated and contains theorems and
invariants. If a proof obligation of a theorem is discharged by creating an instance we
would not want to re-prove the theorem proof. Regarding the invariants and respective
proof obligations we would have a similar situation where we would not want to dis-
charge proof obligations in the instance if they were already discharged in the pattern.
Ideally we would like to add to the instance the assumptions and assertions given by
the theorems and invariants without re-proving them. Although addressed here as an
open question, this situation suggests a different kind of theorem that does not exist in
Event-B, a pre-proved theorem to be used in the instance. A pre-proved theorem would
be similar to a theorem but it would not have an associated proof obligation. The in-
variants imported from the pattern fall under the same category, where the respective
proof obligations should not be re-generated. Informally the instances are just renaming
and replacing elements without changing the semantics under the original pattern (if the
validity checks are followed) so theorems and invariants would work as assumptions in
the instantiated machine. The assumptions in the pattern (axioms) need to be satisfied
by the instances through the generation of proof obligations but the same does not apply
for invariants and theorems that are assertions in the pattern.
3.7 Conclusions
Reusability is of significant interest in the general software engineering research com-
munity. Reuse has its advantages and disadvantages discussed by Standish [176] and
Cheng [55]. Reusing patterns in a style similar to design patterns is proposed in [63]
using the KAOS specification language and temporal logic. KAOS goals are combined
with existing patterns, that are already proved correct and complete and proofs can
be reused. Sabatier [154] discusses the reuse of formal models as a detailed component
specification or a high level requirement, and presents some real project examples. In
classical B [158, 4], reuse is expressed using the keywords INCLUDES and USES where
an existing machine can be used in other developments. Instantiation is a way of reusing.
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Instantiation is well-established in areas such as mathematics and other formal methods
like classical B or theorem provers such as Isabelle [137]. Blazy et al. [33] reuse Gang of
Four (GoF) design pattern adapted to formal specifications (denominated specification
patterns) for classical B. Several reuse mechanisms are suggested like instantiation, com-
position and extension. Proof obligations are also reused when the patterns are applied.
Focusing on the instantiation, this is achieved by renaming sets (machine parameters),
variables and operations. Unlike our work, this approach only defines patterns as a
single abstract machine whereas we define the parameterisation in contexts and extend
the pattern to a chain of refinements.
Abrial and Hallerstede [15] and Me´tayer et al [124] make use of generic instantiation
for Event-B. The flattening of the context is proposed in a way that the contexts of
the pattern are merged and the reuse by instantiating the flat context is suggested.
Following and extending that approach, we:
• propose a methodology for the implementation of generic instantiation.
• define a generic instantiation mechanism for a machine as an instantiated machine.
• define a generic instantiation mechanism for a chain of refinement as an instantiated
refinement.
• show that that generic proofs can be reused in specific instances under the condi-
tions described in Sects. 3.3.3, 3.3.4 and 3.5.3.
The motivation for such implementation is concerned with reusability of components
and existing developments. By creating an instance from a generic model, a new pa-
rameterised model is created based on the pattern with new specific properties.
Event-B supports generic developments but lacks the capacity to instantiate and reuse
those generic developments. As a solution, generic instantiation is applied to patterns
and as an outcome instantiated machines are created and parameterised. An instan-
tiated machine instantiates a generic machine, is parameterised by a context and the
pattern elements are renamed/replaced according to the instance. In a similar style,
an instantiated refinement instantiates a chain of refinements reusing the pattern proof
obligations assuming that the instantiated proof obligations are as valid as the pattern
ones. By quantifying the variables, constants and types we want to ensure that pattern
proof obligations remain valid when instantiating. Event-B is not a higher-order for-
malism: although it is possible to quantify over expression, it is not possible to directly
quantify types. Nevertheless instantiation of sequences (hypotheses and goal) is possible
as long as is done in an alpha-congruent manner. Therefore the generic proofs can be
instantiated and be used in the instance since they will also hold. A renaming plug-
in was developed supporting the renaming of Event-B elements and respective proofs.
Optimisation at level of proof renaming will be investigated in the future as it may be
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a slow operation for large proof trees. A practical case that models a communication
protocol between two entities illustrates the advantages of using generic instantiation
and in particular how to use our approach in the Rodin platform. Although a simple
case study, we believe that it can be applied to more complex cases.
Further study is required to determine if context instantiation similar to instantiated
machines is a worthwhile approach while modelling (for instance, to instantiate sets into
implementable types) Some methodological points will arise in a possible implementation
of instantiated machines and refinements in the Rodin platform. As an example, Section
3.6 addresses the situation of instantiating theorems and invariants and is left as an open
question. A future step for the instantiation of a chain of refinements is to study the
possibility of selecting any of the refinement levels as the initial refinement level giving
more freedom to the modeller. In a long term perspective, any refinement chain could be
considered a pattern. Moreover a library of patterns could be provided when modelling:
whenever a formal development fits in a pattern, instantiation could be applied taking
advantage of the reusability of the model and respective proof obligations.
Chapter 4
Decomposition
In the previous chapters we defined mechanisms for reusability. Still following that line
of work, we propose decomposition as another approach for reusing. Decomposition is
motivated by the possibility of breaking a complex problem or system into parts that are
easier to conceive, manage and maintain. The partition of a model into sub-components
can also be seen as a design/architectural decision and the further development of the
sub-components in parallel is possible. Two methods have been identified for Event-B
model decomposition: shared variable and shared event. Besides alleviating the com-
plexity for large systems and respective proofs, decomposition allows team development
in parallel over the same model which is very attractive in the industrial environment.
Moreover the proof obligations of the original (non-decomposed) model can be reused
by the sub-components. This chapter describes the work on decomposition, which is one
of the main goals of this thesis. Part of this work was accepted as a workshop paper
in Workshop on Tool Building in Formal Methods as [165] in the conference ABZ 2010
and afterwards selected to be extended and appear in a special edition of the journal
Software: Practice and Experience as [166]. This work was carried out in collaboration
with Thai Son Hoang and Carine Pascal. Our contribution was the development of the
shared event approach in terms of methodology and in terms of tool support. This is
described in more detail in Chapter 5. The decomposition tool developed for the Rodin
platform has been successfully used in several case studies such as a flash system de-
velopment [62, 60], decomposition of a space craft system [73], development of a cruise
control system, development of a pipeline system, among other works.
4.1 Introduction
The “top-down” style of development used in Event-B allows the introduction of new
events and data-refinement of variables during refinement steps. A consequence of this
development style is an increasing complexity of the refinement process when dealing
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with many events and state variables. The main purpose of the model decomposition
is precisely to address such difficulty by cutting a large model into smaller components.
The complexity of the whole model (also referred as original model) is decreased by
studying, and thus refining, each part independently of the others [124]. Two methods
have been identified for the Event-B decomposition: shared variable [15, 8] and shared
event [45, 47]. Moreover the decomposition also partitions the POs which are expected
to be easier to be discharged in the sub-components. From another point of view, shared
event decomposition is the inverse operation of shared event composition described in
Chapter 2. There it was proved that the shared approach is monotonic and therefore the
resulting sub-components could be further refined. That proof is applied to decomposi-
tion in a similar fashion following the failure-divergence definition of CSP as described
in Sect. 1.6.2. The properties of parallel composition in CSP are also the properties of
shared event decomposition. The most relevant property is monotonicity: as long as the
partition of events maintains the original events interface, the decomposition properties
hold which allow the independent refinement of sub-components. For the shared variable
composition, the monotonicity is proved in [8]. Therefore we can introduce team devel-
opment: several developers share parts of the same model but work independently and
in parallel. We propose a plug-in developed in the Rodin platform [151] that supports
these two decomposition methods for Event-B.
Section 4.2 introduces decomposition using a simple example, describing how model
properties are partition, proof obligations are split and the possibility of refining sub-
components. The definition and validity of the decomposition is illustrated in Sect. 4.3.
Section 4.4 describes the limitations of this approach. We conclude this chapter in
Sect. 4.5 with a summary of this study, discussion about related work, applications and
future work.
4.2 Decomposition Styles
The discussion about the two styles of decomposition was introduced in Sect. 1.7. The
semantics of decomposition is the syntactic composition of M1 and M2 and the proof obli-
gations for M are then derived via that syntactic composition. Consequently, machines
M1 and M2 are constructed according to descriptions in Sect. 1.7.1 and Sect. 1.7.2. The
definition of decomposition is described in Sect. 4.3. Here an example is presented to
illustrate the use of both kind of decompositions. A simple communication process is
modelled. The abstract model can be seen in Fig. 4.1.
The variable a is initialised with the constant d0 and variable b is assigned a value
non-deterministically. The initial model contains only the event copy that copies the
value of a to variable b in one single step as described in Fig. 4.2(a). A refinement
of Communication (Communication M1 ) introduces a middleware entity that stores
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!Communication_M0
!machine Communication_M0
!
!sees Communication_C0
!
!variables a b
!
!invariants
!  @inv1 a ! DATA
!  @inv2 b ! DATA
!
!events
!  event INITIALISATION
!    then
!      @act1 a " d0
!      @act2 b :! DATA
!  end
!
!  event copy
!    then
!      @act1 b " a
!  end
!end
!
!Page 1
(a) Machine Communication M0
!Communication_C0
!context Communication_C0
!
!constants d0 
!
!sets DATA 
!
!axioms
!  @axm1 d0 ! DATA
!end
!
!Page 1
(b) Context Communication C0
Figure 4.1: Event-B model of the Communication example
temporarily the value of a before copying it to b as seen in Fig. 4.2(b). Variable m
represents the middleware.
(a) Diagram of abstract ma-
chine Communication M0
(b) Diagram of Communication M1, refine-
ment of Communication M0
Figure 4.2: Diagrams corresponding to the Simple Communication example
Butler [47, 46] suggests an event refinement diagram to decompose atomicity and we use
it to show the refinement relationship between the events in Communication M0 and
Communication M1 as seen in Fig. 4.3. In fact we are decomposing the initial single
atomic operation into two steps using a middleware. The diagram is read from left to
Figure 4.3: Event refinement diagram illustrating atomicity decomposition
right and that indicates its sequential control. In other words, the abstract event copy
is refined by first executing the initialisation event (Init), then event copy 1 and after-
wards copy 2. In the same figure, the lines that link the events are relevant: a dashed
line represents events that refine skip (such as Init and copy 1(p)). A solid line defines
a refinement relation between events. Thus event copy 2 must be proved to refine copy.
The refinement Communication M1 can be seen in Fig. 4.4. Note that a control variable
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ctrl is introduced to ensure when the content of m can be copied to b. Invariant inv3 ex-
!Communication_M1
!machine Communication_M1 refines Communication_M0
!
!sees Communication_C0
!
!variables a b m ctrl
!
!invariants
!  @inv1 m ! DATA
!  @inv2 ctrl ! BOOL
!  @inv3 ctrl = TRUE ⇒ m = a
!
!variant {ctrl,TRUE}
!
!events
!  event INITIALISATION
!    then
!      @act1 a " d0
!      @act2 b :! DATA
!      @act3 m :! DATA
!      @act4 ctrl " FALSE
!  end
!
!  convergent event copy_1
!    any p
!    where
!      @grd1 p = a
!      @grd2 ctrl = FALSE
!    then
!      @act1 m " p
!      @act2 ctrl " TRUE
!  end
!
!  event copy_2 refines copy
!    where
!      @grd1 ctrl = TRUE
!    then
!      @act1 b " m
!      @act2 ctrl " FALSE
!  end
!end
!
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!Communication_M1
!machine Communication_M1 refines Communication_M0
!
!sees Communication_C0
!
!variables a b m ctrl
!
!invariants
!  @inv1 m ! DATA
!  @inv2 ctrl ! BOOL
!  @inv3 ctrl = TRUE ⇒ m = a
!
!variant {ctrl,TRUE}
!
!events
!  event INITIALISATION
!    then
!      @act1 a " d0
!      @act2 b :! DATA
!      @act3 m :! DATA
!      @act4 ctrl " FALSE
!  end
!
!  convergent event copy_1
!    any p
!    where
!      @grd1 p = a
!      @grd2 ctrl = FALSE
!    then
!      @act1 m " p
!      @act2 ctrl " TRUE
!  end
!
!  event copy_2 refines copy
!    where
!      @grd1 ctrl = TRUE
!    then
!      @act1 b " m
!      @act2 ctrl " FALSE
!  end
!end
!
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Figure 4.4: Machine Communication M1 refinement of Communication M0
presses that when variable ctrl is true, the value of the middleware m corresponds to the
value of source a. This invariant can be seen as a requirement for the refinement between
abstract event Communication M0.copy and concrete event Communication M1.copy 2.
The convergent event copy 1 requires a variant that guarantees that this event is not
enabled forever. Such variant is expressed as {ctrl, TRUE} which means that eventually
the control variable ctrl will be TRU and in that case copy 1 event is not enabled.
Depending on the chosen decomposition style, a system can be decomposed into different
number of sub-components as seen in the following sections. In the rest of this section, we
give an informal introduction to the two decomposition styles using a running example.
In Sect. 4.3 we give decomposition a precise definition and show that they represent
valid refinements.
4.2.1 Shared Event Decomposition of Communication
From the modeller’s point of view, the decomposition starts by defining which sub-
components will be generated. The following step is to define the partition of variables
over the sub-components. The rest of the model decomposition (events, parameters,
invariants, contexts) is a consequence of the variables allocation as defined below. For
the shared event decomposition, we decompose Communication M1 in three parts: MA,
MB and MM as seen in Fig. 4.5.
Variable a is allocated to machine MA, variables m and ctrl to machine MM and variable
b to machine MB. It follows that event copy 1 is split between MA and MM and event
copy 2 is split between MB and MM. The resulting machines can be seen in Fig. 4.6.
Next we describe the steps for a machine decomposition focusing on invariants, events,
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Figure 4.5: Decomposition of Communication M1 into machines MA,MB and MM
!MA
!machine MA
!
!sees Communication_C0
!
!variables a
!
!invariants
! !@inv1 a ! DATA
!
!events
!  event INITIALISATION
!    then
!      @act1 a " d0
!  end
!
!  event copy_1
!    any
!    !p
!    when
!       @grd1 p = a
!  end
!
!end
!
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(a) Machine MA
!MM
!machine MM
!
!sees Communication_C0
!
!variables m ctrl
!
!invariants
!    @inv1 m ! DATA
! !@inv2 ctrl ! BOOL
!
!events
!  event INITIALISATION
!    then
!      @act1 m :! DATA
!      @act2 ctrl " FALSE
!  end
!
!  event copy_1
!    any p
!    where
!      @grd1 p ! DATA
!      @grd2 ctrl = FALSE
!    then
!      @act1 m " p
!      @act2 ctrl " TRUE
!  end
!
!  event copy_2
!    any p
!    where
!      @grd1 ctrl = TRUE
!      @grd2 p = m
!    then
!      @act2 ctrl " FALSE
!  end
!end
!
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(b) Machine MM
!MB
!machine MB
!
!sees Communication_C0
!
!variables b
!
!invariants
! !@inv1 b ! DATA
!
!events
!  event INITIALISATION
!    then
!      @act2 b :! DATA
!   end
!
!  event copy_2
!    any
!     !p
!    when
!      @grd1 p ! DATA
!    then
!      @act1 b " p
!  end
!end
!
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(c) Machine MB
Figure 4.6: Machines MA, MM and MB
variant and contexts. The initial partition of variables between the sub-components
defines the rest of the decomposition as detailed below.
Invariants: The decomposition of the invariants depends on the scope of the variables.
Therefore the minimal set of invariants must include the variable type definitions
as illustrated by inv1 and inv2 in Communication M1 (Fig. 4.4) or inv1 and inv2
in MM (Fig. 4.6(b)). And these are the required invariants for a valid refinement.
Additional ones depend on the user, as they may be useful in later refinements
or to help in reusing the sub-components. An example of partition of invariants
among the sub-components is inv3 in Communication M1 :
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ctrl = TRUE⇒m = a
This invariant contains three variables: ctrl, m and a. According to the defined
decomposition, ctrl and m are variables of MM and a is a variable of MA. This
suggests that inv3 can be a constraint of the composition of the sub-components
and not a constraint of the individual sub-components. As a result, invariant
clause inv3 in Communication M1 is not part of any of the sub-components. Al-
ternatively when an invariant clause is demanded and uses variables placed outside
the scope of a sub-component, a further refinement of the composed component
might be required to make an explicit separation of the variables. If we consider
again inv3 and we would like to add this invariant to the sub-components, we
would need to find a rewrite that invariant without including variables ctrl, m and
a in the same predicate.
Events: The partition of the events depends on the partition of the variables. For
instance, variables m and ctrl are part of MM so their initialisation is allocated
to the same sub-component. Event copy 1 in machine Communication M1 has a
parameter p. When the decomposition occurs, that parameter is shared between
the decomposed events. But the guards referring to that parameter are different
in each decomposed event: in MA the guard is similar to Communication M1
(p = a); in MM only the type of the parameter p is defined (p ∈ DATA). The
type of p is an implicit guard in the original event and during the decomposition,
the type of p is made explicit:
p = a⇔ p ∈ DATA ∧ p = a
The guards of a decomposed event inherits the guards on the composed event
according to the variable partition. Variable a is not within the scope of machine
MM so only the type of p is defined in the guard of MM.copy 1.
A different situation occurs for event copy 2 in machine Communication M1. Al-
though the original event does not have parameters, the decomposed events have
a new parameter p. Action act1 in Communication M1.copy 2 refers to two vari-
ables (b and m) belonging to two different sub-components:
@act1 b := m
This assignment needs to be rewritten in a way that these variables are not part
of the same expression. A solution is to refine this event in a way that the guards
and actions do not refer to variables allocated to different sub-components. Before
the decomposition, we refine event copy 2 by adding parameter p:
copy 2 =̂ ANY p WHERE ctrl = TRUE ∧ p = m THEN b := p ‖ ctrl := FALSE END.
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Parameter p receives the value of variable m. Then the value of p is assigned to
variable b. Whereas variable m is within the scope of MM only, the guard p = m
is added to MM.copy 2 while MB.copy 2 contains the guard p ∈ DATA and the
action b := p.
Non-shared parameters do not need to be maintained in the sub-components. Since
parameters are local to events, only parameters explicitly used in guards or actions
are included in the sub-events.
Variant: Variant is only necessary when new events are introduced in a refinement.
Decomposed events in sub-components are inherit from the composed component
so no new events are introduced meaning that variants are not required.
Contexts: The context Communication C0 used in the example is shared between all
the machines. That context (and possible others) can be flattened into a single
context and decomposed. The context decomposition results from the exclusion
of elements (sets, constants, axioms) that are not used by the sub-component
that sees that context. On the one hand, decomposing contexts can inadvertently
remove relevant information. On the other hand, not decomposing it can add
too many (not relevant and unnecessary) hypotheses which is not beneficial for
the proofs: on the contrary, it might be harmful and complicate the discharge
of proofs. Therefore, the context decomposition is optional as it varies with the
system being modelled.
The events in the sub-components maintain the interface of the original events. By event
interface we refer to the structure of the original event excluding elements referring to
variables not in the scope of the sub-event.
4.2.1.1 Refinement of Sub-Components
An advantage of the decomposition is the possibility to further refine sub-components
independently from the original component and other partitions. This advantage leads
to the concept of team development over the same model by different modellers which
it is an attractive option, in particular for the industry. In this section we introduce
a database table as a refinement of the sub-component MB (resulting from the shared
event decomposition of Communication M1 ) to store the received values (registries).
The database table contains three fields: REGID, DATA and PRIORITY. The new
fields are introduced in the new context MB C0 as seen in Fig. 4.7. REGID is the iden-
tification field of all elements in the table of the database. It is defined as a constant and
represented by a subset of natural numbers (axiom axm1 in Fig. 4.7). The PRIORITY
field corresponds to the priority that a registry is processed: LOW, MEDIUM or HIGH.
The constants id0 and p0 initialise the database fields. New variables are introduced
to represent the database registries: idR and priority. An auxiliary boolean variable
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!MB_C0
!context MB_C0
!
!constants REGID LOW MEDIUM HIGH id0 p0
!
!sets PRIORITY
!
!axioms
!  @axm1 REGID ! !
!  @axm2 partition(PRIORITY, {LOW}, {MEDIUM}, {HIGH})
!  @axm3 id0 ! REGID
!  @axm4 p0 ! PRIORITY
!end
!
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Figure 4.7: Context MB C0 seen by refinement of MB
processQueue is used as a flag to enable the enqueueing of a registry in the database
when a new value is copied to b as seen in Fig. 4.8.
!MB_1
!machine MB_1 refines MB sees Communication_C0 MB_C0
!
!variables b idR processQueue priority
!
!invariants
!  @inv1 idR ! REGID ! DATA
!  @inv2 processQueue ! BOOL
!  @inv4 priority ! dom(idR) ! PRIORITY
!
!variant {processQueue,FALSE}
!
!events
!  event INITIALISATION
!    then
!      @act1 b :! DATA
!      @act2 processQueue " FALSE
!      @act3 idR " id0 " {d0}
!      @act4 priority " id0 " {p0}
!  end
!
!  event copy_2 refines copy_2
!    any p
!    where
!      @grd1 p ! DATA
!      @grd2 processQueue = FALSE
!    then
!      @act1 b " p
!      @act2 processQueue " TRUE
!  end
!
!   convergent event enqueueDB
!  #any i p
!    where
!      @grd1 processQueue = TRUE
!      @grd2 p ! PRIORITY
!      @grd3 i ! REGID$dom(idR)
!    then
!      @act1 processQueue"FALSE
!      @act3 priority(i)"p
!      @act4 idR(i)"b
!  end
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!MB_1
!machine MB_1 refines MB sees Communication_C0 MB_C0
!
!variables b idR processQueue priority
!
!invariants
!  @inv1 idR ! REGID ! DATA
!  @inv2 processQueue ! BOOL
!  @inv4 priority ! dom(idR) ! PRIORITY
!
!variant {processQueue,FALSE}
!
!events
!  event INITIALISATION
!    then
!      @act1 b :! DATA
!      @act2 processQueue " FALSE
!      @act3 idR " id0 " {d0}
!      @act4 priority " id0 " {p0}
!  end
!
!  event copy_2 refines copy_2
!    any p
!    where
!      @grd1 p ! DATA
!      @grd2 processQueue = FALSE
!    then
!      @act1 b " p
!      @act2 processQueue " TRUE
!  end
!
!   convergent event enqueueDB
!  #any i p
!    where
!      @grd1 processQueue = TRUE
!      @grd2 p ! PRIORITY
!      @grd3 i ! REGID$dom(idR)
!    then
!      @act1 processQueue"FALSE
!      @act3 priority(i)"p
!      @act4 idR(i)"b
!  end
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Figure 4.8: Machine MB 1 which is a refinement of MB
After event copy 2 is executed, new event enqueueDB adds an element to the database.
The added registry must have a fresh identification (not used before in the idR function)
and the priority of the registry is defined non-deterministically in guard grd2. A variant
is necessary for the new convergent event enqueueDB which is easily found by defining
that eventually processQueue is FALSE. A possible refinement for the current model is to
process the registries according to the priority. The priority field can also be defined more
deterministically according to the message data. In a team development environment,
the middleware could be refined while in parallel with other sub-components.
4.2.2 Shared Variable Decomposition of Communication
For the shared variable approach, we decide to do a further refinement. After copying
the values, they are processed by being stored in a simple database similar to the one
used in the shared event refinement described by context Communication C1 (equal to
MB C0 in Fig. 4.7). A boolean variable processQueue and new event enqueueDB are
also introduced as seen in Fig. 4.9. Concrete event copy 2 extends the abstract copy 2,
meaning that the concrete event is a copy of the abstract one plus additional concrete
guards, actions, parameters.
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!Communication_M2
!1 !machine Communication_M2 refines Communication_M1
!2 !sees Communication_C0 Communication_C1
!3 !
!4 !variables a b m ctrl idR processQueue priority
!5 !
!6 !invariants
!7 !  @inv1 idR ! REGID ! DATA
!8 !  @inv2 processQueue ! BOOL
!9 !  @inv4 priority!dom(idR) ! PRIORITY
!10 !
!11 !variant {processQueue,FALSE}
!12 !
!13 !events
!14 !  event INITIALISATION extends INITIALISATION
!15 !    then
!16 !      @act5 processQueue " FALSE
!17 !      @act6 idR " id0 " {d0}
!18 !      @act7 priority " id0 " {p0}
!19 !  end
!20 !
!21 !  event copy_2 extends copy_2
!22 !    where
!23 !      @grd3 processQueue = FALSE
!24 !    then
!25 !      @act3 processQueue " TRUE
!26 !  end
!27 !
!28 !  convergent event enqueueDB
!29 !    any i p
!30 !    where
!31 !      @grd1 processQueue = TRUE
!32 !      @grd2 p ! PRIORITY
!33 !      @grd3 i ! REGID#dom(idR)
!34 !    then
!35 !      @act1 processQueue"FALSE
!36 !      @act3 priority(i)"p
!37 !      @act4 idR(i)"b
!38 !  end
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!Communication_M2
!1 !machine Communication_M2 refines Communication_M1
!2 !sees Communication_C0 Communication_C1
!3 !
!4 !variables a b m ctrl idR processQueue priority
!5 !
!6 !invariants
!7 !  @inv1 idR ! REGID ! DATA
!8 !  @inv2 processQueue ! BOOL
!9 !  @inv4 priority!dom(idR) ! PRIORITY
!10 !
!11 !variant {processQueue,FALSE}
!12 !
!13 !events
!14 !  event INITIALISATION extends INITIALISATION
!15 !    then
!16 !      @act5 processQueue " FALSE
!17 !      @act6 idR " id0 " {d0}
!18 !      @act7 priority " id0 " {p0}
!19 !  end
!20 !
!21 !  event copy_2 extends copy_2
!22 !    where
!23 !      @grd3 processQueue = FALSE
!24 !    then
!25 !      @act3 processQueue " TRUE
!26 !  end
!27 !
!28 !  convergent event enqueueDB
!29 !    any i p
!30 !    where
!31 !      @grd1 processQueue = TRUE
!32 !      @grd2 p ! PRIORITY
!33 !      @grd3 i ! REGID#dom(idR)
!34 !    then
!35 !      @act1 processQueue"FALSE
!36 !      @act3 priority(i)"p
!37 !      @act4 idR(i)"b
!38 !  end
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Figure 4.9: Excerpt of machine Communication M2
Communication M2 is shared variable decomposed by separating the copy of the values
and the processing, described by machines MCopy and MProcess respectively. Events
copy 1 and copy 2 are allocated to MCopy while event enqueueDB is allocated to MPro-
cess. The variables separation depends on the event allocation leading to private vari-
ables (accessed by a single sub-component) or shared variables (accessed by multiple
sub-components). The shared variables are used in events copy 2 and enqueueDB : pro-
cessQueue and b. All the other variables are private. The invariants splitting depends
on the initial separation of variables, similar to the shared event approach.
The following step is to separate the private events and create the external events. Pri-
vate events are allocated according to the user’s choice. External events are based on the
original events, preserving the shared variables and turning private variables into event
parameters. If an original event depends on a shared variable, then an external event
is created in the sub-components that use that variable. Events copy 2 and enqueueDB
use shared variables and consequently external events are required. An external event
copy 2 is created in MProcess using the shared variable b. The other variables used by
the original copy 2 become parameters in the external event as they are not in the scope
of that sub-component (ctrl and m). Event enqueueDB is similarly built. The resulting
machines can be seen in Fig. 4.10.
4.3 Definition and Validity of Decomposition
We want to formally prove that a machine M can be decomposed into machines M1
and M2. We shall prove through refinement POs that M v M1 ‖ M2. The proofs are
described in the following sections.
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!MCopy
!1 !machine MCopy sees Communication_C0 Communication_C1
!2 !
!3 !variables m // Private variable
!4 !          a // Private variable
!5 !          ctrl // Private variable
!6 !          processQueue // Shared variable, DO NOT REFINE
!7 !          b // Shared variable, DO NOT REFINE
!8 !
!9 !invariants
!10 !  theorem @typing_m m ! DATA
!11 !  theorem @typing_a a ! DATA
!12 !  theorem @typing_ctrl ctrl ! BOOL
!13 !  theorem @typing_processQueue processQueue ! BOOL
!14 !  theorem @typing_b b ! DATA
!15 !  @Communication_M0_inv1 a ! DATA
!16 !  @Communication_M0_inv2 b ! DATA
!17 !  @Communication_M1_inv1 m ! DATA
!18 !  @Communication_M1_inv2 ctrl ! BOOL
!19 !  @Communication_M1_inv3 ctrl = TRUE ⇒ m = a
!20 !  @Communication_M2_inv2 processQueue ! BOOL
!21 !
!22 !events
!23 !  event INITIALISATION
!24 !    then
!25 !      @act1 a " d0
!26 !      @act2 b :! DATA
!27 !      @act3 m :! DATA
!28 !      @act4 ctrl " FALSE
!29 !      @act5 processQueue " FALSE
!30 !  end
!31 !
!32 !  event copy_1
!33 !    any p
!34 !    where
!35 !      @grd1 p = a
!36 !      @grd2 ctrl = FALSE
!37 !    then
!38 !      @act1 m " p
!39 !      @act2 ctrl " TRUE
!40 !  end
!41 !
!42 !
!43 !
!44 !
!45 !
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!MCopy
!1 !machine MCopy sees Communication_C0 Communication_C1
!2 !
!3 !variables m // Private variable
!4 !          a // Private variable
!5 !          ctrl // Private variable
!6 !          processQueue // Shared variable, DO NOT REFINE
!7 !          b // Shared variable, DO NOT REFINE
!8 !
!9 !invariants
!10 !  theorem @typing_m m ! DATA
!11 !  theorem @typing_a a ! DATA
!12 !  theorem @typing_ctrl ctrl ! BOOL
!13 !  theorem @typing_processQueue processQueue ! BOOL
!14 !  theorem @typing_b b ! DATA
!15 !  @Communication_M0_inv1 a ! DATA
!16 !  @Communication_M0_inv2 b ! DATA
!17 !  @Communication_M1_inv1 m ! DATA
!18 !  @Communication_M1_inv2 ctrl ! BOOL
!19 !  @Communication_M1_inv3 ctrl = TRUE ⇒ m = a
!20 !  @Communication_M2_inv2 processQueue ! BOOL
!21 !
!22 !events
!23 !  event INITIALISATION
!24 !    then
!25 !      @act1 a " d0
!26 !      @act2 b :! DATA
!27 !      @act3 m :! DATA
!28 !      @act4 ctrl " FALSE
!29 !      @a t5 processQueue " FALSE
!30 ! end
!31 !
!32 !  event copy_1
!33 !    any p
!34 !  whe
!35 !      @grd1 p = a
!36 !      @grd2 ctrl = FALSE
!37 !    then
!38 !      @act1 m " p
!39 !      @act2 ctrl " TRUE
!40 !  end
!41 !
!42 !
!43 !
!44 !
!45 !
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!MCopy
! 6 !  event copy_2
! 7 !    any p
! 8 !  where
! 9 !      @grd1 ctrl = TRUE
!50 !      @grd2 p = m
!51 !      @grd3 processQueue = FALSE
!52 !    then
!53 !      @act1 b ! p
!54 !      @act2 ctrl ! FALSE
!55 !      @act3 processQueue ! TRUE
!56 !  end
!57 !
!58 !  event enqueue B // External event, DO NOT REFINE
!59 !    any i p idR
!60 !    where
!61 !      @typing_idR idR " !(" ! DATA)
!62 !      @grd1 processQueue = TRUE
!63 !      @grd2 p " PRIORITY
!64 !      @grd3 i " REGID"dom(idR)
!65 !    then
!66 !      @act1 processQueue!FALSE
!67 !  end
!68 !end
!69 !
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(a)
(b)
Figure 10. Excerpt of the output of shared variable decomposition of
Communication M2 : MCopy and MProcess
automatic decomposition method using LOTOS [16]: the correctness is ensured if the combined
behavior of decomposed sub-specifications is the same as the system’s behavior before the
decomposition. The method decomposes a process into two processes composed by the parallel
operator and automatically generates an additional process that gives some information about
the synchronization. The additional process corresponds to the middleware in a shared event
decomposition in Event-B.
There is a need for modularisation and reuse of sub-components in order to model large
systems and manage better the respective POs. Event-B lacks a sub-component mechanism so
we propose to tackle that problem through the decomposition of a system by their events
or variables. The shared variable (state-based) approach is suitable for designing parallel
algorithms while the shared event (event-based) is suitable for message-passing distributed
systems [10]. [3] suggests the shared variable decomposition where variables are shared
and introduces the notion of external events. [10] suggests the shared event decomposition
where events are partition through the sub-components and the interaction occurs via shared
parameters. The work developed by Butler in [7] for action system is strongly related with
the same approach for shared event decomposition in Event-B [10] as both approaches are
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!MProcess
!1 !machine MProcess sees Communication_C0 Communication_C1
!2 !
!3 !variables processQueue // Shared variable, DO NOT REFINE
!4 !          b // Shared variable, DO NOT REFINE
!5 !          priority // Private variable
!6 !          idR // Private variable
!7 !
!8 !
!9 !invariants
!10 !  theorem @typing_processQueue processQueue ! BOOL
!11 !  theorem @typing_b b ! DATA
!12 !  theorem @typing_priority priority ! !(" ! PRIORITY)
!13 !  theorem @typing_idR idR ! !(" ! DATA)
!14 !  @Communication_M0_inv2 b ! DATA
!15 !  @Communication_M2_inv1 idR ! REGID # DATA
!16 !  @Communication_M2_inv2 processQueue ! BOOL
!17 !  @Communication_M2_inv4 priority!dom(idR) " PRIORITY
!18 !
!19 !events
!20 !  event INITIALISATION
!21 !    then
!22 !      @act2 b :! DATA
!23 !      @act5 processQueue " FALSE
!24 !      @act6 idR " id0 ! {d0}
!25 !      @act7 priority " id0 ! {p0}
!26 !  end
!27 !
!28 !  event copy_2 // External event, DO NOT REFINE
!29 !    any p ctrl m
!30 !    where
!31 !      @typing_ctrl ctrl ! BOOL
!32 !      @typing_m m ! DATA
!33 !      @grd1 ctrl = TRUE
!34 !      @grd2 p = m
!35 !      @grd3 processQueue = FALSE
!36 !    then
!37 !      @act1 b " p
!38 !      @act3 processQueue " TRUE
!39 !  end
!40 !
!41 !
!42 !
!43 !
!44 !
!45 !
!46 !  event enqueueDB
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!MProcess
!1 !machine MProcess sees Communication_C0 Communication_C1
!2 !
!3 !variables processQueue // Shared variable, DO NOT REFINE
!4 !          b // Shared variable, DO NOT REFINE
!5 !          priority // Private variable
!6 !          idR // Private variable
!7 !
!8 !
!9 !invariants
!10 !  theorem @typing_processQueue processQueue ! BOOL
!11 !  theorem @typing_b b ! DA A
!12 !  theorem @typing_priority priority ! !(" ! PRIORITY)
!13 !  theorem @typing_idR idR ! !(" ! DATA)
!14 !  @Communication_M0_inv2 b ! DATA
!15 !  @Communication_M2_inv1 idR ! REGID # DATA
!16 !  @Communication_M2_inv2 processQueue ! BOOL
!17 !  @Communication_M2_inv4 priority!dom(idR) " PRIORITY
!18 !
!19 !events
!20 !  event INITIALISATION
!21 !    then
!22 !      @act2 b :! DATA
!23 !      @act5 processQueue " FALSE
!24 !      @act6 idR " id0 ! {d0}
!25 ! @act7 priority " id0 ! {p0}
!26 !  end
!27 !
!28 !  event copy_2 // External event, DO NOT REFINE
!29 !    any p ctrl m
!30 !    where
!31 !      @typing_ctrl ctrl ! BOOL
!32 !      @typing_m m ! DATA
!33 !      @g d1 ctrl = TRUE
!34 !      @grd2 p = m
!35 !      @grd3 processQueue = FALSE
!36 !    then
!37 !      @act1 b " p
!38 !      @act3 processQueue " TRUE
!39 !  end
!40 !
!41 !
!42 !
!43 !
!44 !
!45 !
!46 !
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!MProcess
!47 !  event enqueueDB
!48 !    any i p
!49 !    where
!50 !      @grd1 processQueue = TRUE
!51 !      @grd2 p ! PRIORITY
!5 !      @grd3 i ! REGID!dom(idR)
!53 !    then
!54 !   @act1 processQueue"FALSE
!55 !    @act3 priority(i)"p
!56 !      @act4 idR(i)"b
!57 !  end
!58 !end
!59 !
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Figure 10. Excerpt of the output of shared variable decomposition of
Com unication M2 : MCopy nd MProc ss
automatic decomposition method using LOTOS [16]: the correctness is ensured if the combined
behavior of decomposed sub-specifications is the same as the system’s behavior before the
decomposition. The method decomposes a process into two processes composed by the parallel
operator and automatically generates an ad itional process that gives ome information about
the synchronization. The ad itional process corresponds to the mid leware in a shared event
decomposition in Event-B.
There is a ne d for modularisation and reuse of sub-components in order to model large
systems and manage better the respective POs. Event-B lacks a sub-component mechanism so
we propose to tackle that problem through the decomposition of a system by their events
or variables. The shared variable (state-based) ap roach is suitable for designing parallel
algorithms while the shared event (event-based) is suitable for message-passing distributed
systems [10]. [3] sug ests the shared variable decomposition where variables are shared
and introduces the notion of external events. [10] sug ests the shared event decomposition
where events are partition through the sub-components and the interaction occurs via shared
parameters. The work developed by Butler in [7] for action system is strongly related with
the same ap roach for shared event decomposition in Event-B [10] as both ap roaches are
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Figure 4.10: Excerpt of the output of shared variable decomposition of Communica-
tion M2 : MCopy and MProcess
4.3.1 Shared Event Style
Assume machine M with tw set of di joint variables v1, v2. F the shared vent
decomposition, events can be categorised in 3 ways: evt1(p1, v1), evt2(p2, v2) and
evt3(p3, v1, v2). evt1(p1, v1) is local toM1, evt2(p2, v2) is local toM2 and evt3(p3, v1, v2)
is split into evt3′(p3, v1) and evt3′′(p3, v2). The invariant ofM is represented by I(v1, v2)
(for simplicity we exclude the use of context el ments). Machin M1 is represented by
variable v1, w1 and events evt1(p1, v1) and evt3′(p3, v1). The inv riant of M1 is rep-
resented by J1(v1, w1). Machine M2 is similar to M1 with variable v2, w2, events
evt2(p2, v2), evt3′′(p3, v2) and i variant J2(v2, w2).
We want to prove that M1 and M2 when composed in parallel are a valid refinement
of M . The refinement POs need to be verified for M1 ‖ M2 in order to ensure that is
a concrete refinement of the abstraction M : M v M1 ‖ M2. Events of the form evt3
have the following shape:
evt3 =̂ ANY p3 WHERE G31(p3, v1) ∧G32(p3, v2) THEN S31(p3, v1, v′1) ‖ S32(p3, v2, v′2) END.
Definition 4.1. After the decomposition, event evt3 is decomposed into events evt3′
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and evt3′′ that are defined as:
evt3′ =̂ ANY p3 WHERE G31(p3, v1) THEN S31(p3, v1, v′1) END
evt3′′ =̂ ANY p3 WHERE G32(p3, v2) THEN S32(p3, v2, v′2) END.
in a way such that evt3 v evt3′||evt3′′.
Abstract machine M(v1, v2) is decomposed into machines M1(v1) and M2(v2). When
the events resulting from the shared event decomposition are composed, they are a valid
refinement of the respective abstract event. Abstract event evt3(p3, v1, v2) is decomposed
into events evt3′(p3, v1) and evt3′′(p3, v2) as long as the set of variables v1 and v2 are
disjoint. Moreover, the guards and actions of events evt3′(p3, v1) and evt3′′(p3, w2) result
from the original abstract event referring only to their respective set of variables. The
set of parameters p3 is the same for the three events. We consider that sub-components
do not introduce additional invariants.
Theorem 4.1. If M1 and M2 are the resulting machines from shared event decomposition
of M , then M vM1 ‖M2. In other words, REFevtiv(evti′‖evti′′) holds, where evti is an
abstract event, evti′ is the resulting decomposed event in machine M1 and evti′′ is the
resulting decomposed event in machine M2.
From the refinement PO for machines (1.5), we need to prove that the resulting events
after the decomposition refine the original abstract ones. Sub-components do not intro-
duce additional invariants. Consequently J1(v1, w1) = J2(v2, w2) = TRUE. For events
of form evt1 and evt2, the resulting events are exactly the same as the original ones.
For events of form evt3:
REFevt3v(evt3′‖evt3′′) : I1(v1, v2)
∧ J1(v1, w1) ∧ J2(v2, w2)
∧H31(p3, v1) ∧H32(p3, v2)
∧ T31(p3, v1, v′1) ∧ T32(p3, v2, v′2)
` ∃v′1, v′2 ·G31(p3, v1) ∧G32(p3, v2)
∧ S31(p3, v1, v′1) ∧ S32(p3, v2, v′2)
∧ J1(v′1, w′1) ∧ J2(v′2, w′2), (4.1)
w1 and w2 are concrete variables in the refinement.
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Also assume:
v1 ∩ v2 = ∅
J1(v1, w1) = TRUE (4.2)
J2(v2, w2) = TRUE (4.3)
H31(p3, v1) = G31(p3, v1) (4.4)
H32(p3, v2) = G32(p3, v2) (4.5)
T31(p3, v1, v
′
1) = S31(p3, v1, v
′
1) (4.6)
T32(p3, v2, v
′
2) = S32(p3, v2, v
′
2) (4.7)
Prove: REFevt3v(evt3′‖evt3′′).
Proof. Assume the hypotheses of REFevt1v(evt1′‖evt1′′):
I1(v1, v2)
J1(v1, w1) ∧ J2(v2, w2) ≡ TRUE {From (4.2) and (4.3)} (4.8)
H31(p3, v1) ∧H32(p3, v2) ≡ G31(p3, v1) ∧G32(p3, v2) {From (4.4) and (4.5)} (4.9)
T31(p3, v1, v
′
1) ∧ T32(p3, v2, v′2)
≡ S31(p3, v1, v′1) ∧ S32(p3, v2, v′2) {From (4.6) and (4.7)} (4.10)
Prove:
` ∃v′1, v′2 ·G31(p3, v1) ∧G32(p3, v2) ∧ S31(p3, v1, v′1) ∧ S32(p3, v2, v′2) ∧ J1(v′1, w′1) ∧ J2(v′2, w′2).
The proof proceeds as follows:
∃v′1, v′2 ·G31(p3, v1) ∧G32(p3, v2)
∧ S31(p3, v1, v′1) ∧ S32(p3, v2, v′2)
∧ J1(v′1, w′1) ∧ J2(v′2, w′2)
≡ ∃v′1, v′2 ·G31(p3, v1) ∧G32(p3, v2)
∧ S31(p3, v1, v′1) ∧ S32(p3, v2, v′2)
∧ TRUE {From (4.8)}
≡ G31(p3, v1) ∧G32(p3, v2)
∧ ∃v′1, v′2 ·S31(p3, v1, v′1) ∧ S32(p3, v2, v′2) {G1 and G2 have free vars}
≡ TRUE
∧ TRUE {From hypotheses (4.9) and (4.10)}
M1 ‖ M2 is a valid refinement of M . In fact, they are syntactically the same apart
from the invariants that can be lost during the decomposition: M 6= M1 ‖ M2 but
M vM1 ‖M2.
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4.3.2 Shared Variable Style
Abrial and Hallerstede [15] use refinement POs to prove that the shared variable de-
composition is monotonic. In Fig. 4.111, machine M is decomposed into N and P
(represented by the diagonal arrows) which are further refined by NR and PR respec-
tively (vertical arrows). Afterwards, NR and PR are composed originating MR. To prove
monotonicity, it is necessary to prove that MR is a valid refinement of M.
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Clearly NR and PR are refined byMR, but it is not obvious thatM is refined byMR, this is precisely what we have
to prove. The situation is illustrated in the following diagram, where the arrows indicates a refinement relationship:
N P
↖ ↗
↑ M ↑
NR ↑ ? PR
↖ ↗
MR
In what follows we shall prove that, provided e1r and e2r are refinements of e1 and e2 respectively in NR,
then they also are correct refinements of e1 and e2 inMR. Similar proofs can be conducted for the other events of
MR. We first treat the case e1. We have to show that e1r is also a refinement of e1 inMR. The correct refinement
condition REF1 (Section 5.2) of e1 to e1r within NR is the following:
J(v1, w1, v2) ∧ G1r(w1) ∧ E1r(w1, w1′)
⇒
G1(v1) ∧ ∃ v1′ · (E1(v1, v1′) ∧ J(v1′, w1′, v2) )
Under this hypothesis, the following correct refinement condition of e1 to e1r withinMR clearly holds:
J(v1, w1, v2) ∧ K(v3, w3, v2) ∧ G1r(w1) ∧ E1r(w1, w1′)
⇒
G1(v1) ∧ ∃ v1′ · (E1(v1, v1′) ∧ J(v1′, w1′, v2) ∧ K(v3, w3, v2) )
As can be seen, condition K(v3, w3, v2) can be extracted from the existential quantification in the consequent of
this implication (this is so because variable v1′ does not occur free in it). It is then easily discharged because it is
already present in the antecedent of the implication.
The situation is a bit different in the case of the event e2: this is because this event modifies variable v2. We
have to prove that e2r is a refinement of e2 in MR. Next is the correct refinement condition REF1 (Section 5.2)
of e2 into e2r within NR:
J(v1, w1, v2) ∧ G2r(w1, v2) ∧ E2r(w1, w1′, v2, v2′)
⇒
G2(v1, v2) ∧ ∃ v1′ · (E2(v1, v1′, v2, v2′) ∧ J(v1′, w1′, v2′) )
The correct refinement condition of e2 into e2r withinMR is:
Figur 4.11: S red Variable Decomposition Diag am
Abrial [8] proves this property by means of state relations between the original machine
and sub-components.
4.4 Limitations
The decomposition should have a final goal: a misleading decomposition may harm the
development of a system instead of helping. For the shared variable decomposition the
partition of events is always possible in the sense that it is always possible to gener-
ate sub-components. On the other hand, that decomposition might be less significant
despite being possible: a further refinement may be more complex and not benefit the
development. The point of decomposition (correct abstraction level) is important, since
if it is done too early, the sub-component might be too abstract and will not be able to
be refined (without knowing more about the other sub-systems). If the system is de-
composed too late, it will not benefit from the approach anymore. For the shared event
decomposition, the partition of variables is not always possible for all developments.
An additional “preparation step” may be required to solve complex predicates (invari-
ants, guards, axioms) or assignments (actions) involving variables allocated to different
sub-components. This step can be achieved through refinement. Another limitation is
that the overlapping of elements in the sub-components is not allowed which sometimes
may be useful. Even in the shared variable approach, the overlapped (shared) elements
cannot be further refined independently.
1Extracted from [15]
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4.5 Conclusions
This chapter presents the decomposition of Event-B models and tool support in the
Rodin platform. Decomposition can advantageously be used to decrease the complexity
and increase the modularity of large systems, especially after several refinements. Main
benefits are the distribution of POs over the sub-components which are expected to be
easier to be discharged and the further refinement of independent sub-components in
parallel introducing team development of a model. Our goal is to develop a robust tool
to model distributed systems that can be used by academic institution and industrial
companies.
The decomposition benefits has been exploited as seen in the literature: [30, 29] study
the formal development of MAS (Multi-Agent Systems) which are complex distributed
systems to be used for critical applications using abstraction and decomposition for clas-
sical B and Event-B. Lanoix [110] also studies MAS using shared variable decomposition
to model a platoon of vehicles using Event-B. Butler [44] uses the shared event approach
in classical B to decompose a railway system into three sub-components: Train, Track
and Communication. The system is modelled and reasoned as a whole in an event-
based approach, both the physical system and the desired control behaviour.Go and
Shiratori [83] propose an automatic decomposition method using LOTOS [98]: the cor-
rectness is ensured if the combined behavior of decomposed sub-specifications is the
same as the system’s behavior before the decomposition. The method decomposes a
process into two processes composed by the parallel operator and automatically gener-
ates an additional process that gives some information about the synchronization. The
additional process corresponds to the middleware in a shared event decomposition in
Event-B. Rezazadeh and Butler [148] use classical B to model a distributed monitoring
and control system for vehicles entering and leaving a controlled area. After some refine-
ments, the model is decomposed into asynchronous sub-systems. Rezazadeh [147] and
Butler [149] introduce some guidelines for formal development of web-based applications
(distributed systems that can be accessed using a Web browser) in B-method. That for-
mal modelling considers only safety properties and a decomposition is suggested based
on the CSP style message-passing channels. Iliasov [96] suggests a kind of decomposition
based on modularization. The modules are introduced as a special case of shared vari-
able decomposition by modelling sequential systems and Event-B is extended to model a
system in the space domain. Separation logic [146, 144], an extension of the Hoare logic,
supports reasoning about shared mutable data structures in a “bottom-up” approach
where sub-components are put together and some composition properties can be proved.
Such an approach is different from ours: we follow a “top-down” approach proving the
global properties in the abstraction and decomposing only after proving the composi-
tion properties. Nevertheless Hoare and O’Hearn [93] combine the concurrent separation
logic (CSL) and CSP aiming to reason about the communication between concurrent
processes. In this work, trace semantics of parallel composition uses a composition op-
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eration on traces that partition channel ends between processes. The communication
occurs via point to point channels with value passing messages not covering divergence
nor refusals. The traces of parallel processes correspond to the separation conjunction
of the processes traces: traces(P ‖ Q) = traces(P ) ∗ traces(Q) where the alphabet
of processes P and Q are disjoint. Comparing to our shared event decomposition also
based in the CSP, value passing channels correspond to sub-components events that
communicate via shared parameters.
There is a need for modularisation and reuse of sub-components in order to model large
systems and manage better the respective POs. Event-B lacks a sub-component mech-
anism. Thus we propose to tackle that problem through the decomposition of a system
by their events or variables. The shared variable (state-based) approach is suitable
for designing parallel algorithms while the shared event (event-based) is suitable for
message-passing distributed systems [45]. Following any of these two approaches, the
parallel components of a distributed system can be refined and decomposed separately
without making any assumptions about the rest of the system. The shared variable
style relies on the work of Abrial and Hallerstede [15] where variables are shared and
exists the notion of external events. Butler [45] suggests the shared event decomposition
where events are partitioned through the sub-components and the interaction occurs via
shared parameters. The work developed by Butler in [40] for action system is strongly
related with the same approach for shared event decomposition in Event-B [45] as both
approaches are state-based formalism combined with event-based CSP. The end-user
chooses a decomposition style depending on specific systems and on its modelling pref-
erences. The decomposition configuration is stored persistently for replaying/editing
although further study is still required for this matter. We present an example of the
different styles of decomposition. A tool was developed to model distributed systems
in the Rodin platform that can be used by the industry (cf. Sect. 5.5). A visualisation
view for decomposition seems intuitive and we intend to explore it using GMF [82].

Chapter 5
Tool Support
The adoption of a technology or even a theory in detriment of another can rely on the
tool support [89]. The efficiency of the tool, how practical it is, the range of problems
it can solve and user support are some of the important points when developing a
tool. Formal methods are not different: tool support is important to add automation,
efficiency and ease the task of developing formal models. Mathematical rigour enables
modellers to analyse and verify models at any part of the program lifecycle: requirements
engineering, specification, architecture, design, implementation, testing, maintenance,
and evolution [188]. To a long time, formal methods has been primarily restricted to
various research organisations. However, it is becoming apparent that formal methods
is in the transition process from academic research to industrial application. Formal
methods tools are also in the process of transition from academic toys to industrial-
strength tools [58]. In this document we address this topic by giving tool support to the
previous described techniques: composition, decomposition and generic instantiation.
5.1 Introduction
In the previous chapters, three techniques that help the modelling of complex systems
were described. The semantics behind each one of the techniques and their advan-
tages/disadvantages were explained with the usage of small examples. Nevertheless the
broad usage of such techniques requires tool support to allow automation, to ease the
user’s effort of applying the techniques and to be more efficient. Moreover, the tool
implementation ofter unveils constraints that are not taken into account while study-
ing the techniques such as scaling, optimisation or miscellaneous other issues. A user
friendly tool can be a powerful support to a defined theory and often is the reason why
the theory may be adopted or not. Therefore we strive to have suitable tool support not
only to more easily test the strength of the technique but also to allow others to quickly
use it.
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As aforementioned, the Rodin platform [151] is the result of an EU research project.
It is a software toolset, based on modern software programming tools developed to use
Event-B notation. It is open source, based on Eclipse Platform [66] and it works has
a complement for rigorous modelling developments [49]. The aim is to benefit industry
by permitting the integration of any necessary functionality in the same tool. Rodin
contains a Static Checker that analyses Event-B components for syntactical errors (well-
formedness and typing of models), a Proof Obligation Generator for generating PO and
these obligations can be discharged by a theorem prover. An important Rodin feature is
the high level of extensibility reflected by, for instance, the ability to contribute plug-ins.
Plug-ins are components providing a certain type of service within the context of the
Eclipse workbench. By components here we mean objects that may be configured into a
system at system deployment time [66], such as the default theorem prover (B4free [21])
or model checking systems (ProB [141]). Three tools (plug-ins) resulted from the study
of the three previous techniques: shared event composition plug-in, refactory plug-in
and decomposition plug-in. These were developed for the Rodin platform although the
methodology behind them could be implemented in other platforms and even for other
formalisms.
This chapter is organised as follows: we described the tool support for shared event
composition in Section 5.2. After the generic instantiation (Section 5.3) and refactory
(Section 5.4) are outlined. Section 5.5 illustrates the decomposition tool before the
conclusions in Section 5.6.
5.2 Shared Event Composition Plug-in
A plug-in for composed machines was developed to support the shared event composition.
We extend the Rodin static checker to validate composed machines based on checks
defined in Sect. 2.3.2. POs ought to be automatically generated over the composed
machines. Currently this feature is not available but we will address this issue in the
future. The current solution to address POs is to generate a standard machine from
the composed machine. In Fig. 5.1(a), composed machine cM2 includes machines M3
and M4. cM2 is then “expanded” as a standard machine M2′ which itself refines
abstract machine M1. The composition POs (including refinement) are generated in
M2′. Generating a new machine allows the further development of the composed model.
Moreover the inspection of the composed events is beneficial based on the experience of
using the tool. In the future, we would like to still have the option to generate a new
machine, but the POs should be discharged at the composed machine as depicted in
Fig. 5.1(b).
Chapter 5 Tool Support 109
(a) (b)
Figure 5.1: Composition structure: current(a) and future(b)
5.2.1 Composed Machines
The tool implementation follows the structure described in Sect. 2.3.1 as seen in Fig. 5.2.
A new constructor is added to the Event-B syntax. This constructor, composed machine,
allows standard machines to be included : they are structured and saved in a single file.
The interaction between standard machines occur by defining which events are composed
in parallel. Moreover additional invariants, can be added to composed machine. This
is the only way to relate the state space of the included machines, since the machines
remain independent of each other. Composed machines can refine standard machines.
Consequently the abstract events must be refined by concrete ones to comply with the
refinement proof obligations.
In Fig. 5.2, composed machine Carriage M1 cmp (extracted from the case study in Chap-
ter 6) refines machine Carriage M1 and sees context Train C4. Moreover two machines
are included: Doors and CarriageInterface. In other words, we want to express that
Carriage M1 v Carriage M1 cmp ∧ Carriage M1 cmp ≡ (Doors ‖ CarriageInterface).
Moreover invariant inv1 is an additional invariant for this composed machine. There-
fore ICM (v Doors, v CarriageInterface) = I(v Doors) ∧ I(v CarriageInterface) ∧
carriage door = ∅, where v Doors, v CarriageInterface are the variables of machine
Doors and CarriageInterface respectively. The label in the front (Invariant not in-
cluded) means that the invariant clauses of the individual machines will not be in-
cluded if this composed machine is “expanded” as explained in Sect. 5.2. The interac-
tion is achieved with the composition of events: the initialisation events are composed
in parallel; also the composed event openDoors result from the composition of event
Doors.openDoors and CarriageInterface.openDoors. This composed event refines
the abstract event Carriage M1.openDoors. More composed events can be added in
a similar fashion. As future work, proof obligations should be generated directly for
composed machines.
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Figure 5.2: Pretty print of the composed machine tool
5.3 Generic Instantiation Plug-in
Generic instantiation is a technique to help the development of models. In particular
if a development matches or fits an existing pattern, that pattern (and possibly its
refinement chain) can be instantiated and reused. This is particular interesting when
we are targeting multiple instances of a generic pattern because we can benefit from the
existing proofs of the pattern (that are expected to be discharged) and customise the
instance according to a particular purpose.
In Sects. 3.3.3 and 3.5.3, we suggest a methodology for the implementation of the generic
instantiation of Event-B machines through instantiated machine (Fig. 5.3) and instan-
tiated refinement 5.4 files. The instantiation is a result of the mandatory replacement
of pattern’s sets and constants and the optional renaming of variables, parameters and
events. The user needs to supply an instance context to be used for the replacement of
sets and constants (context D in Fig. 5.3). Furthermore if the instance corresponds to a
refinement of an existing development, the abstract machine (M0) needs to be specified.
Consequently, refinement proof obligations are generated and need to be discharged by
the user.
For instantiated refinements, a pattern refinement chain is instantiated. We define as the
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INSTANTIATED MACHINE IM
INSTANTIATES M VIA Ctx
REFINES M0 /* abstract machine */
SEES D /* context containing the instance properties */
REPLACE /* replace parameters defined in context C */
SETS S1 := DS1, . . . , Sm := DSm /* Carrier Sets */
CONSTANTS C1 := DC1, . . . , Cn := DCn /* Constants */
RENAME /*rename elements in machine M */
VARIABLES v1 := nv1, . . . , vq := nvq /* optional */
EVENTS ev1 := nev1 /* optional */
p1 := np1, . . . , ps := nps /* parameters: optional */
:
evr := nevr
END
Figure 5.3: An Instantiated Machine
INSTANTIATED REFINEMENT IR
INSTANTIATES Mt VIA Ctxt
REFINES IR0 /* abstract machine */
SEES Dw /* context containing the instance properties */
REPLACE /* replace parameters defined in context C */
SETS S1 := DS1, . . . , Sm := DSm /* Carrier Sets */
CONSTANTS C1 := DC1, . . . , Cn := DCn /* Constants */
RENAME /*rename variables, events and params in M1 to Mt */
VARIABLES v1 := nv1, . . . , vq := nvq
EVENTS ev1 := nev1 / ∗ optional ∗ /
p1 := np1, . . . , ps := nps / ∗ parameters :optional ∗ /
. . .
evr := nevr
END
Figure 5.4: An Instantiated Refinement
starting point of the instantiation the most abstract machine of the refinement chain (in
the future, the abstract machine selection might be more flexible). Besides the instance
context (Dw in Fig. 5.4), the mandatory replacement of sets and constants and the
definition of the abstract machine (IR0), the modeller is given the choice to explicitly
define the last refinement machine to be refined (machine Mt).
The output of the instantiation is a new Event-B machine/refinement chain similar to
the pattern apart from the differences originated by the renaming and replacements
according to instantiated machine/refinement. Moreover to reuse the pattern proofs,
pattern axioms must be preserved in the instance and therefore theorems (refactored
from the pattern axioms) are automatically generated in the instances.
Although the structure of instantiated machines and instantiated refinements are de-
fined, we were not able to develop the tool support for instantiation due to time con-
straints. We also intend to build a library of patterns that could easily be instantiated.
This library should be categorised according to the formal modelling pattern as sug-
gested by Stepney [178]. Nevertheless the need to rename Event-B model elements, in
particular when the renaming involved a refinement chain, was strong enough for tool
support to be developed. That tool is intended to be used as part of generic instantiation
tool support. The renaming refactory framework is described in more detail in the next
section.
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5.4 Renaming Refactory Framework
The instantiation implies the renaming/replacing of some properties in the pattern. A
renaming supporting tool is required in a tool implementation of generic instantiation.
Moreover one of the most recurring requirements from users of the Rodin platform is
to have simple means for renaming modelling elements. Users want to have a unique
operation that will rename an element both at its declaration and all its occurrences. A
renaming operation entails that the renaming of an element does not modify its existing
proof state (no loss of proof) [160]. These requirements fall in the more general context
of refactoring. In software engineering, “refactoring source code” means improving the
source code without changing its overall results, and is sometimes informally referred
to as “cleaning it up”. In the case of the Rodin platform, the refactoring framework
is not intended to change the overall behaviour of the files/elements nor losing proofs.
Note that this tool is also useful for the shared event composition (Sect. 5.2) where
the occurrence of variables with the same name results in the renaming of at least one
of them (shared variables are not allowed). This section describes the developed work
for the renaming/refactory framework, giving an overview of the architecture and how
the framework works. Initially the renaming framework was designed and developed by
Stefan Hallerstede and Sonja Holl [94].
The basic requirement for the renaming framework is the ability to rename Event-
B elements. Moreover renamings involving machine refinements or context extensions
should propagate through all the occurrences of the elements even in different files
keeping the consistency of the model. “Renaming” simply renames the free identifiers
and by checking possible renaming clashes we ensure that we are not changing the
meaning of the model (apart from the change of names or labels). As a consequence,
the overall proof obligations state should not change after the renaming.
Figure 5.51 shows the renaming framework architecture. It is considered a framework
because it is designed in a generic way allowing the incorporation of other languages
(i.e. not restricted to Event-B).
The renaming framework is an Eclipse plug-in [66, 36]. The renaming operation starts
at the RefactoryManager which loads the refactoring tree in the extension points. The
refactoring tree corresponds to the structure of the language to be used: that structure
is used to navigate and find occurrences in the files. Afterwards Operation Scheduler re-
trieves the related files, the symbols (possible name clashes) and the individual renaming
operations (renaming operation is different for each element) to be applied. The run()
method checks for possible clashes, returns a clash report and requests a confirmation
before executing the renaming. Upon confirmation, the renaming is propagated in a
“top-down” style (from the abstract to the concrete level) throughout the model and
1Extracted from [160] and designed by Stefan Hallerstede and Sonja Holl
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Figure 5.5: Renaming/Refactory Architecture
related files. The possible clashes are overestimated: if the files are somehow related (for
instance, two machines share the same context but are not a refinement of each other)
a clash can be reported. Currently the refactory plug-in also uses the Rodin Indexer
plug-in [184] to accelerate the search of elements and find clashes.
The renaming can be applied to the following Event-B elements:
• variables
• carrier sets
• constants
• event parameters
• labelled elements like events, invariants, actions, guards, axioms
• machines
• contexts
Figure 5.62 represents the refactory trees when an invariant label is renamed.
The renaming operation creates a list of related files and proofs to be renamed according
to the refactory tree in the extension points.
2Extracted from [160] and designed by Hallerstede and Sonja Holl
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Figure 5.6: Refactoring Trees after processing the extension points
5.4.1 User interface
This section briefly describes how the renaming plug-in is used. After installing this plug-
in (available under the main Rodin Update site http://rodin-b-sharp.sourceforge.
net/updates) in the Event-B explorer perspective, the user selects the element to re-
name as seen in Fig. 5.7(a). After the introduction of the new name (Fig. 5.7(b)), a
list of related files is created and the possible clashes are reported as seen in Fig. 5.7(c).
Thereafter the user decides to proceed or not by confirming the renaming execution.
5.4.2 Renaming Proof Obligations
One of the initial requirements for the renaming plug-in is the renaming of proofs.
The current version (v1.1.0) supports the renaming of proofs including the renaming of
carrier sets (that was not possible in previous versions). In the Rodin platform, proof
obligations for a model are divided in three different files: Proof Obligation file (bpo),
Proof file (bpr) and Proof Status file (bps). The proof obligation (bpo) contains the
proof obligations generated by the Proof Generator (Sect. 1.5.7) for a model. The proof
file (bpr) contains the proof tree for each proof obligation including generated hypotheses
to be discharged, applied proof rules (device used to construct proofs of sequents) and
the elements (variables, carrier sets, constants, etc) that are part of the proof. Finally
the proof status file (bps) contains the state of the proof obligation: not proved or
discharged. Any change in the model regenerates a new bpo and bps file. The bpr files
are heavier (proof tree needs to be reconstructed and loaded to memory) so the proof
trees are reused whenever possible. For the renaming of proof obligation, three possible
solutions arised:
• Adding new hypotheses: after the renaming execution terminates, the proof obli-
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(a) Refactory menu
(b) New name wizard
(c) Report wizard
Figure 5.7: Refactory User Interface
gation files are updated by adding new hypotheses (something like old name =
new name) to the proof trees (in bpr files). This approach has its advantages
(fast, since proofs do not have to be replayed) and disadvantages (it is not really
refactoring since you can still see the old variables in the refactored proof). Also
it does not work for carrier sets (in Event-B, two carrier sets are always distinct).
• Renaming the proof obligation: the occurrences of the names to be changed
(old name) in the proof obligations are renamed to the new name (new name).
There are two possible implementations of this option:
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– Renaming proof tree: The occurrences of the old name are replaced with
new name at the level of the proof tree. The reasoners (generates proof
rules) for those proofs are rerun returning a new (renamed) version of the
original proof rule. The reasoners input elements in the style old name →
new name, which will be used to re-compute the reasoners recursively when
replaying the proof tree [123].
– Renaming proof files: just as machine and context files, the structure of
proof files is added to the plug-in extension-points (corresponding to bpr).
The result is renaming the occurrences directly over bpr whenever necessary.
The disadvantage of using this approach is the dependence on the proof file
structure: changes in the proof file structure would require the change of the
plug-in which is cumbersome.
We opt to use the second solution where proof trees are renamed. The leaves of the trees
need to be explored to find and rename all the occurrences but in the end, the proof
trees completely reflect the renamed element. The disadvantage is that the operation
can take some time to finish when there are many proof trees with several long leaves
(complex proofs). We intend to work on an optimisation of such renaming in the future.
5.5 Decomposition tool
Using the extensibility of the Rodin platform, a plug-in was developed for the semi-
automatic decomposition of models. The tool allows shared event and shared variable
decomposition. This work was developed in collaboration with Thai Son Hoang and
Carine Pascal. With Michael Butler, we agreed that the correct methodology to sup-
port decomposition should be different for each style: for shared variable decomposition,
the events to be allocated to each sub-component should be selected by the user; for the
shared event decomposition, variables instead are selected by the user; as much as pos-
sible, the rest of the decomposition process should not require the user’s input. Hoang
started the development of the tool by creating the interface corresponding to the de-
composition for the shared variable decomposition. Pascal continued that development
by introducing the required validations, creation of external external and shared vari-
ables. Our contribution was the development of the shared event approach in terms of
validations, splitting events, validating predicates and generating the sub-components.
Moreover, we developed the persistency file where the decomposition configuration can
be saved and re-run as many times as desired.
The decomposition originates sub-components according to the decomposition configu-
ration (allocation of variables). That configuration is stored persistently in a composed
machine (cf. Chapter 2 and [162]) for possible future reuse or editing as seen in Fig. 5.8.
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(a)
COMPOSED MACHINE CM
REFINES Mn
INCLUDES
N
P
Q
EVENTS
evt 1 REFINES Mn.evt 1
Combines Events N.evt 1 ‖ P.evt 1
. . .
evt n REFINES Mn.evt n
Combines Events P.evt n ‖ Q.evt n
END
(b)
Figure 5.8: Decomposition tool diagram for a machine Mn and composed machine
CM
The input for the decomposition is a machine of a given Rodin project selected by the
end-user. After the selection of decomposition configuration, the tool generates the
sub-components automatically. The steps to be followed in order to decompose are (we
decompose machine Mn in Fig. 5.8(a)):
1. End-user selects a machine Mn to decompose.
2. End-user defines sub-components to be generated: N, P, Q . . . .
3. End-user selects the decomposition style to use:
Shared Variable: end-user selects the events to be allocated to sub-components.
The tool automatically decomposes the rest of the model according to the
event partition (shared/private variables, external events).
Shared Event: the end-user selects the variables to be allocated for each sub-
component. The rest is done automatically.
4. The end-user can opt to decompose the seen contexts into the sub-components
similarly to the machine decomposition.
5. Sub-components are fulfilled according to the decomposition configuration. Invari-
ants depending on variables allocated to a single sub-component (private variables)
are automatically added.
6. The decomposition configuration is stored as a composed machine.
7. Sub-components N, P, Q . . . can be further refined.
For the shared event decomposition, a validation might be required to ensure that the
selected machine (Machine Mn) does not have complex predicates or assignments in-
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Figure 5.9: Graphical User Interface for the Decompositon tool
volving variables of different sub-components. That would be a hint that a further
requirement is required in the model before the decomposition.
The decomposition configuration is performed through a wizard using the Rodin’s Graph-
ical User Interface as depicted in Fig. 5.9. The decomposition configuration is stored
persistently for replaying/editing although further study is still required for this matter.
A visualisation view for decomposition seems intuitive and we intend to explore it using
GMF [82].
5.6 Conclusions
The progression and the maturity of formal methods shifted the way they are applied
nowadays. In the 1980s the application of the Z notation to the IBM CICS transaction
processing system was recognised as a major (award-winning) technical achievement,
but it is significant that it used only very simple tools: syntax and type-checkers. In the
1990s, the Mondex project was largely a paper-and-pencil exercise, but it still achieved
the highest level of certification [188]. Modelling and proving manually by hand it is still
possible but slowly the need for less error-prone methodologies, in particular for repet-
itive tasks, requires the use of tools. Developing tools to support the formal methods
process has been an activity that started with the first developments of formal methods
technology. Both the underlying formal methods technology and formal methods tools
have evolved substantially over the past four decades [58]. Today many people feel that
it would be inconceivable not to use some kind of verification tool [188]. Consequently
the tool development in formal methods and best practices to reach it are currently
subject of study within our community [107].
In this document, we address this topic by envisaging tool support to the previous
described techniques: composition, decomposition and generic instantiation. In all tech-
niques we have suggested methodologies for the implementation of tools. Nevertheless
due to time constraints, only composition and decomposition have more elaborated tool
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support. As a result of our study, we addressed the need of other tools (such as refac-
toring of Event-B elements throughout refinement chain while maintaining the validity
of discharged proofs). Our goal was to develop prototype tools that with experience and
application to more complex case studies, could become more mature and robust. Con-
sequently further challenges regarding formal modelling to be found and tackled. And
even as prototypes, the developed plug-ins have been used already to model different
systems such as flash systems [62, 60], a spacecraft system [73] or cruise control sys-
tem [190], among others with success. With the received feedback, the tools undertook
several changes resulting in performance improvements, becoming more user friendly
and sometimes having additional features. There are still plenty of tool challenges to be
explored and developed as described in Chapter 7.

Chapter 6
Case Study
A case study involving the specification and refinement of an Event-B model is presented.
This chapter describes how the techniques presented in the previous chapters may be
used in practice. Throughout the case study, some design rules for Event-B are presented.
These rules are specialisations of Event-B techniques already presented. These rules were
suggested by the needs of the case study, but are general enough to be useful in other
cases.
6.1 Introduction
Case studies can be described as a process or record of research in which detailed con-
sideration is given to the development of a particular matter over a period of time. They
have two main purposes: the explanation and description of the application of a par-
ticular technique (illustration purposes) and to validate the usefulness of the technique
in a variety of systems (validation purpose). The described case study fulfils the first
purpose: modelling a complex system from an abstraction to a more concrete model.
Consequently the number of events, variables and proof obligations increase in a way
that the model starts becoming hard to manage. Therefore a suitable solution at this
stage is to use our decomposition technique. This procedure is repeatedly applied to
the rest of the refinements. The application of decomposition in simple, abstract cases
has very little or no real advantage. As aforementioned in Section. 4.4, the point of
decomposition (correct abstraction level) is important, since if it is done too early, the
sub-component might be too abstract and will not be able to be refined (without know-
ing more about the other sub-systems); if the system is decomposed too late, it will not
benefit from the approach anymore. Therefore the application of decomposition only
occurs after several refinements as expected.
The second purpose of case studies is usually achieved through the development of
different models that represent different kind of systems. Their application allows the
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assessment of techniques, their suitability, advantages and disadvantages when applied
in different manners. Besides the case study in this chapter, the presented techniques
have already been used for different systems:
• Flash System Development [62, 60]: use of shared event composition and decom-
position.
• Decomposition of a Spacecraft System [73]: use of shared event decomposition.
• Development of a Cruise Control System [190]: use of shared event composition
and decomposition.
• Development of a Pipeline System [56, 12]: use of shared event composition and
decomposition.
• Development of Parallel Programs [90]: use of shared variable decomposition over
shared data accessed by different components.
• Development of a Multi-directional Communication Channel [163]: use of generic
instantiation.
Here, a safety-critical metro system case study is developed. This version is a simplified
version of a real system but tackles points where there the model becomes complex and
where the presented techniques are suitable: stepwise incrementation of the complexity
of the system being modelled, sub-components communication, stepwise addition of
requirements at each refinement level, refinement of decomposed sub-components. We
develop a metro system model introducing several details including notion of tracks,
switches, several safety measures and doors functionality among others. If the presented
techniques were not used, the metro system model would be extremely complex and hard
to manage after the inclusion of all the requirements due to the high number of variables,
events, properties to be added and proof obligations to be discharged. Decomposition
and generic instantiation alleviate that issue by introducing modularity and reusing
existing sub-components allowing further manageable refinements to be reached.
The metro doors requirements are based on real requirements. The case study is devel-
oped in the Rodin platform using the developed tools whenever possible. We use the
shared event composition/decomposition and generic instantiation. The metro system
can be seen as a distributed system. Nevertheless the modelling style suggested can be
applied to a more general use.
Chapter 6 Case Study 123
6.2 Overview of the safety-critical metro system
The safety-critical metro system case study describes a formal approach for the devel-
opment of embedded controllers for a metro system1. Butler [44] makes a description
of embedded controllers for a railway using classical B. The railway system is based
on the french train system and it was subject of study as part of the european project
MATISSE [121]. Our starting point is based on that work but applied to a metro sys-
tem. That work goes as far as our first decomposition originating three sub-components.
We augment that work by refining each sub-component, introducing further details and
more requirements to the model. Moreover in the end we instantiate emergency and
service doors for the metro system.
The metro system is characterised by trains, tracks circuits (also called sections or
CDV:Circuit De Voie, in French) and a communication entity that allows the interaction
between trains and tracks. The trains circulate in sections and before a train enters or
leaves a section, a permission notification must be received. In case of a hazard situation,
trains receive a notification to brake. The track is responsible for controlling the sections,
changing switch directions (switch is a special track that can be divergent or convergent
as seen in Fig. 6.1) and sending signalling messages to the trains.
(a) Divergent Switch (b) Convergent Switch
Figure 6.1: Different types of Switches: divergent and convergent
Figure 6.22 shows a schematic representation of the metro system decomposed into three
sub-components. Initially the metro system is modelled as a whole. Global properties
are introduced and proved to be preserved throughout refinement steps. The abstract
model is refined in three levels (MetroSystem M0 to MetroSystem M3 ) before we apply
the first decomposition. We follow a general top-down guideline to apply decomposition:
Stage 1 : Model system abstractly, expressing all the relevant global system properties.
Stage 2 : Refine the abstract model to fit the decomposition (preparation step).
Stage 3 : Apply decomposition.
Stage 4 : Develop independently the decomposed parts.
1A version of this model is available online at http://eprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/23135/
2Image extracted from [44]
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For instance, Stage 1 is expressed by refinements MetroSystem M0 to MetroSystem M3.
MetroSystem M3 is also used as the preparation step before the decomposition corre-
sponding to Stage 2. The model is decomposed into three parts: Track, Train and
Middleware as described in Stage 3. This step allows further refinements of the indi-
vidual sub-components corresponding to Stage 4. The following decompositions follow
a similar pattern.
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Figure 6.2: Components of metro system
An overview of the entire development can be seen in Fig. 6.3. After the first decompo-
sition, sub-components can be further refined. Train global properties are introduced in
Train leading to several refinements until Train M4 is reached. Train M4 is decomposed
into LeaderCarriage and Carriage. We are interested in refining the sub-component cor-
responding to carriages in order to introduce doors requirements. These requirements
are extracted from real requirements for metro carriage doors.Carriage is refined and
decomposed until it fits in a generic model GCDoor corresponding to a Generic Carriage
Door development as seen in Fig. 6.4. We then instantiate GCDoor into two instances:
EmergencyDoors and ServiceDoors benefiting from the refinements in the pattern. We
describe in more detail each of the development steps in the following sections.
6.3 Abstract Model: MetroSystem M0
We model a system constituted by trains that circulate in tracks. The tracks are di-
vided into smaller parts called sections. The most important (safety) global property
introduced at this stage states that two trains cannot be in the same section at the same
time (which would mean that the trains had clashed).
We need to ensure some properties regarding the routes (set of track sections):
• Route sections are all connected: sections should be all connect and cannot have
empty spaces between them.
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Figure 6.3: Overall view of the safety-critical metro system development
Figure 6.4: Carriage Refinement Diagram and Door Instantiation
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• There are no loops in the route sections: sections cannot be connected to each
other and cannot introduce loops.
These properties can be preserved if we represent the routes as a transitive closure
relation. We use the no-loop property proposed by Abrial [9] applied to model a tree
structured file system in Event-B [61]: a context is defined and this property is proved
over track section relations and functions. The reason we choose this formulation, instead
of transitive closure which is generally used is to make the model simpler and easier to
prove. Context TransitiveClosureCtx containing the transitive closure property can
be seen in Fig. 6.5.
context TransitiveClosureCtx  
 
constants cdvrel // type of relation on sections 
          tcl // transitive closure of an cdvrel 
          cdvfn // type of function on sections */ 
 
sets CDV // Track Sections 
 
axioms 
  @axm1 cdvrel = CDV ! CDV 
  @axm2 cdvfn = CDV " CDV 
  @axm3 tcl # cdvrel $ cdvrel 
  @axm4 %r·(r#cdvrel & r ' tcl(r)) // r included in tcl(r) 
  @axm5 %r·(r#cdvrel &r;tcl(r) ' tcl(r)) // unfolding included in tcl(r) 
  @axm6 %r,t·(r#cdvrel ( r't ( r;t't & tcl(r)'t) // tcl(r) is least 
  theorem @thm1 cdvfn ' cdvrel 
  theorem @thm2 %r·r#cdvrel & tcl(r) = r ) (r;tcl(r)) // tcl(r) is a fixed 
point 
  theorem @thm3 %t·t#cdvfn((%s·s't*[s]&s=+)&tcl(t),(CDV - id)=+  
theorem @thm4 tcl(+) = + 
end !
Figure 6.5: Context TransitiveClosureCtx
Set CDV represents all the track sections in our model. Constant tcl which is a transitive
closure, it is defined as a total function mapped from CDV ↔ CDV to CDV ↔ CDV .
Giving r ∈ CDV ↔ CDV , the transitive closure of r is the least x satisfying x =
r∪r;x [61]. Difficult transitive closure proofs in machines are avoided by using theorems
such as theorem thm3 shown in Fig. 6.5: for s ⊆ CDV and t as a partial function
CDV 7→CDV , s ⊆ t−1[s] means that s contains a loop in the t relationship. Hence, this
states that the only such set that can exist is the empty set and thus the t structure
cannot have loops. This theorem has been proved using the interactive prover of Rodin.
The strategy to prove this theorem is to use proof by contradiction [61].
We define the environment of the case study (static part) with context MetroSystem C0
that extends TransitiveClosureCtx as seen in Fig. 6.6. Set TRAIN represent all the
trains in our model. Several track properties are described in the axioms:
• The constant net represents the total possible connectivity of sections (all possible
routes subject to the switches positions) defined as relation CDV ↔CDV (axm1).
No circularity is allowed as described by axm2. Moreover, the no loop property
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context MetroSystem_C0 extends TransitiveClosureCtx 
 
constants aig_cdv // Switches 
          net // Total connectivity of sections */ 
          div_aig_cdv // divergent switches 1->2 
          cnv_aig_cdv // convergent switches 2->1 
          next0 
 
sets TRAIN 
 
axioms 
  @axm1 net ! CDV " CDV // net represents the connectivity between track sections /* 
  @axm2 net #(CDV $ id)=% // no cdv is connected to itself 
  @axm3 aig_cdv & CDV // aig_cdv is a subset of CDV representing cdv that are switches 
  @axm4 div_aig_cdv  & aig_cdv // div_aig_cdv ! aig_cdv 
  @axm5 cnv_aig_cdv & aig_cdv 
  @axm6 div_aig_cdv # cnv_aig_cdv = % 
  @axm7 finite(net) // explicite declaration to simplify the proving 
  @axm8 (aig_cdv ' aig_cdv) # net = % // switches are not directly connected 
  @axm9 (cc·(cc ! (CDV)aig_cdv) * card(net[{cc}]) +1 , card(net-[{cc}])+1) // non 
switch cdv has at most one successor and at most one predecessor 
  @axm10 (cc·( cc ! aig_cdv * ( (card(net[{cc}])+2 , card(net-[{cc}])+1) . ( 
card(net[{cc}]) +1 , card( net-[{cc}])+2 ))) // switch cdv has at most two predecessors  
and one successor or one predecessor and two successors 
  @axm11 tcl(net)#id=% // No-loop property 
  theorem @thm1 tcl(net) = net / (net;tcl(net))// the transitive closure of net is 
equal to net " net;tcl(net) 
end !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
Figure 6.6: Context MetroSystem C0
for net is expressed by axiom axm11. Theorems thm1 states that net preserves
transitive closure.
• Switches (aiguillages in French) are sections (axm3) that cannot be connected
to each others (axm6). They are represented by aig cdv divided into two kinds:
div aig cdv for divergence switches and cnv aig cdv for convergent switches. More-
over switches have at most two predecessors and one successor or one predecessor
and two successors (axm10).
• Non-switches have at most one successor and at most one predecessor (axm9).
Besides the global property described before defined by invariant inv13 in Fig. 6.7(a),
some other properties of the system are added:
1. The trains (variable trns) circulate in tracks. The current route based on current
positions of switches is defined by next: a partial injection CDV 7 CDV . next
is a subset of net (inv1) preserving the transitive closure property as described
by theorem thm1,thm2 and does not have loops (thm3). Sections occupied by
trains are represented by variable occp. These sections also preserve the transitive
closure property as seen by thm4.
2. A train occupies at least one section and the section corresponding to the beginning
and end of the train is represented by variables occpA and occpZ respectively. Note
that next does not indicate the direction that a train is moving in: the direction
can be occpA to occpZ or occpZ to occpA. These two variables point to the same
section if the train only occupies one section (inv11).
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The system proceeds as follows: trains modelled in the system circulate by entering and
leaving sections (events enterCDV and leaveCDV in Fig. 6.7(b)), ensuring that the
next section is not occupied (grd9 in enterCDV ) and updating all the sections occupied
by the train (act1 and act2 in both events). At this abstract level, event modifyTrain
modifies a train defining the set of occupied sections for a train t. A train changes speed,
brakes or stops braking in events changeSpeed, brake and stopBraking. When event
brake occurs, train t is added to a set of braking trains (variable braking). Variable
next represents the current connectivity of the trail based on the positions of switches.
The current connectivity can be updated by changing convergent/divergent switches in
events switchChangeDiv and switchChangeCnv as seen in Fig. 6.7(b).
6.4 First Refinement: MetroSystem M1
MetroSystem M1 refines MetroSystem M0, incorporating the communication layer and
an emergency button for each train. The communication work as follows: a message is
sent from the tracks, stored in a buffer and read in the recipient train. The properties
to be preserved for this refinement are:
1. Messages are exchanged between trains and tracks. If a train intends to move to
an occupied section, track sends a message negating the access to that section and
the train should brake.
2. As part of the safety requirements, all trains have an emergency button.
3. While the emergency button is enabled, the train continues braking and cannot
speed up.
Now the system proceeds as follows: trains that enter and leave sections must take
into account the messages sent by the tracks. Therefore events corresponding to enter
and leaving section need to be strengthened to preserve this property. The requirement
concerning the space required for the train to halt is a simplification of a real metro
system and could require adjustments to replicate the real behaviour (for instance the
occupied sections of a train could be defined as the sum of the sections directly occupied
by the train and the sections indirectly occupied by the same train that correspond to the
sections required for the train to halt). Nevertheless in real systems, trains can have in-
built a way to detect the required space to break. For instance in Communication Based
Train Control (CBTC [97, 72]) systems, that is called the stopping distance downstream.
The messages are represented by variables tmsgs that stores the messages (buffer) sent
from the tracks and permit that receives the message in the train, expressing property
1. At this level, the messages are just boolean values assessing if a train can move to the
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machine MetroSystem_M0 sees MetroSystem_C0 
 
variables next // Currrent connectivity based on switch positions 
          trns // Set of trains on network 
          occp // Occupancy function for section 
          occpA // Initial cdv occupied by train 
          occpZ // Final   cdv occupied by train 
          braking speed 
 
invariants 
  @inv1 next ! net 
  @inv2 next " CDV # CDV 
  @inv3 trns ! TRAIN 
  @inv4 occp " CDV $ trns 
  @inv5 occpA " trns % CDV 
  @inv6 &tt·(tt"trns ' occpA(tt) " occp([{tt}]) 
  @inv7 occpZ " trns % CDV 
  @inv8 &tt·(tt"trns ' occpZ(tt) " occp([{tt}]) 
  @inv9 braking ! trns 
  @inv10 speed " trns % ) 
  @inv11 &tt·tt"trns * card(occp([{tt}])>1 ' occpA(tt) + occpZ(tt)  
  @inv12 finite(occp() 
  @inv13 &t1,t2·t1"trns * t2"trns * t1+t2 ' occp([{t1}],occp([{t2}]=- 
  theorem @thm1 next " cdvfn 
  theorem @thm2 tcl(next) = next . (next;tcl(next)) // tcl(next) is a fixed 
point 
  theorem @thm3 (&s·s!next([s]'s=-)'tcl(next),(CDV / id)=- // next has no 
loops 
  theorem @thm4 &tt,s·tt"trns * s ! next0occp([{tt}] ' tcl(s) = s .  
(s;tcl(s)) 
 
events 
  event INITIALISATION 
    then 
      @act1 next 1 next0 
      @act2 trns 1 - 
      @act3 occp 1 - 
      @act4 occpA 1 - 
      @act5 occpZ 1 - // occpZ ! " 
      @act6 braking 1 - 
      @act7 speed 1 - 
  end 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(a) Variables, invariants in MetroSystem M0
  event enterCDV 
    any t1 c1 c2 
    where 
      @grd1 t1 ! trns 
      @grd2 c1 ! CDV 
      @grd3 c2 ! CDV 
      @grd4 speed(t1)>0 
      @grd5 c1 = occpZ(t1) 
      @grd6 c1!dom(next) 
      @grd7 c2 = next(occpZ(t1))  
      @grd8 "tt·tt!trns # card((occp $ {c2 % t1})&[{tt}])>1  
            ' (occpZ({t1 % c2})(tt) ) occpA(tt)  
      @grd9 c2 * dom(occp) 
    then 
      @act1 occpZ(t1) + c2 
      @act2 occp+occp $ { c2 % t1} 
  end 
 
  event leaveCDV 
    any t1 c1 c2 
    where 
      @grd1 t1 ! trns 
      @grd2 c1 ! CDV 
      @grd3 c2 ! CDV 
      @grd4 speed(t1)>0 
      @grd5 c1!dom(next) 
      @grd6 c1=occpA(t1) 
      @grd7 c2=next(c1) 
      @grd8 occpA(t1))occpZ(t1) 
      @grd9 c2 ! (occp,{c1%t1})&[{t1}] 
      @grd10 "tt·tt!trns # card(((occp , {c1 % t1}))&[{tt}])>1  
             ' (occpA({t1 % c2})(tt))occpZ(tt) 
    then 
      @act1 occpA(t1)+c2 
      @act2 occp + occp,{c1%t1} 
  end 
 
  event changeSpeed 
    any t1 s1 
    where 
      @grd1 t1 ! trns 
      @grd2 s1 ! - 
      @grd3 t1! braking ' s1<speed(t1) 
    then 
      @act1 speed(t1) + s1 
  end 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  event brake 
    any t1 
    where 
      @grd1 t1 ! TRAIN 
      @grd2 t1!trns"braking 
    then 
      @act1 braking#braking$ {t1} 
  end 
 
  event stopBraking 
  any t1 
    where 
      @grd1 t1 ! TRAIN 
      @grd2 t1!braking 
    then 
      @act1 braking#braking"{t1} 
  end 
 
  event switchChangeDiv 
    any ac c1 c2 
    where 
      @grd1 ac ! div_aig_cdv 
      @grd2 c1 ! CDV 
      @grd3 c2 ! CDV 
      @grd8 c2 % ran (next) 
      @grd4 (ac & c1) ! next 
      @grd5 (ac & c2) ! net 
      @grd6 c1 ' c2 
      @grd7 ac % dom(occp) 
    then 
    @act1 next # next ( {ac & c2} 
  end 
 
  event switchChangeCnv 
    any ac c1 c2 
    where 
      @grd1 ac ! cnv_aig_cdv 
      @grd2 c1 ! CDV 
      @grd3 c2 ! CDV 
      @grd8 c2 % dom (next) 
      @grd4 (c1 & ac) ! next 
      @grd5 (c2 & ac) ! net 
      @grd6 c1 ' c2 
      @grd7 ac % dom (occp) 
    then 
      @act1 next # ({c1})next) $ {c2 & ac} 
  end 
 
 
 
 
 
  event addTrain 
    any t oc 
    where 
      @grd1 t ! TRAIN"trns 
      @grd2 oc ! CDV 
      @grd3 oc # dom(occp) 
    then 
      @act1 trns$trns %{t} 
      @act2 speed(t)$0 
      @act3 occpA(t) $ oc 
      @act4 occpZ(t) $ oc 
      @act5 occp $ occp % {oc&t} 
  end 
 
  event modifyTrain 
    any t ocA oc 
    where 
      @grd1 ocA!dom(next) 
      @grd2 t ! trns 
      @grd3 oc ' CDV 
      @grd4 ocA ! oc 
      @grd5 oc ( dom(occp)=) 
      @grd6 finite(oc) 
      @grd7 occpZ(t)!dom(next) 
      @grd8 card(oc)=0 *ocA = occpZ(t) 
      @grd9 card(oc)+1  
            * occpZ(t) , ocA - next(occpZ(t))!oc 
      @grd10 next(ocA)#oc 
    then 
      @act1 occpA(t) $ ocA 
      @act2 occp $ occp % (oc.{t}) 
   end 
end 
!
(b) Events of MetroSystem M0
Figure 6.7: Variables, invariant and events of MetroSystem M0
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following section (check if the section is free): if TRUE the train can move; if FALSE the
next section is occupied and the train should brake. New event sendTrainMsg models
the message sending. The reception of messages is modelled in event recvTrainMsg
where the message is stored in permit before tmsgs is reset. The guards of event
brake are strengthened to allow a train to brake when permit(t) = FALSE or when
the emergency button is activated (guard grd3 in Fig. 6.8(b)). Property 2 is expressed
by adding variable emergency button. The activation/deactivation of the emergency
button occurs in the new event toggleEmergencyButton. Property 3 is expressed by
guard grd3 in event stopBraking: a train can only stop braking if the emergency button
is not enabled.
machine MetroSystem_M1 refines MetroSystem_M0  sees MetroSystem_C0  
 
variables next trns occp occpA occpZ  
           braking speed  
           tmsgs permit emergency_button  
 
invariants 
  @inv1 tmsgs ! trns " #(BOOL) 
  @inv2 permit ! trns " BOOL 
  @inv3 emergency_button ! trns " BOOL 
 
events 
  event INITIALISATION 
    then 
      @act1 next $ next0 
      @act2 trns $ % 
      @act3 occp $ % 
      @act4 occpA $ % 
      @act5 occpZ $ % 
      @act6 braking $ % 
      @act7 speed $ % 
      @act8 tmsgs $ % 
      @act9 permit $ % 
      @act12 emergency_button $ % 
  end 
 
  event enterCDV refines enterCDV  
    any t1 c1 c2  
    where 
      @grd1 t1 ! trns 
      @grd2 c1 ! CDV 
      @grd3 c2 ! CDV 
      @grd4 speed(t1)>0 
      @grd5 c1 = occpZ(t1) 
      @grd6 c1!dom(next) 
      @grd7 c2 = next(occpZ(t1))  
      @grd8 &tt·tt!trns ' card((occp ( {c2 ) t1})*[{tt}])>1  
            + (occpZ,{t1 ) c2})(tt) - occpA(tt)  
      @grd9 c2 . dom(occp) 
      @grd10 permit(t1)=TRUE 
    then 
      @act1 occpZ(t1) $ c2 
      @act2 occp$occp ( { c2 ) t1} 
  end 
 
  event leaveCDV refines leaveCDV  
    any t1 c1 c2  
(a) Variables and invariants in MetroSystem M1
  event brake refines brake 
    any t1 
    where 
      @grd1 t1 ! TRAIN 
      @grd2 t1!trns"braking 
      @grd3 permit(t1) = FALSE  
            # emergency_button(t1)=TRUE 
    then 
      @act1 braking$braking % {t1} 
  end 
 
  event stopBraking refines stopBraking 
    any t1 
    where 
      @grd1 t1 ! TRAIN 
      @grd2 t1!braking 
      @grd3 emergency_button(t1) = FALSE 
    then 
      @act1 braking$braking"{t1} 
  end 
 
  event sendTrainMsg 
    any t1 
    where 
      @grd1 t1 ! trns 
      @grd2 tmsgs(t1) = & 
    then 
      @act1 tmsgs(t1)$ {bool( 
           occpZ(t1)!dom(next) 
           'next(occpZ(t1)) ( dom(occp))} 
  end 
 
  event recvTrainMsg 
    any t1 bb 
    where 
      @grd1 t1 ! trns 
      @grd2 bb ! tmsgs(t1) 
    then 
      @act1 permit(t1) $ bb 
      @act2 tmsgs(t1) $ & 
  end 
 
  event switchChangeDiv refines switchChangeDiv 
    any ac c1 c2 
    where 
      @grd1 ac ! div_aig_cdv 
      @grd2 c1 ! CDV 
      @grd3 c2 ! CDV 
      @grd4 ( ac ) c1 ) ! next 
      @grd5 ( ac ) c2 ) ! net 
      @grd6 c2 ( ran (next) 
      @grd7 c1 * c2 
      @grd8 ac ( dom (occp) 
    then 
      @act1 next $ next + {ac ) c2} 
  end 
 
  event switchChangeCnv refines switchChangeCnv 
    any ac c1 c2 
event sendTrainMsg 
    any t1 
    where 
      @grd1 t1 ! trns 
      @grd2 tmsgs(t1) = " 
    then 
      @act1 tmsgs(t1)# {bool( 
           occpZ(t1)!dom(next) 
           $next(occpZ(t1)) % dom(occp))} 
  end 
 
event recvTrainMsg 
    any t1 bb 
    where 
      @grd1 t1 ! trns 
      @grd2 bb ! tmsgs(t1) 
    then 
      @act1 permit(t1) # bb 
      @act2 tmsgs(t1) # " 
  end 
 
  event toggleEmergencyButton 
    any t value 
    where 
      @guard t ! trns 
      @guard1 value ! BOOL 
    then 
      @act1 emergency_button(t)# value 
  end 
 
  event addTrain extends addTrain 
    then 
      @act6 tmsgs(t)#" 
      @act7 permit(t)#FALSE 
      @act8 emergency_button(t)#FALSE 
  end 
 
  event modifyTrain extends modifyTrain 
  end 
end 
!
event sendTrainMsg 
    any t1 
    where 
      @grd1 t1 ! trns 
      @grd2 tmsgs(t1) = " 
    then 
      @act1 tmsgs(t1)# {bool( 
           occpZ(t1)!dom(next) 
           $next(occpZ(t1)) % dom(occp))} 
  end 
 
event recvTrainMsg 
    any t1 bb 
    where 
      @grd1 t1 ! trns 
      @grd2 bb ! tmsgs(t1) 
    then 
      @act1 permit(t1) # bb 
      @act2 tmsgs(t1) # " 
  end 
 
  event toggleEmergencyButton 
    any t value 
    where 
      @guard t ! trns 
      @guard1 value ! BOOL 
    then 
      @act1 emergency_button(t)# value 
  end 
 
  event addTrain extends addTrain 
    then 
      @act6 tmsgs(t)#" 
      @act7 permit(t)#FALSE 
      @act8 emergency_button(t)#FALSE 
  end 
 
  event modifyTrain extends modifyTrain 
  end 
end 
!
(b) Some events of MetroSystem M1
Figure 6.8: Excerpt of MetroSystem M1
6.5 Second Refin m nt: MetroSystem M2
In this refinement, we introduce train doors and platforms where the trains can stop to
load/unload. When stopped, a train can open its doors. The properties to be preserved
are:
1. If a train door is opened, then the train is stopped. In contrast, if the train is
moving, then its doors are closed.
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2. If a train door is opened, that either means that the train is in a platform or there
was an emergency and the train had to stop suddenly.
3. A train door cannot be allocated to different trains.
We consider that platforms are represented by single sections. A train is in a platform
if one of the occupied sections correspond to a platform. Doors are introduced as illus-
trated in Fig. 6.9(a) by sets DOOR and their states are represented by DOOR STATE.
Variables door and door state represent the train doors and their current states as seen
in Fig. 6.9(b): all trains have allocated a subset of doors (inv2). Several invariants are
introduced to preserve the desired properties: property 1 is defined by invariants inv4
and inv5; property 2 is defined by invariant inv7; property 3 is stated by inv3; theorem
thm1 is used for proving purposes (if no doors are open, then all doors are closed).
To preserve inv5, the guards of changeSpeed (in Fig. 6.8(b)) are strengthened by
grd4 ensuring that whilst the train is moving, the train doors are closed. Also events
that model entering and leaving sections are affected, with the introduction of a sim-
ilar guard (grd11 in leaveCDV ). Adding/removing train doors is modelled in events
addDoorTrain and removeDoorTrain respectively: to add/remove a door, the respec-
tive train must be stopped. If the train is stopped and either one of the occupied sections
corresponds to a platform or the emergency button is activated (guard grd3), doors can
be opened as seen in event openDoor. For safety reasons, event toggleEmergencyButton
is strengthened by guard grd3 to activate the emergency button whenever doors are open
and the train is not in a platform.
6.6 Third Refinement and First Decomposition: MetroSys-
tem M3
This refinement does not introduce new details to the model. It corresponds to the prepa-
ration step before the decomposition. We want to implement a three way shared event
decomposition and therefore we need to separate the variables that will be allocated to
each sub-component. In particular for exchanged messages between the sub-components,
the protocol will work as follows: messages are sent from Track and stored in the Mid-
dleware. After receiving the message, the Middleware forwards it to the corresponding
Train. Train reads the message and processes it according to the content. This protocol
allows a separation between Train and Track with the Middleware working as a bridge
between these two sub-components.
The decomposition follows the steps described in Sect. 5.5. Variables are distributed
according to Fig. 6.10. To avoid constraints during the decomposition process, predi-
cates and assignments containing variables that belong to different sub-components are
rearranged in this refinement step.
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MetroSystem_C1
context MetroSystem_C1 extends MetroSystem_C0 
constants OPEN CLOSED PLATFORM 
sets DOOR_STATE DOOR 
axioms
  @axm1 partition(DOOR_STATE, {OPEN}, {CLOSED})
  @axm2 PLATFORM ! CDV
end
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(a) Context MetroSystem C1
machine MetroSystem_M2 refines MetroSystem_M1  sees MetroSystem_C1 
 
variables next trns occp occpA occpZ  
           braking speed tmsgs permit 
           door door_state emergency_button 
 
invariants 
  @inv1 door_state ! DOOR " DOOR_STATE 
  @inv2 door ! trns " #(DOOR) 
  @inv3 $t1,t2·t1 ! dom(door) % t2 ! dom(door) % t1 &t2  
        ' door(t1) ( door(t2) = ) 
  @inv4 $t·t ! dom(door) '(*d·d+door(t) % door_state[d]={OPEN}  
        ' speed(t)=0)  
  @inv5 $t·t ! dom(door) % speed(t) > 0  
        ' door(t) + door_state,[{CLOSED}]  
  @inv6 $t,d·t ! dom(door) % d ! door(t) % PLATFORM ( occp,[{t}]&)  
        ' door_state(d) ! {OPEN, CLOSED}  
  @inv7 $t·t ! dom(door) % door(t) ( door_state,[{OPEN}] & )  
        ' PLATFORM ( occp,[{t}]&) - emergency_button(t) = TRUE 
  theorem @thm1 $t·t ! dom(door) % door(t) ( door_state,[{OPEN}] =)  
           ' door(t)+door_state,[{CLOSED}] 
   
events 
  event INITIALISATION extends INITIALISATION 
    then 
      @act13 door .) 
      @act14 door_state . DOOR / {CLOSED} 
  end 
 
  event enterCDV refines enterCDV 
    any t1 
        /* Start occupying the successor of occpZ, i.e., 
           change from 
           ... -> 0 -> t1 -> ... -> t1 -> 0  -> 0 -> ... 
           to 
           ... -> 0 -> t1 -> ... -> t1 -> t1 -> 0 -> ... */ 
        c1 c2 
    where 
      @grd1 t1 ! trns 
      @grd2 c1 ! CDV 
      @grd3 c2 ! CDV 
      @grd4 speed(t1)>0 
      @grd5 c1 = occpZ(t1) 
      @grd6 c1!dom(next) 
      @grd7 c2 = next(occpZ(t1)) // card(occp![{t1}])>1 " 
next(occpZ(t1)) # occpA(t1) 
      @grd8 $tt·tt!trns % card((occp 0 {c2 1 t1}),[{tt}])>1 ' 
(b) Variables, invariants in MetroSystem M2
  event toggleEmergencyButton  
  refines toggleEmergencyButton 
    any t value 
    where 
      @grd1 t ! dom(door) 
      @grd2 value ! BOOL 
      @grd3 door(t) " door_state#[{OPEN}] $ % 
            & PLATFORM " occp#[{t}]=%  
            ' value = TRUE 
    then 
      @act1 emergency_button(t)( value 
  end 
 
  event openDoor 
    any t ds 
    where 
      @grd1 t ! dom(door) 
      @grd2 speed(t) = 0 
      @grd3 occp#[{t}] " PLATFORM $ %  
            ) emergency_button(t) = TRUE 
      @grd4 ds * door(t) 
      @grd5 +d·d!ds'door_state(d)=CLOSED 
      @grd6 ds$% 
    then 
      @act1 door_state( door_state , (ds-{OPEN}) 
  end 
 
  event closeDoor 
    any t ds 
    where 
      @grd1 t ! dom(door) 
      @grd2 speed(t) = 0 
      @grd3 ds * door(t) 
      @grd4 door_state[ds]={OPEN} 
      @grd5 ds$% 
    then 
      @act1 door_state( door_state , (ds-{CLOSED}) 
  end 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  event addDoorTrain 
    any t d  
    where 
      @grd1 t ! trns 
     @grd2 d " DOOR 
    @grd3 #tr·tr!dom(door) $ r%t  
     $ door(tr)%&'d(door(tr)=& 
 @grd5 speed(t)=0  
 @grd7 d(door(t)=& 
 then
      @act1 door(t))door(t)*d  
      @act2 door_state) 
           door_state+(d,{CLOSED}) 
  end 
 
  event removeDoorTrain 
    any t d  
    where 
      @grd1 t ! dom(door) 
      @grd2 d " DOOR 
      @grd3 d " door(t)  
      @grd4 door_state[d]={CLOSED} 
      @grd5 speed(t)=0 
    then 
      @act1 door(t) ) door(t)-d 
  end 
 
  event addTrain extends addTrain  
    then 
      @act9 door(t))& 
  end 
 
  event modifyTrain extends modifyTrain  
  end 
end 
!
  event leaveCDV refines leaveCDV  
    any t1 c1 c2  
    where 
      @grd1 t1 ! dom(door) 
      @grd2 c1 ! CDV 
     @grd3 c2 ! CDV 
      @grd4 speed(t1)>0 
      @grd5 c1!dom(next) 
      @grd6 c1=occpA(t1) 
      @grd7 c2=next(c1) 
      @grd8 occpA(t1)"occpZ(t1) 
      @grd9 c2 ! (occp#{c1$t1})%[{t1}] 
      @grd10 &tt·tt!trns  
      ' card(((occp # {c1 $ t1}))%[{tt}])>1  
      ( (occpA){t1 $ c2})(tt)"occpZ(tt) 
      @grd11 door(t1)*door_state%[{OPEN}]=+ 
      @grd12 permit(t1)=TRUE 
    then 
      @act1 occpA(t1),c2 
      @act2 occp , (occp#{c1$t1}) 
  end 
 
  event changeSpeed refines changeSpeed  
    any t1 s1  
    where 
      @grd1 t1 ! dom(door) 
      @grd2 s1 ! - 
      @grd3 t1! braking ( s1<speed(t1)  
      @grd4 door(t1)*door_state%[{OPEN}]=+ 
    then 
      @act1 speed(t1) , s1 
  end 
 
  event brake refines brake  
    any t1  
    where 
      @grd1 t1 ! TRAIN 
      @grd2 t1!trns#braking 
      @grd3 permit(t1) = FALSE .  emergency_button(t1)=TRUE 
    then 
      @act1 braking,braking / {t1} 
  end 
 
  event stopBraking refines stopBraking  
    any t1  
    where 
      @grd1 t1 ! TRAIN 
      @grd2 t1!braking 
      @grd3 emergency_button(t1) = FALSE 
    then 
      @act1 braking,braking#{t1} 
  end 
 
  event sendTrainMsg extends sendTrainMsg  
  end 
 
  event recvTrainMsg extends recvTrainMsg  
  end 
 
(c) Some events of MetroSystem M2
Figure 6.9: Excerpt of MetroSystem M2
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Figure 6.10: MetroSystem M3 (shared event) decomposed into Track, Train and
Middleware
Some guards need to be rewritten in the refined events. For instance, guard grd10
in event leaveCDV needs to be rewritten in order not to include both variables trns
(sub-component Train) and occp (sub-component Track). Therefore it is changed from:
∀tt·tt ∈ trns ∧ card((occp ∪ {c2 7→ t1})−1[{tt}]) > 1⇒ (occpZ − {t1 7→ c2})(tt) 6= occpA(tt)
to:
∀tt·tt ∈ dom(occpZ)∧ card((occp ∪ {c2 7→ t1})−1[{tt}]) > 1⇒ (occpZ−{t1 7→ c2})(tt) 6= occpA(tt) (Fig. 6.11).
Both predicates represent the same property since trns corresponds to the domain
of variable occpZ (see inv7 in Fig. 6.7(a)). In Fig. 6.11, the original guard grd3 in
toggleEmergencyButton is rewritten to separate variables occp and door. In this case,
an additional parameter occpTrns representing the variable occp is added (grd4). This
additional parameter will represent the value passing between the resulting decomposed
events: parameter occpTrns is written the value of occp and afterwards it is read in
guard grd3. Similarly guard grd4 in event openDoor must not include variables occp
and emergency button and consequently parameter occpTrns is added.
Sub-components Train, Track and Middleware are described in the following sec-
tions. The composed machine corresponding to the defined decomposition can be seen
in Fig. 6.12 where it is illustrated how the original events are decomposed.
6.6.1 Machine Track
Machine Track contains the properties concerning the sections in the metro system.
Events corresponding to entering, leaving tracks and changing switch positions are part
of this sub-component resulting from the variables allocation for this sub-component:
next, occp, occpA and occpZ. Event sendTrainMsg is also added since the messages are
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event toggleEmergencyButton  
refines toggleEmergencyButton 
    any t value occpTrns 
    where 
      @grd1 t ! dom(door) 
      @grd2 value ! BOOL 
      @grd3 door(t) " door_state#[{OPEN}] $ %  
            & PLATFORM " occpTrns=%  
            ' value = TRUE 
      @grd4 occpTrns = occp#[{t}] 
    then 
      @act1 emergency_button(t)( value 
  end 
 
 event openDoor refines openDoor 
    any t occpTrns ds 
    where 
      @grd1 t ! dom(door) 
      @grd2 speed(t) = 0 
      @grd3 occpTrns = occp#[{t}] 
      @grd4 occpTrns " PLATFORM $ %  
            ) emergency_button(t) = TRUE 
      @grd5 ds * door(t) 
      @grd6 +d·d!ds'door_state(d)=CLOSED 
      @grd7 ds$% 
    then 
      @act1 door_state( door_state , (ds-{OPEN}) 
  end 
 
  event closeDoor refines closeDoor  
    any t ds  
    where 
      @grd1 t ! dom(door) 
      @grd2 speed(t) = 0 
      @grd3 ds * door(t) 
      @grd4 door_state[ds]={OPEN} 
    then 
      @act1 door_state! door_state , (ds-{CLOSED}) 
  end 
 
  
  event addDoorTrain extends addDoorTrain  
  end 
 
  event removeDoorTrain extends removeDoorTrain  
  end 
end 
!
 event leaveCDV refines leaveCDV 
    any t1 c1 c2 
    where 
      @grd1 t1 ! dom(door) 
      @grd2 c1 ! CDV 
      @grd3 c2 ! CDV 
      @grd4 speed(t1)>0 
      @grd5 c1!dom(next) 
      @grd6 c1=occpA(t1) 
      @grd7 c2=next(c1) 
      @grd8 occpA(t1)"occpZ(t1) 
      @grd9 c2 ! (occp#{c1$t1})%[{t1}] 
      @grd10 &tt·tt!dom(occpZ)  
             ' card(((occp # {c1 $ t1}))%[{tt}])>1  
             ( (occpA){t1 $ c2})(tt)"occpZ(tt) 
      @grd11 door(t1)*door_state%[{OPEN}]=+ 
      @grd13 permit(t1)=TRUE 
    then 
      @act1 occpA(t1),c2 
      @act2 occp , (occp#{c1$t1}) 
  end 
 
  event switchChangeDiv refines switchChangeDiv  
    any ac c1 c2  
    where 
      @grd1 ac!div_aig_cdv 
      @grd2 c1 ! CDV 
      @grd3 c2 ! CDV 
      @grd4 (ac ! c1) ! next 
      @grd5 (ac ! c2) ! net 
      @grd6 c2 " ran (next) // Added for helping the proving. Confirms that 
section(CDV) c2 is not the end connected of any other section 
      @grd7 c1 " c2 
      @grd8 ac " dom (occp) 
    then 
      @act1 next " next ) {ac ! c2} 
  end 
 
  event switchChangeCnv refines switchChangeCnv  
    any ac c1 c2  
    where 
      @grd1 ac ! cnv_aig_cdv 
      @grd2 c1 ! CDV 
      @grd3 c2 ! CDV 
      @grd4 c2 " dom (next) 
      @grd5 c1 ! ac ! next 
      @grd6 c2 ! ac ! net 
      @grd7 c1 " c2 
      @grd8 ac " dom (occp) 
    then 
      @act1 next " (({c1}#next) - {c2 ! ac}) 
  end 
Figur 6.11: Preparation step before decomposition of MetroSystem M3
sent from the tracks as seen in Fig. 6.13. The original ev nts toggleEmergencyButton
and openDoor require occp in their guards. Consequently part of these original events
are included in this sub-component.
Note that the invariants defining the variables may change: in MetroSystem M1 variable
occp is defi ed as occp ∈ CDV ↔ trns (inv4 in Fig. 6.7(a)); in Track is occp ∈ CDV ↔
TRAIN (which is the same as theorem typing occp : occp ∈ P(CDV × TRAIN) in
Fig. 6.13). This is a consequence of the variable partition since trns is not part of
Track and therefore the occp relation is updated with trns’s type: TRAIN (cf. inv3 in
Fig. 6.7(a)). Variables occpA and occpZ are subject to the same procedure where the
original invariant is a total function trns→CDV and in the sub-component both become
P(TRAIN×CDV ). The sub-components invariants are derived from the different initial
abstract models (cf. their labels in Fig. 6.13). Invariants that only restrain the sub-
component variables are automatically included although additional ones can be added
manually.
6.6.2 Machine Train
Machine Train models the trains in the metro system. Trains entering/leaving a sec-
tion, modelled by events enterCDV and leaveCDV are part of this sub-component,
in spite of the decomposed events do not execute any actions (see Fig. 6.14(b)). The
interaction with sub-component Track occurs through parameters t1, c1 and c2 (see
events Track.leaveCDV in Fig. 6.13). Variables door and door state are part of this
sub-component and consequently the events that modify these variables: openDoor and
closeDoor. Moreover, since the emergency button is part of a train, the respective vari-
able emergencyButton (and the modification event toggleEmergencyButton) is also
included in this sub-component. Event recvTrainMsg receives messages sent to the
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COMPOSED MACHINE MetroSystem M3 cmp
REFINES MetroSystem M3
INCLUDES
Track Train Middleware
EVENTS
addTrain refines addTrain
Combines Events Train.addTrain ‖ Middleware.addTrain ‖Track.addTrain
modifyTrain refines modifyTrain
Combines Events Train.modifyTrain ‖Track.modifyTrain
sendTrainMsg refines sendTrainMsg
Combines Events Track.sendTrainMsg ‖ Middleware.sendTrainMsg
recvTrainMsg refines recvTrainMsg
Combines Events Train.recvTrainMsg ‖ Middleware.recvTrainMsg
changeSpeed refines changeSpeed
Combines Events Train. changeSpeed
brake refines brake
Combines Events Train.brake
stopBraking refines stopBraking
Combines Events Train.stopBraking
enterCDV refines enterCDV
Combines Events Train.enterCDV ‖ Track.enterCDV
leaveCDV refines leaveCDV
Combines Events Train.leaveCDV ‖ Track.leaveCDV
openDoor refines openDoor
Combines Events Train.openDoor ‖ Track.openDoor
closeDoor refines closeDoor
Combines Events Train.closeDoor
toggleEmergencyButton refines toggleEmergencyButton
Combines Events Train.toggleEmergencyButton ‖ Track.toggleEmergencyButton
addDoorTrain refines addDoorTrain
Combines Events Train.addDoorTrain
removeDoorTrain refines removeDoorTrain
Combines Events Train.removeDoorTrain
switchChangeDiv refines switchChangeDiv
Combines Events Track.switchChangeDiv
switchChangeCnv refines switchChangeCnv
Combines Events Track.switchChangeCnv
END
Figure 6.12: Composed machine tool view corresponding to MetroSystem M3 decom-
position
trains and the content is stored in the variable permit. Although variable permit is set
based on the content of the messages exchanged between Train and Track, that variable
is read by trains. This is the reason why it is allocated to this sub-component. The
events that change the speed of the train are also included in this sub-component: brake,
stopBraking, changeSpeed due to variables speed and braking as depicted in Fig. 6.14.
6.6.3 Machine Middleware
Finally the communication layer in modelled by Middleware as seen in Fig. 6.15. Mid-
dleware bridges Track and Trains, by receiving messages (sendTrainMsg) from the
tracks and delivering to the trains (recvTrainMsg). Variable tmsgs is used as a buffer.
Benefiting from the monotonicity of the shared event approach, the resulting sub-
components can be further refined. Following Fig. 6.3, Train is refined as described
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machine Track sees MetroSystem_C1  
 
variables next occp occpA occpZ  
 
invariants 
  theorem @typing_occpZ occpZ ! !(TRAIN " CDV) 
  theorem @typing_occp occp ! !(CDV " TRAIN) 
  theorem @typing_next next ! !(CDV " CDV) 
  theorem @typing_occpA occpA ! !(TRAIN " CDV) 
  @MetroSystem_M0_inv1 next # net 
  @MetroSystem_M0_inv2 next ! CDV ! CDV 
  @MetroSystem_M0_inv12 finite(occp$) 
 
  event sendTrainMsg 
    any t1 bb  
    where 
      @typing_t1 t1 ! TRAIN 
      @typing_bb bb ! BOOL 
      @grd3 bb = bool (occpZ(t1)!dom(next)  
            % next(occpZ(t1))"dom(occp) ) 
  end 
 
events 
  event INITIALISATION 
    then 
      @act6 next " # 
      @act7 occp " # 
      @act8 occpA " # 
      @act9 occpZ " # 
  end 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 event enterCDV 
    any t1 c1 c2  
    where 
      @typing_t1 t1 ! TRAIN 
      @grd2 c1 ! CDV 
      @grd3 c2 ! CDV 
      @grd5 c1 = occpZ(t1) 
      @grd6 c1!dom(next) 
      @grd7 c2 = next(occpZ(t1)) 
      @grd8 "tt·tt!dom(occpZ)  
            # card((occp $ {c2 % t1})&[{tt}])>1  
            ' (occpZ({t1 % c2})(tt) ) occpA(tt) 
      @grd9 c2*dom(occp) 
    then 
      @act1 occpZ(t1) + c2 
      @act2 occp+occp $ { c2 % t1} 
  end 
 
  event leaveCDV 
    any t1 c1 c2  
    where 
      @typing_t1 t1 ! TRAIN 
      @grd2 c1 ! CDV 
      @grd3 c2 ! CDV 
      @grd5 c1!dom(next) 
      @grd6 c1=occpA(t1) 
      @grd7 c2=next(c1) 
      @grd8 occpA(t1))occpZ(t1) 
      @grd9 c2 ! (occp,{c1%t1})&[{t1}] 
      @grd10 "tt·tt!dom(occpZ)  
             # card(((occp , {c1 % t1}))&[{tt}])>1  
             ' (occpA({t1 % c2})(tt))occpZ(tt) 
    then 
      @act1 occpA(t1)+c2 
      @act2 occp + (occp,{c1%t1}) 
  end 
 
  event switchChangeDiv 
    any ac c1 c2  
    where 
      @typing_ac ac ! CDV 
      @grd1 ac!div_aig_cdv 
      @grd2 c1 ! CDV 
      @grd3 c2 ! CDV 
      @grd4 (ac ! c1) ! next 
      @grd5 (ac ! c2) ! net 
      @grd6 c2 " ran (next) 
      @grd7 c1 ) c2 
      @grd8 ac " dom (occp) 
    then 
      @act1 next " next ( {ac ! c2} 
  event switchChangeCnv 
    any ac c1 c2  
    where 
      @typing_ac ac ! CDV 
      @grd1 ac ! cnv_aig_cdv 
      @grd2 c1 ! CDV 
      @grd3 c2 ! CDV 
      @grd4 c2 " dom (next) 
      @grd5 c1 ! ac ! next 
      @grd6 c2 ! ac ! net 
      @grd7 c1 ! c2 
      @grd8 ac " dom (occp) 
    then 
      @act1 next " (({c1}#next) " {c2 ! ac}) 
  end 
 
event openDoor 
    any t occpTrns ds  
    where 
      @typing_t t # TRAIN 
      @typing_occpTrns occpTrns # $(CDV) 
      @typing_ds ds # $(DOOR) 
      @grd3 occpTrns = occp%[{t}] 
      @grd7 ds!& 
  end 
 
  event toggleEmergencyButton 
    any t value occpTrns  
    where 
      @typing_t t # TRAIN 
      @typing_occpTrns occpTrns # $(CDV) 
      @grd2 value # BOOL 
      @grd4 occpTrns = occp%[{t}] 
  end  
end 
!
 
 event enterCDV 
    any t1 c1 c2  
    where 
      @typing_t1 t1 ! TRAIN 
      @grd2 c1 ! CDV 
      @grd3 c2 ! CDV 
      @grd5 c1 = occpZ(t1) 
      @grd6 c1!dom(next) 
      @grd7 c2 = next(occpZ(t1)) 
      @grd8 "tt·tt!dom(occpZ)  
            # card((occp $ {c2 % t1})&[{tt}])>1  
            ' (occpZ({t1 % c2})(tt) ) occpA(tt) 
      @grd9 c2*dom(occp) 
    then 
      @act1 occpZ(t1) + c2 
      @act2 occp+occp $ { c2 % t1} 
  end 
 
  event leaveCDV 
    any t1 c1 c2  
    where 
      @typing_t1 t1 ! TRAIN 
      @grd2 c1 ! CDV 
      @grd3 c2 ! CDV 
      @grd5 c1!dom(next) 
      @grd6 c1=occpA(t1) 
      @grd7 c2=next(c1) 
      @grd8 occpA(t1))occpZ(t1) 
      @grd9 c2 ! (occp,{c1%t1})&[{t1}] 
      @grd10 "tt·tt!dom(occpZ)  
             # card(((occp , {c1 % t1}))&[{tt}])>1  
             ' (occpA({t1 % c2})(tt))occpZ(tt) 
    then 
      @act1 occpA(t1)+c2 
      @act2 occp + (occp,{c1%t1}) 
  end 
 
  event switchChangeDiv 
    any ac c1 c2  
    where 
      @typing_ac ac ! CDV 
      @grd1 ac!div_aig_cdv 
      @grd2 c1 ! CDV 
      @grd3 c2 ! CDV 
      @grd4 (ac ! c1) ! next 
      @grd5 (ac ! c2) ! net 
      @grd6 c2 " ran (next) 
      @grd7 c1 ) c2 
      @grd8 ac " dom (occp) 
    then 
      @act1 next " next ( {ac ! c2} 
  event switchChangeCnv 
  any ac c1 c2  
  where 
  @typing_ac ac ! CDV 
      @grd1 ac ! cnv_aig_cdv 
      @grd2 c1 ! CDV 
      @grd3 c2 ! CDV 
      @grd4 c2 " dom (next) 
      @grd5 c1 ! ac ! next 
      @grd6 c2 ! ac ! net 
      @grd7 c1 ! c2 
      @grd8 ac " dom (occp) 
    then
      @act1 next " (({c1}#next) " {c2 ! ac}) 
  end
 
event openDoor 
    any t occpTrns ds  
    where 
      @typing_t t # TRAIN 
      @typing_occpTrns occpTrns # $(CDV) 
      @typing_ds ds # $(DOOR) 
      @grd3 occpTrns = occp%[{t}] 
      @grd7 ds!& 
  end 
 
  event toggleEmergencyButton 
    any t value occpTrns  
    where 
      @typing_t t # TRAIN 
      @typing_occpTrns occpTrns # $(CDV) 
      @grd2 value # BOOL 
      @grd4 occpTrns = occp%[{t}] 
  end  
end 
!
Figure 6.13: Excerpt of Track
in the following section.
6.7 Refinement of Train : Train M1
In Train M1, carriages are introduced as parts of a train. Each carriage has an individual
alarm that when activated, triggers the train alarm (enables the emergency button of
the train). E ch train has a limited number of carriages. Each carriage has a set of
doors and the sum of carriage doors corresponds to the doors of a train. The properties
to be preserved are:
1. There is a limit to the number (MAX NUMBER CARRIAGE) of carriages per
train.
2. Whenever a carriage alarm is activated, then the emergency button of that same
train is activated.
3. The sum of carriage doors corresponds to the doors of a train.
The definition of these requirements require the introduction of some static elements
like a carrier set CARRIAGE, constants MAX NUMBER CARRIAGE and
DOOR CARRIAGE (function between DOOR and CARRIAGE ). The latter is defined
as a constant because the number of doors in a carriage does not change. Context
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machine Train sees MetroSystem_C1  
 
variables trns speed permit braking emergency_button door_state door  
 
invariants 
  theorem @typing_trns trns ! "(TRAIN) 
  theorem @typing_door_state door_state ! "(DOOR # DOOR_STATE) 
  theorem @typing_braking braking ! "(TRAIN) 
  theorem @typing_speed speed ! "(TRAIN # $) 
  theorem @typing_permit permit ! "(TRAIN # BOOL) 
  theorem @typing_door door ! "(TRAIN # "(DOOR)) 
  theorem @typing_emergency_button emergency_button ! "(TRAIN # BOOL) 
  @MetroSystem_M0_inv3 trns % TRAIN 
  @MetroSystem_M0_inv9 braking % trns 
  @MetroSystem_M0_inv10 speed ! trns & ' 
  @MetroSystem_M1_inv2 permit ! trns & BOOL 
  @MetroSystem_M1_inv7 emergency_button ! trns & BOOL 
  @MetroSystem_M2_inv1 door_state ! DOOR & DOOR_STATE 
  @MetroSystem_M2_inv2 door ! trns & "(DOOR) 
  @MetroSystem_M2_inv3 (t1,t2·t1 ! dom(door) ) t2 ! dom(door) ) t1 *t2 + door(t1) , door(t2) = - 
  @MetroSystem_M2_inv4 (t·t ! dom(door) +(.d·d%door(t) ) door_state[d]={OPEN} + speed(t)=0) 
  @MetroSystem_M2_inv5 (t·t ! dom(door) ) speed(t) > 0 + door(t) % door_state/[{CLOSED}] 
  theorem @MetroSystem_M2_thm1 (t·t ! dom(door) ) door(t) , door_state/[{OPEN}] =-  
                                + door(t)%door_state/[{CLOSED}] 
 
events 
  event INITIALISATION 
    then 
      @act2 trns 0 - 
      @act3 speed 0 - 
      @act4 permit 0 - 
      @act5 braking 0 - 
      @act10 door 0- 
      @act11 emergency_button 0 - 
      @act12 door_state 0 DOOR # {CLOSED} 
  end 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  event recvTrainMsg 
    any t1 bb  
    where 
      @typing_t1 t1 ! TRAIN 
(a) Variables and invariants in Train
  event recvTrainMsg 
    any t1 bb  
    where 
      @typing_t1 t1 ! TRAIN 
      @typing_bb bb ! BOOL 
    then 
      @act2 permit(t1)"bb 
  end 
 
  event changeSpeed 
    any t1 s1  
    where 
      @typing_t1 t1 ! TRAIN 
      @typing_s1 s1 ! # 
      @grd1 s1 ! $ 
      @grd2 t1 ! dom(door) 
      @grd3 t1 ! braking % s1 < speed (t1) 
      @grd4 door(t1) & door_state'[{OPEN}] =( 
    then 
      @act1 speed (t1) " s1 
  end 
 
  event brake 
    any t1  
    where 
      @typing_t1 t1 ! TRAIN 
      @grd1 t1 ! trns)braking 
      @grd2 t1 ! dom(emergency_button) 
      @grd3 permit(t1) = FALSE  
            * emergency_button(t1)=TRUE 
    then 
      @act1 braking " braking + {t1} 
  end 
 
event leaveCDV 
    any t1 c1 c2  
    where 
      @typing_t1 t1 ! TRAIN 
      @grd1 t1 ! dom(door) 
      @grd2 c1 ! CDV 
      @grd3 c2 ! CDV 
      @grd4 speed(t1)>0 
      @grd11 door(t1)&door_state'[{OPEN}]=( 
      @grd12 permit(t1)=TRUE 
  end 
 
 
  event stopBraking 
    any t1  
    where 
      @grd1 t1 ! TRAIN 
      @grd2 t1!braking 
      @grd3 emergency_button(t1) = FALSE 
    then 
      @act1 braking"braking){t1} 
  end 
 
  event enterCDV 
    any t1 c1 c2  
  event leaveCDV 
    any t1 c1 c2  
    where 
      @typing_t1 t1 ! TRAIN 
      @grd1 t1 ! dom(door) 
      @grd2 c1 ! CDV 
     @gr 3 c2 ! CDV 
      @grd4 speed(t1)>0 
      @grd11 door(t1)"door_state#[{OPEN}]=$ 
      @grd12 permit(t1)=TRUE 
  end 
 
  event openDoor 
    any t occpTrns ds  
    where 
      @typing_t t ! TRAIN 
      @typing_occpTrns occpTrns ! %(CDV) 
     @typing_ds ds ! %(DOOR) 
     @grd1 t ! dom(door) 
      @grd2 speed(t) = 0 
      @grd4 occpTrns " PLATFORM & $  
            ' emergency_button(t) = TRUE 
      @grd5 ds ( door(t) 
      @grd6 )d·d!ds*door_state(d)=CLOSED 
      @grd7 ds&$ 
    then 
      @act1 door_state+ door_state , (ds-{OPEN}) 
  end 
 
  event closeDoor 
    any t ds  
    where 
      @typing_t t ! TRAIN 
      @typing_ds ds ! %(DOOR) 
      @grd1 t ! dom(door) 
      @grd2 speed(t) = 0 
      @grd3 ds ( door(t) 
      @grd4 door_state[ds]={OPEN} 
      @grd5 ds&$ 
    then 
      @act1 door_state+ door_state , (ds-{CLOSED}) 
  end 
 
  event toggleEmergencyButton 
    any t value occpTrns  
    where 
      @typing_t t ! TRAIN 
      @typing_occpTrns occpTrns ! %(CDV) 
      @grd1 t ! dom(door) 
      @grd2 value ! BOOL 
      @grd3 door(t) " door_state#[{OPEN}] & $  
            . PLATFORM " occpTrns=$  
            * value = TRUE 
    then 
      @act1 emergency_button(t)+ value 
  end 
 
  event addDoorTrain 
    any t d  
event addDoorTrain 
    any t d  
    where 
      @typing_d d ! "(DOOR) 
      @typing_t t ! TRAIN 
      @grd1 t ! trns 
      @grd2 d # DOOR 
      @grd3 $tr·tr!dom(door) % tr&t  
            % door(tr)&' ( d)door(tr)=' 
      @grd5 speed(t)=0 
      @grd7 d)door(t)=' 
    then 
      @act1 door(t)*door(t)+d 
      @act2 door_state*door_state,(d-{CLOSED}) 
  end 
 
  event removeDoorTrain 
    any t d  
    where 
      @typing_d d ! "(DOOR) 
      @typing_t t ! TRAIN 
      @grd1 t ! dom(door) 
      @grd2 d # DOOR 
      @grd3 d # door(t) 
      @grd4 door_state[d]={CLOSED} 
      @grd5 speed(t)=0 
    then 
      @act1 door(t) * door(t).d 
  end 
 
  event addTrain 
    any t oc  
    where 
      @typing_t t ! TRAIN 
      @guard t ! TRAIN.trns 
      @grd1 oc ! CDV 
    then 
      @act1 trns*trns +{t} 
      @act2 speed(t)*0 
      @act7 permit(t)*FALSE 
      @act8 emergency_button(t)*FALSE 
      @act9 door(t)*' 
  end 
 
  event modifyTrain 
    any t ocA oc  
    where 
      @typing_ocA ocA ! CDV 
      @typing_oc oc ! "(CDV) 
      @typing_t t ! TRAIN 
      @grd2 t ! trns 
      @grd3 oc # CDV 
      @grd4 ocA ! oc 
      @grd6 finite(oc) 
      @grd10 speed(t)=0 
  end 
end 
!
  event recvTrainMsg 
    any t1 bb  
    where 
      @typing_t1 t1 ! TRAIN 
      @typing_bb bb ! BOOL 
    then 
      @act2 permit(t1)"bb 
  end 
 
  event changeSpeed 
    any t1 s1  
    where 
      @typing_t1 t1 ! TRAIN 
      @typing_s1 s1 ! # 
      @grd1 s1 ! $ 
      @grd2 t1 ! dom(door) 
      @grd3 t1 ! braking % s1 < speed (t1) 
      @grd4 door(t1) & door_state'[{OPEN}] =( 
    then 
      @act1 speed (t1) " s1 
  end 
 
  event brake 
    any t1  
    where 
      @typing_t1 t1 ! TRAIN 
      @grd1 t1 ! trns)braking 
      @grd2 t1 ! dom(emergency_button) 
      @grd3 permit(t1) = FALSE  
            * emergency_button(t1)=TRUE 
    then 
      @act1 braking " braking + {t1} 
  end 
 
event leaveCDV 
    any t1 c1 c2  
    where 
      @typing_t1 t1 ! TRAIN 
      @grd1 t1 ! dom(door) 
      @grd2 c1 ! CDV 
      @grd3 c2 ! CDV 
      @grd4 speed(t1)>0 
      @grd11 door(t1)&door_state'[{OPEN}]=( 
      @grd12 permit(t1)=TRUE 
  end 
 
 
  event stopBraking 
    any t1  
    where 
      @grd1 t1 ! TRAIN 
      @grd2 t1!braking 
      @grd3 emergency_button(t1) = FALSE 
    then 
      @act1 braking"braking){t1} 
  end 
 
  event enterCDV 
    any t1 c1 c2  
(b) Some events of Train
Figure 6.14: Excerpt of Train
Train C2 is depicted in Fig. 6.16(a). Several variables are added such as train carriage
relating carriages with trains and carriage alarm that is a total function between
CARRIAGE and BOOL, illustrated in Fig. 6.16(b). Property 1 is expressed by invari-
ant inv6 stating that trains have a maximum of MAX NUMBER CARRIAGE carriages.
Property 2 is defined in inv7 as seen in Fig. 6.16(b). Events activateEmergencyCarriage-
Button and deactivateEmergencyTrainButton refine abstract event toggleEmergencyBut-
ton: the first event enables a carriage alarm and consequently enables the emergency
button of the train; the later occurs when the emergency button of a train is active
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machine Middleware sees MetroSystem_C1  
 
variables tmsgs  
 
invariants 
  theorem @typing_tmsgs tmsgs ! "(TRAIN # "(BOOL)) 
 
events 
  event INITIALISATION 
    then 
      @act1 tmsgs $ % 
  end 
 
  event sendTrainMsg 
    any t1 bb  
    where 
      @typing_t1 t1 ! TRAIN 
      @typing_bb bb ! BOOL 
      @grd1 t1 ! dom(tmsgs) 
      @grd2 tmsgs(t1)=% 
    then 
      @act1 tmsgs(t1) $ {bb} 
  end 
 
  event recvTrainMsg 
    any t1 bb  
    where 
      @typing_t1 t1 ! TRAIN 
      @typing_bb bb ! BOOL 
      @grd1 t1 ! dom(tmsgs) 
      @grd2 bb ! tmsgs(t1) 
    then 
      @act1 tmsgs(t1)$% 
  end 
 
  event addTrain 
    any t oc  
    where 
      @typing_t t ! TRAIN 
      @grd1 oc ! CDV 
    then 
      @act6 tmsgs(t)$% 
  end 
end 
!
machine Middleware sees MetroSystem_C1  
 
variables tmsgs  
 
invariants 
  theorem @typing_tmsgs tmsgs ! "(TRAIN # "(BOOL)) 
 
events 
  event INITIALISATION 
    then 
      @act1 tmsgs $ % 
  end 
 
  event sendTrainMsg 
    any t1 bb  
    where 
      @typing_t1 t1 ! TRAIN 
      @typing_bb bb ! BOOL 
      @grd1 t1 ! dom(tmsgs) 
      @grd2 tmsgs(t1)=% 
    then 
      @act1 tmsgs(t1) $ {bb} 
  end 
 
  event recvTrainMsg 
    any t1 bb  
    where 
      @typing_t1 t1 ! TRAIN 
      @typing_bb bb ! BOOL 
      @grd1 t1 ! dom(tmsgs) 
      @grd2 bb ! tmsgs(t1) 
    then 
      @act1 tmsgs(t1)$% 
  end 
 
  event addTrain 
    any t oc  
    where 
      @typing_t t ! TRAIN 
      @grd1 oc ! CDV 
    then 
      @act6 tmsgs(t)$% 
  end 
end 
!
Figure 6.15: Machine Middleware
and corresponds to the deactivation of the last enabled carriage alarm which results in
deactivating the emergency button; a new event deactivateEmergencyCarriageButton
is added to model the deactivation of a carriage alarm when there is still another alarm
enabled for the same train (guards grd4 and grd5). The allocation and removal of
carriages (events allocateCarriageTrain and removeCarriageTrain) refine addDoorTrain
and removeDoorTrain respectively. In these two events, the parameter d representing
a set of doors, is replaced in the witness section by the doors of the added/removed
carriage: d = DOOR CARRIAGE−1[{c}]. We continue the refinement of Train in the
following section.
6.8 Second Refinement of Train : Train M2
In this refinement of Train, carriages requirements are added. We specify carriage
doors instead of the more abstract train doors. As a consequence, variable doors is
data refined and disappears. Each train contains two cabin carriages (type A) and two
ordinary carriages (type B) allocated as follows: A+B+B+A. Only one of the two cabin
carriages is set to be the leader carriage controlling the set of carriages and the moving
direction. Trains have states defining if they are in maintenance or if they are being
driven manually or automatically. More safety requirements are introduced: if the speed
of a train exceeds the safety maximum speed, the emergency brake for that train must
be activated. The abstract event representing the change of speed is refined by several
concrete events and includes the behaviour of the system when a train is above the
maximum speed. The properties to be preserved in this refinement are:
1. If a train is not in maintenance, then it must have the correct number of carriages
and the leader carriage must be defined already. Consequently, this is a condition
to be verified before the train can change speed.
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context Train_C1 extends MetroSystem_C1 
 
constants MAX_NUMBER_CARRIAGE  
           DOOR_CARRIAGE 
 
sets CARRIAGE 
 
axioms 
  @axm1 MAX_NUMBER_CARRIAGE ! "1  
  @axm2 DOOR_CARRIAGE ! DOOR#CARRIAGE 
  @axm3 $c·c!ran(DOOR_CARRIAGE) 
                %DOOR_CARRIAGE&[{c}]'( 
end 
!
(a) Context Train C1
machine Train_M1 refines Train  sees Train_C1  
 
variables trns speed permit braking door_state door emergency_button  
          train_carriage carriage_alarm  
 
invariants 
  @inv1 finite(trns) 
  @inv2 carriage_alarm ! CARRIAGE " BOOL 
  @inv3 train_carriage ! CARRIAGE # trns 
  @inv4 finite(train_carriage) 
  @inv5 finite(dom(train_carriage)) 
  @inv6 $t·t ! trns % card(train_carriage&[{t}])'MAX_NUMBER_CARRIAGE 
  @inv7 (c·(c ! dom(train_carriage) ) carriage_alarm(c) = TRUE  
  * c ! dom(train_carriage) ) emergency_button(train_carriage(c))= TRUE) 
  @inv8 $t·t!dom(door) % door(t)=DOOR_CARRIAGE&[train_carriage&[{t}]] 
 
events 
  event INITIALISATION 
    then 
      @act1 trns + , 
      @act2 speed + , 
      @act3 permit + , 
      @act4 braking + , 
      @act5 door +, 
      @act6 door_state + DOOR - {CLOSED} 
      @act7 carriage_alarm+ CARRIAGE - {FALSE} 
      @act8 train_carriage + , 
      @act9 emergency_button + , 
  end 
 
    event recvTrainMsg refines recvTrainMsg  
    any t1 bb  
    where 
      @typing_t1 t1 ! trns 
      @typing_bb bb ! BOOL 
    then 
      @act2 permit(t1)+bb 
  end 
 
  event changeSpeed refines changeSpeed  
    any t1 s1  
    where 
      @grd1 t1 ! TRAIN 
      @grd2 s1 ! . 
      @grd3 s1 ! / 
      @grd4 t1 ! dom(door) 
      @grd5 t1 ! braking % s1 < speed (t1) 
      @grd6 door(t1) 0 door_state&[{OPEN}] =, 
      @grd7 door(t1)1, 
    then 
      @act1 speed (t1) + s1 
  end 
 
  event brake extends brake  
  end 
 
  event stopBraking refines stopBraking  
    any t1  
    where 
(b) Variables and Invariants of Train M1
  event activateEmergencyCarriageButton  
  refines toggleEmergencyButton  
    any c occpTrns  
    where 
      @grd1 occpTrns ! "(CDV)  
      @grd2 c ! dom(train_carriage)  
      @grd3 carriage_alarm(c) = FALSE 
    with 
      @value value = TRUE 
      @t t = train_carriage(c) 
    then 
      @act1 carriage_alarm(c) # TRUE 
      @act2 emergency_button(train_carriage(c)) # TRUE 
  end 
 
  event deactivateEmergencyCarriageButton 
    any c  
    where 
      @grd1 c ! dom(train_carriage) 
      @grd2 emergency_button(train_carriage(c)) = TRUE 
      @grd3 carriage_alarm(c) = TRUE 
      @grd4 {c} $ (dom(carriage_alarm % {TRUE})  
                 & train_carriage'[{train_carriage(c)}])  
      @grd5 card(train_carriage%{train_carriage(c)})>1 
    then 
      @act1 carriage_alarm(c)# FALSE 
  end 
 
  event deactivateEmergencyTrainButton  
  refines toggleEmergencyButton  
    any c occpTrns  
    where 
      @grd1 occpTrns ! "(CDV)  
      @grd2 c ! dom(train_carriage)  
      @grd3 emergency_button(train_carriage(c)) = TRUE 
      @grd4 carriage_alarm(c) = TRUE 
      @grd5 {c} = (dom(carriage_alarm % {TRUE})  
                  & train_carriage'[{train_carriage(c)}]) 
      @grd6 door(train_carriage(c))&door_state'[{OPEN}] = (  
    with 
      @value value = FALSE 
      @t t = train_carriage(c) 
    then 
      @act1 carriage_alarm(c)# FALSE 
      @act2 emergency_button(train_carriage(c)) # FALSE 
  end 
 
  event alocateCarriageTrain refines addDoorTrain  
    any c t  
    where 
      @grd1 c ! CARRIAGE)dom(train_carriage) 
      @grd2 carriage_alarm[{c}]= {FALSE} 
      @grd4 *tr·tr!dom(door) + tr$t + door(tr)$( , DOOR_CARRIAGE'[{c}]&door(tr)=( 
      @grd5 t ! trns 
      @grd6 emergency_button(t) = FALSE 
      @grd7 finite(train_carriage'[{t}]) 
      @grd8 card(dom(train_carriage % {t}))<MAX_NUMBER_CARRIAGE 
      @grd9 speed(t)=0 
      @grd10 DOOR_CARRIAGE'[{c}] & door(t)=( // @grd11 t ! dom(door) " 
  event alocateCarriageTrain refines addDoorTrain 
    any c t 
    where 
      @grd1 c ! CARRIAGE"dom(train_carriage) 
      @grd2 carriage_alarm[{c}]= {FALSE} 
      @grd3 #tr·tr!dom(door) $ tr%t $ door(tr)%&  
            ' DOOR_CARRIAGE([{c}])door(tr)=& 
      @grd4 t ! trns 
      @grd5 emergency_button(t) = FALSE 
      @grd6 finite(train_carriage([{t}]) 
      @grd7 card(dom(train_carriage * {t})) 
                             <MAX_NUMBER_CARRIAGE 
      @grd8 speed(t)=0 
      @grd9 DOOR_CARRIAGE([{c}] ) door(t)=& 
    with 
      @d d=(DOOR_CARRIAGE([{c}]) 
    then 
      @act1 train_carriage(c)+ t 
      @act2 door(t)+door(t) , DOOR_CARRIAGE([{c}] 
      @act3 door_state+ 
        door_state-(DOOR_CARRIAGE([{c}].{CLOSED}) 
  end 
 
  event removeCarriageTrain refines removeDoorTrain 
    any c t 
    where 
     @grd1 t ! dom(door) 
      @grd2 c/t ! train_carriage 
      @grd3 carriage_alarm(c) = FALSE 
     @grd4 emergency_button(t) = FALSE 
      @grd5 speed(t)=0 
      @grd6 DOOR_CARRIAGE([{c}]0door(t) 
      @g d7 DOOR_CARRIAGE([{c}]%& 
      @grd8 door_state[DOOR_CARRIAGE([{c}]]={CLOSED} 
    with 
      @d d = (DOOR_CARRIAGE([{c}]) 
    then 
      @act1 train_carriage + {c}1train_carriage 
      @act2 door(t)+door(t)"DOOR_CARRIAGE([{c}] 
  end 
 
  event addTrain extends addTrain 
  end 
 
  event modifyTrain extends modifyTrain 
  end 
end 
!
(c) Some events of Train M1
Figure 6.16: Excerpt of machine Train M1
2. If a train is in maintenance, then it must be stopped.
3. If the speed of a train exceeds the maximum speed, the emergency brake must be
activated.
Figure 6.17(a) illustrates two new carrier sets: SIDE corresponding to which side a car-
riage door or a platform is located (constants LEFT or RIGHT ) and TRAIN STATE
that defines the state of a train (MAINTENANCE, MANUAL or AUTOMATIC).
There are some new constants added as well: CABIN CARRIAGE defined as a sub-
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set of CARRIAGE, NUMBER CABIN CARRIAGE defining the number of cabin
carriages allowed per train, DOOR SIDE defined as a total function between DOOR
and SIDE representing which side a door is located, MAX SPEED defining the up-
per speed limit for running a train before the activation of the emergency brake and
PLATFORM SIDE defining the side of a platform.
Figure 6.17 shows Train M2 where several new variables are introduced: leader carriage
defining the leader carriage for a train (inv6), trns state defining the state of a train
(inv8), emergency brake that defines which trains have the emergency brake activated
(inv11) and carriage door state defining the state of the carriage doors (inv15). More-
over door train carriage defines the train doors based on the carriages (inv2, inv3 and
inv4) and each door belongs to at most one train (inv4) although a train can have
several doors (inv2). This variable refines door that disappears in this refinement level,
plus some gluing invariants: inv1, inv5 and theorem thm2 state that the range of door
for a train t is the same as the range of door train carriage as long as t has doors.
Property 1 is expressed by inv9. Property 2 is expressed by inv10 and property 3
by inv12. inv13 and inv14 state that the doors in the domain of door state are the
same as the ones in carriage door state and therefore their state must match. Theorem
thm1 relates the carriages doors with variables door train carriage and train carriage.
Theorem thm3 states that the domain of carriage door state is a subset of the domain
of door state since both variables refer to the same set of doors.
New events are added defining the allocating of a leader carriage to a train (event
allocateLeaderCabinCarriageTrain in Fig. 6.17(c)). This event is enabled only if the
train is in maintenance (grd5), already has the required number of carriages (grd6)
but does not have a leader carriage yet (grd7). To deallocate the leader carriage in
event deallocateLeaderCabinCarriageTrain, the train must be in maintenance. A
train change state in event modifyTrain: to change to MAINTENANCE, the train
must be stopped (grd2); for the other states, the number of cabin carriages must be
NUMBER CABIN CARRIAGE and a leading carriage have to be allocated already
(grd3). Abstract event changeSpeed is refined by four events: two to increase the
speed (increaseSpeed and increaseMaxSpeed in Fig. 6.17(c)) and two to reduce the
speed (reduceSpeed and reduceMaxSpeed). If the speed of a train is increasing in a
way that is superior to MAX SPEED, event increaseMaxSpeed is enabled and if it
occurs, the emergency brake is activated. If the current speed of a train is superior to
MAX SPEED but the new speed is decreasing in a way that is inferior to the maximum
speed then the emergency brake can be deactivated (event reduceMaxSpeed).
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context Train_C2 extends Train_C1  
 
constants CABIN_CARRIAGE NUMBER_CABIN_CARRIAGE  
           LEFT RIGHT DOOR_SIDE PLATFORM_SIDE 
           MAINTENANCE MANUAL AUTOMATIC MAX_SPEED  
 
sets SIDE TRAIN_STATE  
 
axioms 
  @axm1 CABIN_CARRIAGE ! CARRIAGE 
  @axm2 NUMBER_CABIN_CARRIAGE " #1 
  @axm3 DOOR_SIDE " DOOR $ SIDE 
  @axm4 partition(SIDE, {LEFT}, {RIGHT}) 
  @axm5 partition(TRAIN_STATE, {MAINTENANCE}, 
        {MANUAL},{AUTOMATIC}) 
  @axm6 MAX_SPEED " #1 
  @axm7 PLATFORM_SIDE " PLATFORM $ SIDE 
  @axm8 finite(CABIN_CARRIAGE) 
  @axm9 PLATFORM %& 
  @axm10 CABIN_CARRIAGE%& 
  @axm11 CABIN_CARRIAGE! ran(DOOR_CARRIAGE) 
end 
!
(a) Context Train C2
machine Train_M2 
/* Introduction of more details about doors in the carriages. 
   Doors of a train is defined by the doors of each carriage that is part of that train 
   Each train contains two cabin carriages (A) and two ordinary carriages (B): A+B+B+A. 
   From the cabin carriages, only one is the leaderCarriage (all trains have a leaderCarriage when not in 
maintenance) 
   if the speed of a train is superior MAX_SPEED, then the emergency brake for that train should be 
activated 
   Based on the requirements sent by Dinho (Aryldo Russo) for Door System. */ 
 refines Train_M1  sees Train_C2 
 
variables trns speed permit braking door_state emergency_button train_carriage carriage_alarm 
leader_carriage trns_state emergency_brake carriage_door_state door_train_carriage 
 
invariants 
  @inv1 !t·t" dom(door_train_carriage) # t " dom(door) $ door(t) = door_train_carriage[{t}] $ door(t)%& 
  @inv2 door_train_carriage " trns ' DOOR 
  @inv3 door_train_carriage = (DOOR_CARRIAGE;train_carriage)( 
  @inv4 door_train_carriage(" DOOR ) trns 
  @inv5 !t·t" dom(door) $ door(t)%& # door(t) = door_train_carriage[{t}]  
  @inv6 leader_carriage " trns ) CABIN_CARRIAGE 
  @inv7 finite(leader_carriage) 
  @inv8 trns_state " trns * TRAIN_STATE 
  @inv9 !t,c·t"ran(train_carriage) $ trns_state(t)%MAINTENANCE $ c = train_carriage([{t}]  
        $ finite(CABIN_CARRIAGE) $ t " dom(leader_carriage) 
        # card(c+CABIN_CARRIAGE)=NUMBER_CABIN_CARRIAGE $ leader_carriage(t) " c 
  @inv10 !t·t"trns $ trns_state(t)=MAINTENANCE # speed(t)=0 
  @inv11 emergency_brake ,trns  
  @inv12 !t·((t"trns $ speed(t)>MAX_SPEED) # t " emergency_brake)  
  @inv13 carriage_door_state " DOOR_CARRIAGE * DOOR_STATE 
  @inv14 !d·d " dom(door_state) $ door_state(d)=OPEN # carriage_door_state(d-DOOR_CARRIAGE(d))=OPEN 
  @inv15 !d·d"dom(door_state)$door_state(d)=CLOSED # carriage_door_state(d-DOOR_CARRIAGE(d))=CLOSED    
  theorem @thm1 !c·c"ran(DOOR_CARRIAGE) $ c"dom(train_carriage)  
                 # DOOR_CARRIAGE([{c}],door_train_carriage[{train_carriage(c)}] 
  theorem @thm2 !c·c " dom(train_carriage) $ door(train_carriage(c)) + door_state([{OPEN}]=&  
           $ door(train_carriage(c))%& # DOOR_CARRIAGE([{c}],door(train_carriage(c))  
           $ DOOR_CARRIAGE([{c}] + door_state([{OPEN}]=&  
  theorem @thm3 dom(dom(carriage_door_state)) , dom(door_state) 
 
events 
  event INITIALISATION 
    then 
      @act1 trns . & 
      @act2 speed . & 
      @act3 permit . & 
      @act4 braking . & 
      @act5 door_state . DOOR / {CLOSED} 
      @act6 carriage_alarm . CARRIAGE / {FALSE} 
      @act7 train_carriage . & 
      @act8 emergency_button . & 
      @act9 leader_carriage . & 
      @act10 trns_state .& 
      @act11 emergency_brake .& 
      @act12 carriage_door_state . DOOR_CARRIAGE / {CLOSED} 
      @act13 door_train_carriage . & 
  end 
 
  event recvTrainMsg extends recvTrainMsg 
  end 
(b) Variables and Invariants
 
  event increaseMaxSpeed refines changeSpeed 
    any t1 s1 
    where 
      @grd1 s1 ! " 
      @grd2 t1 ! dom(door_train_carriage)#braking 
      @grd3 trns_state(t1) $ MAINTENANCE 
      @grd4 s1 > MAX_SPEED 
      @grd5 speed(t1)<s1 
      @grd6 t1 % emerge cy_brake 
      @grd7 speed(t )& MAX_SPEED 
      @grd8 door_ rain_carriage[{t1}]  
         ' door_state([{OPEN}] =) 
      @grd9 door_train_carriage[{t1}]$) 
      @grd10 permit(t1)=TRUE 
    then 
      @act1 speed (t1) * s1 
      @act2 emergency_brake *emergency_brake + {t1} 
  end 
 
  event modifyTrain refines modifyTrain 
    any t state 
    where 
      @grd1 t ! trns 
      @grd2 state = MAINTENANCE , speed(t)=0 
      @grd3 card(train_carriage([{t}]'CABIN_CARRIAGE) 
             =NUMBER_CABIN_CARRIAGE  
             - t ! dom(leader_carriage)  
            - leader_carriage(t) ! train_carriage([{t}] 
      @grd4 state ! TRAIN_STATE  
      @grd5 state $ trns_state(t)  
    then 
      @act1 trns_state(t)*state 
  end 
end 
!
  end 
 
  event deactivateEmergencyCarriageButton extends deactivateEmergencyCarriageButton 
  end 
 
  event deactivateEmergencyTr inButton refines deactivateEmergencyTrainButton 
    any c
   whe e 
      @grd2 c ! dom(train_carriage) // @grd5 t = train_carriage(c) 
      @grd3 emergency_button(train_carriage(c)) = TRUE 
      @grd4 carriage_alarm(c) = TRUE 
      @grd5 {c} = (dom(carriage_alarm " {TRUE}) # train_carriage$[{train_carriage(c)}]) 
      @grd6 ((DOOR_CARRIAGE);train_carriage)$[{train_carriage(c)}] # 
door_state$[{OPEN}] = % // doors must be closed to deactivate emergency button 
    then 
      @act1 carriage_alarm(c)& FALSE 
      @act2 emergency_button(train_carriage(c)) & FALSE 
  end 
 
  event allocateLeaderCabinCarriageTrain 
    any c 
    where 
      @grd1 c ! dom(train_carriage) 
      @grd2 finite(train_carriage$[{train_carriage(c)}]) 
      @grd3 c ! CABIN_CARRIAGE 
      @grd4 c ! dom(train_carriage " {train_carriage(c)}) 
      @grd5 trns_state(train_carriage(c))=MAINTENANCE 
      @grd6 card(dom(train_carriage " {train_carriage(c)})) 
            =MAX_NUMBER_CARRIAGE 
      @grd7 train_carriage(c) ' dom(leader_carriage) 
    then 
      @act1 leader_carriage(train_carriage(c)) & c 
  end 
 
  event deallocateLeaderCabinCarriageTrain 
    any t 
    where 
      @grd1 t ! dom(leader_carriage) 
      @grd2 finite(train_carriage$[{t}]) 
     @grd3 trns_state(t)=MAINTENANCE 
      @grd4 card(dom(train_carriage " {t})) 
            =MAX_NUMBER_CARRIAGE 
    then 
      @act1 leader_carriage & {t}(leader_carriage 
  end 
 
  event allocateCarriageTrain refines alocateCarriageTrain 
    any c t 
    where 
      @grd1 c ! CARRIAGE)dom(train_carriage) 
      @grd2 carriage_alarm[{c}]= {FALSE} 
      @grd4 *tr·tr ! dom(door_train_carriage) + tr,t  
         - DOOR_CARRIAGE$[{c}]#door_train_carriage[{tr}]=% 
      @grd5 t ! trns 
      @grd6 emergency_button(t) = FALSE 
      @grd7 finite(train_carriage$[{t}]) 
      @grd8 card(dom(train_carriage " {t}))<MAX_NUMBER_CARRIAGE 
      @grd9 speed(t)=0 
      @grd10 DOOR_CARRIAGE$[{c}] # door_train_carriage[{t}]=% // @grd11 t ! 
(c) Some events of Train M2
Figure 6.17: Excerpt of ma hine Train M2
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6.9 Third Refinement of Train : Train M3
As a continuation of the refinement of the train doors by carriage, we data refine vari-
able door state. The opening doors event needs to be strengthened to specify which
doors to open when a train is stopped in a platform. Figure 6.18 shows an excerpt of
Train M3. Some additional properties related to the allocation of the leader carriage
are defined: when a train has already allocated a leader carriage, then it has the cor-
rect number of carriages (inv2) and the leader carriage belongs to the set of carriage
of that train (inv3). These two invariants could have been included in the previous
refinement. Nevertheless due to the high number of proof obligations already existing
in the previous refinement, they were added later. Variable door state disappears being
refined by door carriage state and gluing invariants inv1 and thm2. Theorem thm1
is added to help with the proofs: the carriage doors of a train t are the same as the
doors defined by the constant DOOR CARRIAGE restricted to the carriages. Some
existing events are strengthened in this refinement to be consistent with the invariants
as illustrated in Fig. 6.18(b). Due to inv2, event allocateLeaderCabinCarriageTrain
needs to be strengthened by adding guard grd8: this event is only enabled if the number
of carriages for that train is equal to NUMBER CABIN CARRIAGE. Also events
allocateCarriageTrain and removeCarriageTrain require an additional guard (grd4
and grd11 respectively) stating that the events are only enabled if train t does not have
a leader carriage yet. Therefore we reinforce some ordering in the events: first car-
riages are allocated/removed; after the leader carriage can be allocated. Refined event
openDoors is strengthened with the inclusion of guard grd8: the set of carriage doors
ds that are opened are located in the same side as the platform.
6.10 Fourth Refinement of Train and Second Decomposi-
ton: Train M4
The fourth refinement of Train corresponds to the preparation step before the decom-
position. Context Train C4, illustrated in Fig. 6.19(a), introduces an enumerated car-
rier set TRAIN MOV ING STATE defining the moving state of a train: MOV ING,
NOT READY (not ready to move) and NEUTRAL (not moving but ready to move).
We use additional control variables to help in the separation of aspects resulting in
adding variables ready train and train doors closed. Both are total functions between
trns and BOOL (inv1 and inv2 in Fig. 6.19(b)). ready train defines trains that are
ready to move or moving (which therefore have a leader carriage and the correct number
of carriages to move (inv3)); train doors closed defines trains that have all their doors
closed (inv4). These variables are somehow redundant and are mainly added as a prepa-
ration for the shared event decomposition: they will be allocated to LeaderCarriage and
represent a combination of states defined by Carriage variables. They also simplify
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machine Train_M3 refines Train_M2  sees Train_C2 
 
variables trns speed permit braking emergency_button train_carriage carriage_alarm leader_carriage  
           trns_state emergency_brake carriage_door_state door_train_carriage 
 
invariants 
  @inv1 !d,ds·d " dom(door_state) # ds " DOOR_STATE # carriage_door_state(d$DOOR_CARRIAGE(d))=ds % door_state(d)=ds 
  @inv2 !t·t"trns # t " dom(leader_carriage) # card(train_carriage&[{t}])=MAX_NUMBER_CARRIAGE  
        # card(train_carriage&[{t}]'CABIN_CARRIAGE)=NUMBER_CABIN_CARRIAGE 
  @inv3 !t·t"trns # t " dom(leader_carriage) ( leader_carriage(t) " train_carriage&[{t}] 
  theorem @thm1 !t·t"dom(door_train_carriage) ( door_train_carriage[{t}]=DOOR_CARRIAGE&[train_carriage&[{t}]] 
  theorem @thm2 !d,ds·d ) dom(door_state) # ds " DOOR_STATE # carriage_door_state[d*DOOR_CARRIAGE[d]]={ds} 
                 %door_state[d]={ds} 
 
events 
  event INITIALISATION 
    then 
      @act1 trns + , 
      @act2 speed + , 
      @act3 permit + , 
      @act4 braking + , 
      @act5 carriage_alarm + CARRIAGE * {FALSE} 
      @act6 train_carriage + , 
      @act7 emergency_button + , 
      @act8 leader_carriage + , 
      @act9 trns_state +, 
      @act10 emergency_brake +, 
      @act11 carriage_door_state + DOOR_CARRIAGE * {CLOSED} 
      @act12 door_train_carriage + , 
  end 
 
  event reduceSpeed refines reduceSpeed 
    any t1 s1 
    where 
      @grd1 s1 " - 
      @grd2 t1 " dom((DOOR_CARRIAGE;train_carriage)&) 
      @grd4 trns_state(t1) . MAINTENANCE 
      @grd5 speed(t1) / MAX_SPEED 
      @grd6 speed(t1)>s1 
      @grd7 !d·d "  door_train_carriage[{t1}] ( 
carriage_door_state(d$DOOR_CARRIAGE(d)).OPEN 
      @grd8 door_train_carriage[{t1}]., 
    then 
      @act1 speed (t1) + s1 
  end 
 
  event brake refines brake 
    any t1 
    where 
      @grd1 t1 " trns 
      @grd2 permit(t1) = FALSE 0 emergency_button(t1)=TRUE 
      @grd3 t1 1 braking 
    then 
      @act1 braking + braking 2 {t1} 
  end 
 
  event enterCDV refines enterCDV 
    any t1 c1 c2 
    where 
      @grd1 c2 " CDV 
(a) Variables and invariants
  event allocateLeaderCabinCarriageTrain  
  refines allocateLeaderCabinCarriageTrain 
    any c 
    where 
      @grd1 c ! dom(train_carriage) 
      @grd2 finite(train_carriage"[{train_carriage(c)}]) 
     @grd3 c ! CABIN_CARRIAGE 
     @grd4 c ! dom(train_carriage # {train_carriage(c)}) 
      @grd5 trns_state(train_carriage(c))=MAINTENANCE 
      @grd6 card(train_carriage"[{train_carriage(c)}]) 
            =MAX_NUMBER_CARRIAGE 
      @grd7 train_carriage(c) $ dom(leader_carriage) 
      @grd8 card(train_carriage"[{train_carriage(c)}]%CABIN_CARRIAGE) 
            =NUMBER_CABIN_CARRIAGE 
    then 
     @act1 leader_carriage(train_carriage(c)) & c 
  end
 
  event allocateCarriageTrain refines allocateCarriageTrain 
    any c t 
    where 
      @grd1 c ! CARRIAGE'dom(train_carriage) 
      @grd2 carriage_alarm[{c}]= {FALSE} 
      @grd3 (tr·tr ! dom(door_train_carriage) ) tr*t  
         + DOOR_CARRIAGE"[{c}]%door_train_carriage[{tr}]=, 
     @grd4 t ! trns'dom(leader_ca riage) 
      @grd5 emergency_button(t) = FALSE 
      @grd6 finite(train_carriage"[{t}]) 
      @grd7 card(dom(train_carriage # {t}))<MAX_NUMBER_CARRIAGE 
      @grd8 speed(t)=0 
      @grd9 DOOR_CARRIAGE"[{c}] % door_train_carriage[{t}]=,  
      @grd10 trns_state(t)=MAINTENANCE 
    then 
     @act1 train_carriage(c)& t 
     @act2 door_train_carriage & door_train_carriage  
                               - ({t} . DOOR_CARRIAGE"[{c}]) 
      @act3 carriage_door_state& carriage_door_state  
                                / ((DOOR_CARRIAGE#{c}).{CLOSED}) 
  end 
 
  event removeCarriageTrain refines removeCarriageTrain 
    any c t 
    where 
     @grd1 t ! dom(door_train_carriage) 
     @grd2 c0t ! train_carriage 
      @grd3 carriage_alarm(c) = FALSE 
      @grd4 emergency_button(t) = FALSE 
      @grd5 trns_state(t)=MAINTENANCE 
      @grd6 speed(t)=0 
      @grd8 carriage_door_state[DOOR_CARRIAGE#{c}]={CLOSED} // !d·d"DOOR_CARRIAGE#[{c}] 
$ carriage_door_state(d%DOOR_CARRIAGE(d))=CLOSED // 
door_state[door_train_carriage[{t}]]={CLOSED} 
      @grd10 (d·d!DOOR_CARRIAGE"[{c}] + t = door_train_carriage"(d) 
      @grd11 c ! ran(DOOR_CARRIAGE) 
      @grd12 DOOR_CARRIAGE"[{c}]1door_train_carriage[{t}] 
      @grd13 t $ dom(leader_carriage) // no leader carriage allocated 
    then 
      @act1 train_carriage & {c}2train_carriage 
      @act2 door_train_carriage & door_train_carriage 3DOOR_CARRIAGE"[{c}] 
    where 
      @grd1 c ! CARRIAGE"dom(train_carriage) 
      @grd2 carriage_alarm[{c}]= {FALSE} 
      @grd3 #tr·tr ! dom(door_train_carriage) $ tr%t  
            & DOOR_CARRIAGE'[{c}](door_train_carriage[{tr}]=) 
      @grd4 t ! trns"dom(leader_carriage) 
      @grd5 emergency_button(t) = FALSE 
      @grd6 finite(train_carriage'[{t}]) 
      @grd7 card(dom(train_carriage * {t}))<MAX_NUMBER_CARRIAGE 
      @grd8 speed(t)=0 
      @grd9 DOOR_CARRIAGE'[{c}] ( door_train_carriage[{t}]=)  
      @grd10 trns_state(t)=MAINTENANCE 
    then 
      @act1 train_carriage(c)+ t 
    @act2 tr in_carriage + door_train_carriage  
                                  , ({t} - DOOR_CARRIAGE'[{c}]) 
      @act3 carriage_door_state+ carriage_door_state  
                                . ((DOOR_CARRIAGE*{c})-{CLOSED}) 
  end 
 
event openDoors refines openDoors 
    any t occpTrns platform ds 
    where 
      @grd1 t ! TRAIN 
      @grd2 occpTrns ! /(CDV) 
      @grd3 platform ! PLATFORM 
      @grd4 platform ! (occpTrns ( PLATFORM) 
      @grd5 t ! dom((DOOR_CARRIAGE;train_carriage)') 
      @grd6 speed(t) = 0 
      @grd7 ({platform} % )) 0 emergency_button(t) = TRUE  
      @grd8 DOOR_SIDE[ds]={PLATFORM_SIDE(platform)} 
      @grd9 ds 1 DOOR_CARRIAGE'[train_carriage'[{t}]]        
      @grd10 #d·d!ds  
             &carriage_door_state[{d}2DOOR_CARRIAGE]={CLOSED} 
      @grd11 ds%) 
    then 
      @act1 carriage_door_state+ carriage_door_state  
                          . ((ds2DOOR_CARRIAGE)-{OPEN})  
  end 
 
  event removeCarriageTrain refines removeCarriageTrain 
    any c t 
    where 
      @grd1 t ! dom(door_train_carriage) 
      @grd2 c3t ! train_carriage 
      @grd3 carriage_alarm(c) = FALSE 
      @grd4 emergency_button(t) = FALSE 
      @grd5 trns_state(t)=MAINTENANCE 
      @grd6 speed(t)=0 
      @grd7 carriage_door_state[DOOR_CARRIAGE*{c}]={CLOSED}  
      @grd8 #d·d!DOOR_CARRIAGE'[{c}]  
            & t = door_train_carriage'(d) 
      @grd9 c ! ran(DOOR_CARRIAGE) 
      @grd10 DOOR_CARRIAGE'[{c}]1door_train_carriage[{t}] 
      @grd11 t 4 dom(leader_carriage) 
    then 
      @act1 train_carriage + {c}5train_carriage 
      @act2 door_train_carriage + door_train_carriage  
                                  6DOOR_CARRIAGE'[{c}] 
(b) Refinement of some events in Train M3
Figure 6.18: Excerpt of machine Train M3
the event splitting by replacing predicates that contain variables related to carriages.
For instance, in Fig. 6.19(c) guard grd8 of event increaseMaxSpeed replaces guard
grd8 in the abstract event (Fig. 6.17(c)): this event does not need to refer to variable
door train carriage since it is only required to ensure that all the train doors are closed
when a train increases its speed (train doors closed(t1) = TRUE). The consequence of
adding these variables is that they need to be consistent throughout the events. For in-
stance, act2 needs to be added to the actions of deallocateLeaderCabinCarriageTrain
when a leader carriage is deallocated from a train which implies that the train is no
longer ready to move (Fig. 6.19(c)). Therefore these control variables should be added
with care in particular when it is intended to further refine the resulting sub-events after
an event decomposition. Invariants inv5 and inv6 are gluing invariants resulting from
the added variables: the first states that if a train has its doors opened, then the train
must be stopped; the second states that if a train is ready, then the set of carriages for
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that train is not empty. All other events are updated reflecting the introduction of the
new variables.
context Train_C4 extends Train_C2  
 
constants MOVING NOT_READY NEUTRAL  
 
sets TRAIN_MOVING_STATE  
 
axioms 
  @axm1 partition(TRAIN_MOVING_STATE, {MOVING}, {NOT_READY}, {NEUTRAL}) 
end 
!
(a) Context Train C4
machine Train_M4 refines Train_M3  sees Train_C4  
 
variables trns speed permit braking emergency_button train_carriage  
carriage_alarm leader_carriage trns_state emergency_brake  
carriage_door_state door_train_carriage ready_train train_doors_closed  
 
invariants 
  @inv1 ready_train ! trns " BOOL 
  @inv2 train_doors_closed ! trns " BOOL 
  @inv3 #t·t!dom(ready_train) $ ready_train(t) = TRUE % t!trns  
         $ card(train_carriage&[{t}])=MAX_NUMBER_CARRIAGE  
         $ card(train_carriage&[{t}]'CABIN_CARRIAGE) 
           =NUMBER_CABIN_CARRIAGE  
         $ t ! dom(leader_carriage) 
  @inv4 #t·t!dom(train_doors_closed)  
        $ train_doors_closed(t) = TRUE  
        % (#d·d !door_train_carriage[{t}]  
            % carriage_door_state(d(DOOR_CARRIAGE(d)))OPEN) 
  @inv5 #t·t!dom(train_doors_closed)  
        $ train_doors_closed(t) = FALSE % speed(t) = 0    
  @inv6 #t·t!dom(ready_train) $ ready_train(t) = TRUE  
        % DOOR_CARRIAGE*train_carriage&[{t}])+ 
 
events 
  event INITIALISATION 
    then 
      @act1 trns , + 
      @act2 speed , + 
      @act3 permit , + 
      @act4 braking , + 
      @act5 carriage_alarm , CARRIAGE - {FALSE} 
      @act6 train_carriage , + 
      @act7 emergency_button , + 
      @act8 leader_carriage , + 
      @act9 trns_state ,+ 
      @act10 emergency_brake ,+ 
      @act11 carriage_door_state , DOOR_CARRIAGE - {CLOSED} 
      @act12 door_train_carriage , + // @act13 train_moving_state !" 
      @act14 ready_train , + 
      @act15 train_doors_closed , + 
  end 
 
  event recvTrainMsg extends recvTrainMsg  
    where 
      @grd3 train_doors_closed(t1) = TRUE  
      /* @grd3 (#d·d $ door_train_carriage[{t1}] % 
carriage_door_state(d&DOOR_CARRIAGE(d))'OPEN) 
         @grd4 train_moving_state(t1)=MOVING */ 
  end 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(b) Variables and invariants
event increaseMaxSpeed refines increaseMaxSpeed  
    any t1 s1  
    where 
      @grd1 s1 ! " 
      @grd2 t1 ! trns 
      @grd3 t1 # braking 
      @grd4 trns_state(t1) $ MAINTENANCE 
      @grd5 s1 > MAX_SPEED 
      @grd6 speed(t1)<s1 
      @grd7 t1 # emergency_brake 
      @grd8 speed(t1)% MAX_SPEED 
      @grd9 train_doors_closed(t1) = TRUE 
      @grd10 permit(t1)=TRUE
      @grd11 speed(t1)>0
      @grd12 ready_train(t1) = TRUE
    then 
      @act1 speed (t1) & s1 
      @act2 emergency_brake & emergency_brake ' {t1} 
  end 
 
event deallocateLeaderCabinCarriageTrain  
refines deallocateLeaderCabinCarriageTrain  
  any t lc  
  where 
    @grd1 t ! dom(leader_carriage)  
    @grd2 finite(train_carriage([{t}]) 
    @grd3 trns_state(t)=MAINTENANCE 
    @grd4 card(dom(train_carriage ) {t}))=MAX_NUMBER_CARRIAGE 
    @grd5 lc = leader_carriage  
  then 
    @act1 leader_carriage & {t}*leader_carriage 
    @act2 ready_train(t) & FALSE 
end 
 
  event addTrain refines addTrain  
    any t oc  
    where 
      @typing_t t ! TRAIN 
      @guard t ! TRAIN+trns 
      @grd1 oc ! CDV 
    then 
      @act1 trns&trns '{t} 
      @act2 speed(t)&0 
      @act7 permit(t)&FALSE 
      @act8 emergency_button(t)&FALSE 
      @act9 trns_state(t)&MAINTENANCE // @act10 train_moving_state(t)!NOT_READY 
      @act11 ready_train(t) & FALSE 
      @act12 train_doors_closed(t)&TRUE 
  end 
 
  event modifyTrain refines modifyTrain  
    any t ocA oc state  
    where 
      @typing_ocA ocA ! CDV 
      @typing_oc oc ! ,(CDV) 
      @typing_t t ! TRAIN 
      @grd1 t ! trns 
      @grd2 ocA ! oc 
      @grd3 finite(oc) 
event increaseMaxSpeed refines increaseMaxSpeed  
    any t1 s1  
    where 
      @grd1 s1 ! " 
      @grd2 t1 ! trns 
      @grd3 t1 # braking 
      @grd4 trns_state(t1) $ MAINTENANCE 
      @grd5 s1 > MAX_SPEED 
      @grd6 speed(t1)<s1 
      @grd7 t1 # emergency_brake 
      @grd8 speed(t1)% MAX_SPEED 
      @grd9 train_doors_closed(t1) = TRUE 
      @grd10 permit(t1)=TRUE 
      @grd11 speed(t1)>0 
      @grd12 ready_train(t1) = TRUE 
    then 
      @act1 speed (t1) & s1 
      @act2 emergency_brake & emergency_brake ' {t1} 
  end 
 
event deallocateLeaderCabinCarriageTrain  
refines deallocateLeaderCabinCarriageTrain  
 any t lc  
  where 
   @grd1 t ! dom(leader_carriage)  
   @grd2 finite(train_carriage([{t}]) 
   @grd3 trns_state(t)=MAINTENANCE 
    @grd4 card(dom(train_carriage ) {t}))=MAX_NUMBER_CARRIAGE 
  @grd5 lc = leader_carriage  
  then 
    @act1 leader_carriage & {t}*leader_carriage 
   @act2 ready_train(t) & FALSE 
end 
 
  event addTrain refines addTrain  
    any t oc  
    where 
      @typing_t t ! TRAIN 
      @guard t ! TRAIN+trns 
      @grd1 oc ! CDV 
    then 
      @act1 trns&trns '{t} 
      @act2 speed(t)&0 
      @act7 permit(t)&FALSE 
      @act8 emergency_button(t)&FALSE 
      @act9 trns_state(t)&MAINTENANCE // @act10 train_moving_state(t)!NOT_READY 
      @act11 ready_train(t) & FALSE 
      @act12 train_doors_closed(t)&TRUE 
  end 
 
  event modifyTrain refines modifyTrain  
    any t ocA oc state  
    where 
      @typing_ocA ocA ! CDV 
      @typing_oc oc ! ,(CDV) 
      @typing_t t ! TRAIN 
      @grd1 t ! trns 
      @grd2 ocA ! oc 
      @grd3 finite(oc) 
(c) Refinement of some events in Train M4
Figure 6.19: Excerpt of machine Train M4
Now w are ready to proceed to the next decomposition as described in Fig. 6.3. We want
to separate the spects related to carriages from the spects related to leader carriages:
Leader Carriage: Allocates the leader carriage, controls the speed of the train, modi-
fies the state of the train, receives the messages sent from the central, handles the
emergency button of the train.
Carriage: Add and removes carriages, opens and closes carriage doors, handles the
carriage alarm.
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The decomposition is summarised in Table 6.1 (equivalent to view of Fig. 6.12 with the
addition of the variable partition):
LeaderCarriage Carriage
Variables trns, permit, braking, emergency button carriage alarm, leader carriage
trns state, speed, emergency brake carriage door state, door train carriage
ready train, train doors closed train carriage
Events openDoors, closeDoors openDoors, closeDoors
activateEmergencyCarriageButton activateEmergencyCarriageButton
deactivateEmergencyCarriageButton deactivateEmergencyCarriageButton
deactivateEmergencyTrainButton deactivateEmergencyTrainButton
allocateLeaderCabinCarriageTrain allocateLeaderCabinCarriageTrain
deallocateLeaderCabinCarriageTrain deallocateLeaderCabinCarriageTrain
allocateCarriageTrain allocateCarriageTrain
modifyTrain, removeCarriageTrain modifyTrain, removeCarriageTrain
increaseSpeed, increaseMaxSpeed
reduceSpeed, reduceMaxSpeed
recvTrainMsg, brake, stopBraking
addTrain, enterCDV, leaveCDV
Table 6.1: Decomposition summary of Train M4
6.10.1 Machine LeaderCarriage
Machine LeaderCarriage contains the variables that are not related to the carriages
(Fig. 6.20(a)). Some events are only included in this sub-component: events dealing
with the speed changes, entering and leaving sections, receiving messages and adding
trains. All the other events are shared between the two sub-components.
6.10.2 Machine Carriage
The variables related to carriages are included in sub-component Carriage (Fig. 6.20(b)).
All the events of Carriage result from splitting the original events as described in Ta-
ble. 6.1. We are interested in adding more details about the carriage doors, therefore we
further refine Carriage.
6.10.3 Refinement of Carriage and Decomposition: Carriage M1
This refinement is a preparation step before the next decomposition. We intend to
use an existing generic development of carriage doors as a pattern and apply a generic
instantiation to our model. We use the shared event decomposition to adjust our current
model to fit the first machine of the pattern. Carriage M1 refines Carriage and after is
decomposed in a way that one of the resulting sub-components fits the generic model of
carriage doors. The generic model is described in Sect. 6.11.
Two variables are introduced in this refinement, representing the carriage doors (carriage door)
and their respective state (carriage ds) as seen in Fig. 6.21(a). The last variable is used
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machine LeaderCarriage sees LeaderCarriage_C0 
 
variables trns speed permit braking emergency_button trns_state  
           emergency_brake ready_train train_doors_closed  
 
invariants 
  theorem @typing_train_doors_closed train_doors_closed ! "(TRAIN # BOOL) 
  @Train_MetroSystem_M0_inv3 trns $ TRAIN 
  @Train_MetroSystem_M0_inv9 braking $ trns 
  @Train_MetroSystem_M0_inv10 speed ! trns % & 
  @Train_MetroSystem_M1_inv2 permit ! trns % BOOL 
  @Train_MetroSystem_M1_inv3 emergency_button ! trns % BOOL 
  @Train_M1_inv1 finite(trns) 
  @Train_M2_inv8 trns_state ! trns % TRAIN_STATE 
  @Train_M2_inv10 't·t!trns ( trns_state(t)=MAINTENANCE ) speed(t)=0 
  @Train_M2_inv11 emergency_brake $trns 
  @Train_M2_inv12 't·((t!trns ( speed(t)>MAX_SPEED) ) t ! emergency_brake) 
  @Train_M4_inv14 ready_train ! trns % BOOL 
  @Train_M4_inv16 train_doors_closed ! trns % BOOL 
  @Train_M4_inv18 't·t!dom(train_doors_closed) ( train_doors_closed(t) = FALSE  
                  ) speed(t) = 0 
  theorem @WD_Train_M4_inv6 't·t!dom(ready_train))ready_train!TRAIN * BOOL 
 
events 
  event INITIALISATION 
    then 
      @act1 trns + , 
      @act2 speed + , 
      @act3 permit + , 
      @act4 braking + , 
      @act7 emergency_button + , 
      @act9 trns_state +, 
      @act10 emergency_brake +, 
      @act14 ready_train + , 
      @act15 train_doors_closed + , 
  end 
 
  event recvTrainMsg 
    any t1 bb  
    where 
      @typing_t1 t1 ! TRAIN 
      @typing_bb bb ! BOOL 
      @grd1 bb ! BOOL 
      @grd2 t1 ! trns 
      @grd3 train_doors_closed(t1) = TRUE 
    then 
      @act1 permit(t1)+bb 
  end 
 
  event increaseSpeed 
    any t1 s1  
    where 
      @typing_t1 t1 ! TRAIN 
      @typing_s1 s1 ! - 
      @grd1 s1 ! & 
      @grd2 t1 ! trns 
      @grd3 t1 . braking 
      @grd4 trns_state(t1) / MAINTENANCE 
      @grd5 s1 0 MAX_SPEED 
(a) sub-component LeaderCarriage
machine Carriage sees Carriage_C0  
 
variables train_carriage carriage_alarm leader_carriage carriage_door_state  
           door_train_carriage  
 
invariants 
  theorem @typing_leader_carriage leader_carriage ! "(TRAIN # CARRIAGE) 
  theorem @typing_door_train_carriage door_train_carriage ! "(TRAIN # DOOR) 
  theorem @typing_train_carriage train_carriage ! "(CARRIAGE # TRAIN) 
  theorem @typing_carriage_alarm carriage_alarm ! "(CARRIAGE # BOOL) 
  @Train_M1_inv2 carriage_alarm ! CARRIAGE $ BOOL 
  @Train_M1_inv4 finite(train_carriage) 
  @Train_M1_inv5 finite(dom(train_carriage)) 
  @Train_M2_inv3 door_train_carriage = (DOOR_CARRIAGE;train_carriage)% 
  @Train_M2_inv7 finite(leader_carriage) 
  @Train_M2_inv13 carriage_door_state ! DOOR_CARRIAGE $ DOOR_STATE 
  theorem @Train_M2_thm1 &c·c!ran(DOOR_CARRIAGE) ' c!dom(train_carriage)  
          ( DOOR_CARRIAGE%[{c}])door_train_carriage[{train_carriage(c)}] 
  theorem @Train_M3_thm1 &t·t!dom(door_train_carriage) 
          ( door_train_carriage[{t}]=DOOR_CARRIAGE%[train_carriage%[{t}]] 
events 
  event INITIALISATION 
    then 
      @act5 carriage_alarm * CARRIAGE # {FALSE} 
      @act6 train_carriage * + 
      @act8 leader_carriage * + 
 @act11 car iage_door_state * DOOR_CARRIAGE # {CLOSED} 
 @act12 doo _train_carriage * + 
  end 
 
  event openDoors 
    any t occpTrns platform ds  
    where 
      @typing_platform platform ! CDV 
      @typing_ds ds ! "(DOOR) 
      @grd1 t ! TRAIN 
      @grd2 occpTrns ! "(CDV) 
      @grd3 platform ! PLATFORM 
      @grd4 platform ! (occpTrns , PLATFORM) 
      @grd5 t ! dom((DOOR_CARRIAGE;train_carriage)%) 
      @grd7 DOOR_SIDE[ds]={PLATFORM_SIDE(platform)} 
      @grd8 ds ) DOOR_CARRIAGE%[train_carriage%[{t}]] 
      @grd10 &d·d!ds(carriage_door_state[{d}-DOOR_CARRIAGE]={CLOSED} 
    then 
      @act1 carriage_door_state* carriage_door_state . ((ds-DOOR_CARRIAGE)#{OPEN}) 
  end 
 
  event closeDoors 
    any t ds closed  
    where 
      @typing_closed closed ! BOOL 
      @typing_ds ds ! "(DOOR) 
      @grd1 t ! TRAIN 
      @grd2 t ! dom(((train_carriage%);(DOOR_CARRIAGE%))) 
      @grd4 ds ) ((train_carriage%);(DOOR_CARRIAGE%))[{t}] 
      @grd5 ds ) DOOR_CARRIAGE%[train_carriage%[{t}]] 
      @grd6 carriage_door_state[ds#DOOR_CARRIAGE[ds]]={OPEN} 
      @grd7 (/d·d!DOOR_CARRIAGE%[train_carriage%[{t}]]0ds ' 
carriage_door_state[{d}-DOOR_CARRIAGE]1{CLOSED}) 2 closed = FALSE 
    then 
(b) sub-component Carriage
Figure 6.20: Variables and invariants of LeaderCarriage and Carriage
to data refine carriage doo s te that disappears. The gluing invariant for this data
refinement is express d by inv4: the state of all the doors in carriage ds match the state
of the same door in carriage door state. As a result, some events need to be refined to
fit the new variables. For instance, in Fig. 6.21(b), act1 in event openDoors updates
variable carriage ds instead of the abstract variable carriage door state. Also when
carriage doors are allocated, both new variables are assigned as seen in actions act3 and
act4 of event allocateCarriageTrain (similar for removeCarriageTrain).
Comparing with the generic model of carriage doors, the relevant events to fit the instan-
tiation are openDoors, closeDoors, allocateCarriageTrain and removeCarriageTrain.
Not by coincidence, these events manipulate variables carriage ds and carriage door
that will instantiate generic variables generic door state and generic door respectively.
The decomposition summary is described in Table 6.2.
6.10.4 Machine CarriageInterface
Machine CarriageInterface contains the variables that are not related to the carriage
doors. This machine handles the activation/deactivation of the carriage alarm, the deac-
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machine Carriage_M1 refines Carriage sees Carriage_C0 
 
variables carriage_alarm leader_carriage train_carriage carriage_door carriage_ds door_train_carriage 
 
invariants 
  @inv1 carriage_door ! DOOR 
  @inv2 carriage_ds " carriage_door # DOOR_STATE 
  @inv3 $c·c"dom(train_carriage) % DOOR_CARRIAGE&[{c}]!carriage_door  
  @inv4 $d,c·d'c"dom(carriage_door_state) ( d " dom(carriage_ds) ( d"ran(door_train_carriage)      
        %carriage_ds(d)=carriage_door_state(d'c) 
  @inv5 door_train_carriage&"DOOR ) TRAIN 
  @inv6 $d·d"ran(door_train_carriage) % d " carriage_door 
 
events 
  event INITIALISATION 
    then 
      @act5 carriage_alarm * CARRIAGE + {FALSE} 
      @act6 train_carriage * , 
      @act8 leader_carriage * , 
      @act12 door_train_carriage * , 
      @act13 carriage_door *, 
      @act14 carriage_ds *, 
  end 
 
  event openDoors refines openDoors 
    any t occpTrns platform ds 
    where 
      @typing_platform platform " CDV 
      @typing_ds ds " -(DOOR) 
      @grd1 t " TRAIN 
      @grd2 occpTrns " -(CDV) 
      @grd3 platform " PLATFORM 
      @grd4 platform " (occpTrns . PLATFORM) 
      @grd5 t " dom((DOOR_CARRIAGE;train_carriage)&) 
      @grd7 DOOR_SIDE[ds]={PLATFORM_SIDE(platform)} 
      @grd8 ds ! DOOR_CARRIAGE&[train_carriage&[{t}]] // @grd10 
!d·d"ds#carriage_door_state[{d}$DOOR_CARRIAGE]={CLOSED} 
      @grd11 ds ! dom(carriage_ds) 
      @grd12 carriage_ds[ds]={CLOSED} 
    then 
      @act2 carriage_ds*carriage_ds/ (ds+{OPEN}) // @act1 carriage_door_state% 
carriage_door_state & ((ds$DOOR_CARRIAGE)'{OPEN}) 
  end 
 
  event closeDoors refines closeDoors 
    any t ds closed cds 
    where 
      @typing_closed closed " BOOL 
      @typing_ds ds " -(DOOR) 
      @grd1 t " TRAIN 
      @grd2 t " dom(((train_carriage&);(DOOR_CARRIAGE&))) 
      @grd4 ds ! ((train_carriage&);(DOOR_CARRIAGE&))[{t}] 
      /* @grd5 ds ( DOOR_CARRIAGE)[train_carriage)[{t}]] 
         @grd6 carriage_door_state[ds'DOOR_CARRIAGE[ds]]={OPEN} */ 
      @gd13 cds = carriage_ds 
      @grd7 (0d·d"DOOR_CARRIAGE&[train_carriage&[{t}]]1ds ( cds(d)2CLOSED) 3 closed = 
FALSE // (*d·d"DOOR_CARRIAGE)[train_carriage)[{t}]]+ds , 
carriage_door_state[{d}$DOOR_CARRIAGE]-{CLOSED}) . closed = FALSE 
      @grd11 ds ! dom(carriage_ds) 
      @grd12 carriage_ds[ds]={OPEN} 
(a) Variables and invariants
machine Carriage_M1 refines Carriage  sees Train_C4 
 
variables carriage_alarm leader_carriage train_carriage  
            carriage_door carriage_ds door_train_carriage 
 
invariants 
  @inv1 carriage_door ! DOOR 
  @inv2 carriage_ds " carriage_door # DOOR_STATE 
  @inv3 $c·c"dom(train_carriage) % DOOR_CARRIAGE&[{c}]!carriage_door  
  @inv4 $d,c·d'c"dom(carriage_door_state) ( d " dom(carriage_ds)  
        ( d"ran(door_train_carriage)  
        % carriage_ds(d)= carriage_door_state(d'c)  
  @inv6 door_train_carriage&"DOOR ) TRAIN 
  @inv7 $d·d"ran(door_train_carriage) % d " carriage_door 
events 
  event INITIALISATION 
    then 
      @act5 carriage_alarm * CARRIAGE + {FALSE} 
      @act6 train_carriage * , 
      @act8 leader_carriage * , 
      @act12 door_train_carriage * , 
      @act13 carriage_door *, 
      @act14 carriage_ds *, 
  end 
 
  event openDoors refines openDoors 
    any t occpTrns platform ds 
    where 
      @typing_platform platform " CDV 
      @typing_ds ds " -(DOOR) 
      @grd1 t " TRAIN 
      @grd2 occpTrns " -(CDV) 
      @grd3 platform " PLATFORM 
      @grd4 platform " (occpTrns . PLATFORM) 
      @grd5 t " dom((DOOR_CARRIAGE;train_carriage)&) 
      @grd6 DOOR_SIDE[ds]={PLATFORM_SIDE(platform)} 
      @grd7 ds ! DOOR_CARRIAGE&[train_carriage&[{t}]]  
      @grd8 ds ! dom(carriage_ds) 
      @grd9 carriage_ds[ds]={CLOSED} 
    then 
      @act1 carriage_ds*carriage_d / (ds+{OPEN})  
  end 
 
  event closeDoors refines closeDoors 
    any t ds closed cds 
    where 
      @typing_closed closed " BOOL 
      @typing_ds ds " -(DOOR) 
      @grd1 t " TRAIN 
      @grd2 t " dom(((train_ca ria &);(DOOR_CARRIAGE&))) 
      @grd3 ds ! ((train_carriage&);(DOOR_CARRIAGE&))[{t}] 
      @grd4 cds = carriage_ds 
      @grd5 (0d·d"DOOR_CARRIAGE&[train_carriage&[{t}]]1ds  
             ( cds(d)2CLOSED) 3 closed = FALSE  
      @grd6 ds ! dom(carriage_ds) 
      @grd7 carriage_ds[ds]={OPEN} 
    then 
      @act2 carriage_ds*carriage_ s / (ds+{CLOSED})  
  end 
  end 
 
  event allocateCarriageTrain refines allocateCarriageTrain 
    any c t ds 
    where 
      @typing_t t ! TRAIN 
      @typing_c c ! CARRIAGE 
      @grd1 c ! CARRIAGE"dom(train_carriage) 
      @grd2 carriage_alarm[{c}]= {FALSE} 
      @grd3 t ! dom(door_train_carriage) 
      @grd4 #tr·tr ! dom(door_train_carriage) $ tr%t  
            & DOOR_CARRIAGE'[{c}](door_train_carriage[{tr}]=) 
      @grd5 finite(train_carriage'[{t}]) 
      @grd6 card(dom(train_carriage * {t}))<MAX_NUMBER_CARRIAGE 
      @grd7 DOOR_CARRIAGE'[{c}] ( door_train_carriage[{t}]=)  
      @grd8 t+dom(leader_carriage) 
      @grd9 ds = DOOR_CARRIAGE'[{c}] 
      @grd10 ds(dom(carriage_ds)=) 
    then 
      @act1 train_carriage(c), t 
      @act2 door_train_carriage , door_train_carriage  
            - ({t} . DOOR_CARRIAGE'[{c}]) 
      @act3 carriage_door , carriage_door - ds 
      @act4 carriage_ds , carriage_ds - (ds.{CLOSED}) 
  end 
 
  event removeCarriageTrain refines removeCarriageTrain 
    any c t ds 
    where 
      @typing_t t ! TRAIN 
      @typing_c c ! CARRIAGE 
      @grd1 t ! dom(door_train_carriage) 
      @grd2 c/t ! train_carriage 
      @grd3 carriage_alarm(c) = FALSE 
      @grd16 t ! dom(door_train_carriage)  
      @grd10 #d·d!DOOR_CARRIAGE'[{c}]  
             & t = door_train_carriage'(d) 
      @grd11 c ! ran(DOOR_CARRIAGE) 
      @grd12 t + dom(leader_carriage) 
      @grd13 ds = DOOR_CARRIAGE'[{c}] 
      @grd14 ds0carriage_door 
      @grd15 carriage_ds[DOOR_CARRIAGE'[{c}]] = {CLOSED} 
    then 
      @act1 train_carriage , {c}1train_carriage 
      @act2 door_train_carriage ,  
                door_train_carriage 2DOOR_CARRIAGE'[{c}] 
      @act3 carriage_door , carriage_door " ds 
      @act4 carriage_ds , ds1carriage_ds 
  end 
 
  event deallocateLeaderCabinCarriageTrain refines deallocateLeaderCabinCarriageTrain 
    any t lc 
    where 
      @typing_t t ! TRAIN 
      @typing_lc lc ! 3(TRAIN . CARRIAGE) 
      @grd5 t ! dom(leader_carriage) 
      @grd2 finite(train_carriage'[{t}]) 
      @grd4 card(dom(train_carriage * {t}))=MAX_NUMBER_CARRIAGE 
      @grd6 lc = leader_carriage 
(b) Refinement of some events in Carriage M1
Figure 6.21: Excerpt of machine Carriage M1
tivation of the emergency button and the allocation/deallocation of the leader cabin car-
riage. Events openDoors, closeDoors, allocateCarriageTrain and removeCarriageTrain
are shared with CarriageDoor.
6.10.5 Machine CarriageDoor
CarriageDoors contains the variables related to carriage doors and the events resulting
from splitting the original events as described in Table 6.2. The resulting sub-events can
be seen in Fig. 6.22.
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CarriageInterface CarriageDoor
Variables carriage alarm, leader carriage carriage doors, carriage ds
train carriage, door train carriage
Events openDoors, closeDoors openDoors, closeDoors
allocateCarriageTrain allocateCarriageTrain
removeCarriageTrain removeCarriageTrain
activateEmergencyCarriageButton
deactivateEmergencyCarriageButton
deactivateEmergencyTrainButton
allocateLeaderCabinCarriageTrain
deallocateLeaderCabinCarriageTrain
modifyTrain
Table 6.2: Decomposition summary of Carriage M1
machine CarriageDoors sees Carriag Doors_C0  
 
variables carriage_door carriage_ds  
 
invariants 
  theorem @typing_carriage_door carriage_door ! ℙ(DOOR) 
  theorem @typing_carriag _ds carriage_ds ! ℙ(DOOR × DOOR_STATE) 
  @Carriage_M1_inv1 carriage_door ⊆ DOOR 
  @Carriage_M1_inv2 carriage_ds ! carriage_door " DOOR_STATE 
 
events 
  event INITIALISATION 
    then 
      @act13 carriage_door #$ 
      @act14 carriage_ds #$ 
  end 
 
  event openDoors 
    any t occpTrns platform ds  
    where 
      @typing_platform platform ! CDV 
      @typing_ds ds ! ℙ(DOOR) 
      @grd1 t ! TRAIN 
      @grd2 occpTrns ! ℙ(CDV) 
      @grd3 platform ! PLATFORM 
      @grd4 platform ! (occpTrns ∩ PLATFORM) 
      @grd7 DOOR_SIDE[ds]={PLATFORM_SIDE(platform)} 
      @grd11 ds ⊆ dom(carriage_ds) 
      @grd12 carriage_ds[ds]={CLOSED} 
    then 
      @act2 carriage_ds#carriage_ds  (ds×{OPEN}) 
  end 
 
  event closeDoors 
    any t ds closed cds  
    where 
      @typing_cds cds ! ℙ(DOOR × DOOR_STATE) 
      @typing_closed closed ! BOOL 
      @typing_ds ds ! ℙ(DOOR) 
      @grd1 t ! TRAIN 
      @gd13 cds = carriage_ds 
      @grd11 ds ⊆ dom(carriage_ds) 
      @grd12 carriage_ds[ds]={OPEN} 
    then 
      @act2 carriage_ds#carriage_ds  (ds×{CLOSED}) 
  end 
 
  event allocateCarriageTrain 
    any c t ds  
    where 
      @typing_ds ds ! ℙ(DOOR) 
      @typing_t t ! TRAIN 
      @typing_c c ! CARRIAGE 
      @grd14 ds = DOOR_CARRIAGE∼[{c}] 
      @grd15 ds∩dom(carriage_ds)=$ 
    then 
      @act3 carriage_door # carriage_door ∪ ds 
      @act4 carriage_ds # carriage_ds ∪ (ds×{CLOSED}) 
  end 
 
  event allocateCarriageTrain 
    any c t ds  
    where 
      @typing_ds ds ! ℙ(DOOR) 
      @typing_t t ! TRAIN 
      @typing_c c ! CARRIAGE 
      @grd14 ds = DOOR_CARRIAGE∼[{c}] 
      @grd15 ds∩dom(carriage_ds)=" 
    then 
      @act3 carriage_door # carriage_door ∪ ds 
      @act4 carriage_ds # carriage_ds ∪ (ds×{CLOSED}) 
  end 
 
  event removeCarriageTrain 
    any c t ds  
    where 
      @typing_ds ds ! ℙ(DOOR) 
      @typing_t t ! TRAIN 
      @typing_c c ! CARRIAGE 
      @grd11 c ! ran(DOOR_CARRIAGE) 
      @grd13 ds = DOOR_CARRIAGE∼[{c}] 
      @grd14 ds⊆carriage_door 
      @grd15 carriage_ds[DOOR_CARRIAGE∼[{c}]] = {CLOSED} 
    then 
      @act3 carriage_door # carriage_door ∖ ds 
      @act4 carriage_ds # ds!carriage_ds 
  end 
end !
Figure 6.22: Events of sub-component CarriageDoors
There are two kind of carriage doors: emergency doors and service doors. We intend to
instantiate twice the gene ic ors development, one per kind of door (the developments
are similar for both kind of doors). Specific details for each kind of door are added
as additional refinements later on. We describe the generic model and afterwards the
instantiation.
6.11 Generic Model: GCDoor
The generic model for the carriage doors is based in three refinements: GCDoor M0,
GCDoor M1 and GCDoor M2. In each refinement step, more requirements and details
are introduced.
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6.11.1 Abstract machine GCDoor M0
We start by adding the carriage doors and respective states. Four events model carriage
doors. The properties to be preserved are:
1. Doors can be added or removed.
2. Doors can be in an opening or closing state. Doors can only be open if the train
is in a platform.
3. When adding/removing doors, they are closed by default for safety reasons.
The static part of the generic development is initially divided in two parts: context
GCDoor C0 for the doors and context GCTrack C0 for the tracks as seen in Fig. 6.23.
context GCDoor_C0 extends GCTrack_C0 
 
constants GEN_DOOR_CARRIAGE 
           DOOR_SIDE 
           OPEN CLOSED 
 
sets DOOR DOOR_STATE 
     GEN_CARRIAGE 
     
axioms 
  @axm1 partition(DOOR_STATE, {OPEN}, {CLOSED}) 
  @axm2 GEN_DOOR_CARRIAGE ! DOOR " GEN_CARRIAGE 
  @axm3 DOOR_SIDE ! DOOR " SIDE 
end 
!
(a) Context GCDoor C0
context GCTrack_C0 
 
constants RIGHT PLATFORM LEFT PLATFORM_SIDE  
 
sets SIDE TRACK  
 
axioms 
  @axm1 PLATFORM ! TRACK 
  @axm2 partition(SIDE, {LEFT}, {RIGHT}) 
  @axm3 PLATFORM_SIDE " PLATFORM # SIDE 
end 
!
(b) Context GCTrack C0
Figure 6.23: Generic contexts
Context GCDoor C0 contains setsDOOR, DOOR STATE andGEN DOOR CARRIAGE,
representing carriage doors, defining if a door is opened or closed and defining the car-
riages to which a door belongs to, respectively. Context GCTrack C0 contains sets
SIDE and TRACK, defining the side (LEFT or RIGHT ) of a door or platform
and each section of the track, respectively. Machine GCDoor M0 contains variables
generic door and generic door state. The invariants of this abstraction are quite weak
since we just add the type variables as can be seen in Fig. 6.24(a).
Property 1 is expressed by events addDoor and removeDoor. Property 2 is expressed by
variable generic door state and events openDoors and closeDoors. Event openDoors is
only enabled if the set of doors ds is closed and if the parameter occpTrns, corresponding
to the sections occupied by the carriage, intersects a platform. Doors are removed in
event removeDoor, if they are CLOSED confirming property 3. Next section describes
the refinement of this machine.
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machine GCDoor_M0 sees GCDoor_C0 
 
variables generic_door generic_door_state 
 
invariants 
  @inv1 generic_door ! DOOR 
  @inv2 generic_door_state " generic_door # DOOR_STATE 
 
event openDoors 
    any ds platform occpTrns 
    where 
      @grd ds ! DOOR 
      @grd1 ds ! dom(generic_door_state) 
      @grd2 generic_door_state[ds]={CLOSED} 
      @grd3 platform " PLATFORM 
      @grd4 platform " (occpTrns $ PLATFORM) 
      @grd5 ds %& 
      @grd6 DOOR_SIDE[ds]={PLATFORM_SIDE(platform)} 
    then 
      @act1 generic_door_state'generic_door_state ( (ds){OPEN}) 
  end 
 
  event closeDoors 
    any ds 
    where 
      @grd ds ! DOOR 
      @grd1 ds ! dom(generic_door_state) 
      @grd2 generic_door_state[ds]={OPEN} 
      @grd3 ds %& 
    then 
      @act1 generic_door_state'generic_door_state  
                                     ( (ds){CLOSED}) 
  end 
 
  event addDoor 
    any ds c 
    where 
      @grd1 ds $ generic_door = & 
      @grd2 ds % & 
      @grd3 ds = GEN_DOOR_CARRIAGE*[{c}] 
    then 
      @act1 generic_door ' generic_door + ds 
      @act2 generic_door_state ' generic_door_state  
                                     + (ds){CLOSED}) 
  end 
 
  event removeDoor 
    any ds c 
    where 
      @grd1 ds ! generic_door 
      @grd2 ds % & 
      @grd3 generic_door_state[ds]={CLOSED} 
      @grd4 ds = GEN_DOOR_CARRIAGE*[{c}] 
    then 
      @act1 generic_door ' generic_door , ds 
      @act2 generic_door_state '  
                          ds-generic_door_state 
  end 
 
(a) Variables, invariants and event openDoors
machine GCDoor_M0 sees GCDoor_C0 
 
variables generic_door generic_door_state 
 
invariants 
  @inv1 generic_door ! DOOR 
  @inv2 generic_door_state " generic_door # DOOR_STATE 
 
event openDoors 
    any ds platform occpTrns 
    where 
      @grd ds ! DOOR 
      @grd1 ds ! dom(generic_door_state) 
      @grd2 generic_door_state[ds]={CLOSED} 
      @grd3 platform " PLATFORM 
      @grd4 platform " (occpTrns $ PLATFORM) 
      @grd5 ds %& 
      @grd6 DOOR_SIDE[ds]={PLATFORM_SIDE(platform)} 
    then 
      @act1 generic_door_state'generic_door_state ( (ds){OPEN}) 
  end 
 
  event closeDoors 
    any ds 
    where 
      @grd ds ! DOOR 
      @grd1 ds ! dom(generic_door_state) 
      @grd2 generic_door_state[ds]={OPEN} 
      @grd3 ds %& 
    then 
      @act1 generic_door_state'generic_door_state  
                                     ( (ds){CLOSED}) 
  end 
 
  event addDoor 
    any ds c 
    where 
      @grd1 ds $ generic_door = & 
      @grd2 ds % & 
      @grd3 ds = GEN_DOOR_CARRIAGE*[{c}] 
    then 
      @act1 generic_door ' generic_door + ds 
      @act2 generic_door_state ' generic_door_state  
                                     + (ds){CLOSED}) 
  end 
 
  event removeDoor 
    any ds c 
    where 
      @grd1 ds ! generic_door 
      @grd2 ds % & 
      @grd3 generic_door_state[ds]={CLOSED} 
      @grd4 ds = GEN_DOOR_CARRIAGE*[{c}] 
    then 
      @act1 generic_door ' generic_door , ds 
      @act2 generic_door_state '  
                          ds-generic_door_state 
  end 
 
(b) Some events in GCDoors M0
Figure 6.24: Machine GCDoors M0
6.11.2 Seco d refinement of GCDoor : GCDoor M1
In this refin ment more details are introduced about the possible behaviour of the doors.
The properties to be preserved are:
1. The actions involving the doors may result from commands sent from the central
door control. These commands have a type (OPEN RIGHT DOORS,
OPEN LEFT DOORS, CLOSE RIGHT DOORS, CLOSE LEFT DOORS,
ISOLATE DOORS, REMOV E ISOLATION DOORS), a state (START , FAIL,
SUCCESS and EXECUTED) and a target (set of doors).
2. After the doors are closed, they must be locked for the train to move.
3. If a door is open, then an opening device was used: MANUAL PLATFORM if
opened manually in a platform, MANUAL INTERNAL if opened inside the car-
riage manually and AUTOMATIC CENTRAL DOOR if opened automatically
from the central control.
4. Doors can get obstructed when closed automatically (people/object obstruction).
If an obstruction is detected then it should be tried to close the doors again.
The context used in this refinement (GCDoor C1 ) extends the existing one as seen in
Fig. 6.25(a). Abstract events are refined to include the properties defined above. Some
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context GCDoor_C1 extends GCDoor_C0 
 
constants MANUAL_PLATFORM MANUAL_INTERNAL AUTOMATIC_CENTRAL_DOOR START FAIL SUCCESS EXECUTED 
OPEN_RIGHT_DOORS OPEN_LEFT_DOORS CLOSE_RIGHT_DOORS CLOSE_LEFT_DOORS ISOLATE_DOORS REMOVE_ISOLATION_DOORS 
 
sets OPENING_DEVICE COMMAND_STATE COMMAND_TYPE COMMAND 
 
axioms 
  @axm1 partition(OPENING_DEVICE, {MANUAL_PLATFORM}, {MANUAL_INTERNAL}, {AUTOMATIC_CENTRAL_DOOR}) 
  @axm2 partition(COMMAND_STATE, {START}, {FAIL}, {SUCCESS},{EXECUTED}) 
  @axm3 partition(COMMAND_TYPE, {OPEN_RIGHT_DOORS}, {OPEN_LEFT_DOORS}, {CLOSE_RIGHT_DOORS},  
                                  {CLOSE_LEFT_DOORS}, {ISOLATE_DOORS}, {REMOVE_ISOLATION_DOORS}) 
end 
!
(a) Context GCDoors C1
machine GCDoor_M1 refines GCDoor_M0  sees GCDoor_C1 
 
variables generic_door generic_door_state locked_doors door_opening_device obstructed_door command  
           command_doors command_type command_state 
 
invariants 
  @inv1 locked_doors ! DOOR 
  @inv2 "d·d#locked_doors $ d # dom(generic_door_state) % generic_door_state(d)&{OPEN} 
  @inv3 door_opening_device # generic_door '  OPENING_DEVICE 
  @inv4 "d·d#generic_door $ generic_door_state(d)=OPEN %d#dom(door_opening_device) 
  @inv5 obstructed_door ! dom(generic_door_state)  
  @inv6 command ! COMMAND 
  @inv7 command_type # command ( COMMAND_TYPE 
  @inv8 command_state # command ( COMMAND_STATE 
  @inv9 command_doors # command ( )(generic_door)  
  @inv10 "dos·dos#ran(command_doors) % dos *+ 
  @inv11 "d,opDev·d # generic_door $ opDev # OPENING_DEVICE $ (d,opDev)#door_opening_device  
         $ opDev=AUTOMATIC_CENTRAL_DOOR (-cmd·cmd#command $ d # command_doors(cmd)) 
 
events 
  event INITIALISATION extends INITIALISATION 
    then 
      @act1 locked_doors.+ 
      @act2 door_opening_device.+ 
      @act3 obstructed_door.+ 
      @act4 command . + 
      @act5 command_doors .+ 
      @act6 command_type .+ 
      @act7 command_state .+ 
  end 
 
  event commandCloseDoors 
    any doors cmd cmd_type 
    where 
      @guard doors ! generic_door 
      @guard1 generic_door_state[doors]*{CLOSED} 
      @guard2 cmd_type # {CLOSE_RIGHT_DOORS,CLOSE_LEFT_DOORS} 
      @guard3 cmd # COMMAND/command 
      @grd4 doors *+ 
    then 
      @act1 command_state(cmd).START 
      @act2 command_doors(cmd).doors 
      @act3 command . command 0 {cmd} 
      @act4 command_type(cmd).cmd_type 
  end 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
event commandOpenDoors 
    any doors cmd cmd_type 
    where 
      @grd doors ! generic_door 
(b) Variables, invariants
Figure 6.25: Excerpt of machine GCDoors M1
new invariants are added as seen in Fig. 6.25(b). Property 1 is defined by new variables
command, command type, command state and command doors (see invariants inv6
to inv9). Property 2 is defined by invariant inv2 (if a door is locked, then the door
is not opened) and events lockDoor/unlockDoor. Property 3 is defined by variables
door opening device, inv3 and inv11 (if a door is opened automatically, then a com-
mand has been issued to do so). Property 4 is defined by variable obstructed door, inv5
and events doorIsObstructed and closeObstructedDoor. The system works as follows:
doors can be opened/closed manually or automatically. To open/close a door automati-
cally, a command must be issued from the central door control defining which doors are
affected (for instance, to open a door automatically, event commandOpenDoors needs
to occur). A command starts with state START which can lead to a successful result
(SUCCESS) or failure (FAIL). Either way, it finishes with state EXECUTED. Ab-
stract event otherCommandDoors refers to commands not defined in this refinement. If
a door gets obstructed when being closed automatically (event doorIsObstructed) then
event closeObstructedDoor models a successful attempt to close an obstructed door.
Otherwise, it needs to be closed manually.
The system works as follows: doors can be opened/closed manually or automatically. If
it is done automatically, a command sent from the central door control is issued defin-
ing which doors are affected (for instance, event commandOpenDoors, illustrated in
Fig. 6.26, issues a command to open a set of doors automatically). Event otherCommandDoors
is left abstract the enough in order to refer to commands not defined in this refinement.
If a door gets obstructed when closing automatically (event doorIsObstructed) then
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event commandOpenDoors 
    any doors cmd cmd_type 
    where 
      @grd doors ! generic_door 
      @grd1 generic_door_state[doors]={CLOSED} 
      @grd2 cmd_type  
          " {OPEN_RIGHT_DOORS,OPEN_LEFT_DOORS} 
      @grd3 cmd " COMMAND#command 
      @grd4 doors $% 
    then 
      @act1 command_state(cmd)&START 
      @act2 command_doors(cmd)&doors 
      @act3 command & command ' {cmd} 
      @act4 command_type(cmd)&cmd_type 
  end 
 
  event otherCommandDoors 
    any doors cmd cmd_type 
    where 
      @grd doors ! generic_door 
      @grd1 cmd_type " COMMAND_TYPE 
      @grd3 cmd " COMMAND#command 
      @grd4 doors $% 
    then 
      @act1 command_state(cmd)&START 
      @act2 command_doors(cmd)&doors 
      @act3 command & command ' {cmd} 
      @act4 command_type(cmd)&cmd_type 
  end 
 
event doorIsObstructed 
    any ds cmd 
    where 
      @grd ds !  DOOR#(locked_doors ' obstructed_door) 
      @grd1 ds ! dom(generic_door_state) 
      @grd2 cmd " command 
      @grd3 command_type(cmd)  
            " {CLOSE_RIGHT_DOORS,CLOSE_LEFT_DOORS} 
      @grd4 command_state(cmd)"{START,FAIL} 
      @grd5 ds ! command_doors(cmd) 
      @grd6 ds $% 
      @grd7 generic_door_state[ds]={OPEN} 
    then 
      @act1 obstructed_door & obstructed_door ' ds 
      @act2 command_state(cmd)&FAIL 
  end 
 
  event updateCmdState 
    any state cmd 
    where 
      @guard3 cmd " command 
      @guard state " COMMAND_STATE#{START} // @guard1 command_state(cmd)=START 
    then 
      @act1 command_state(cmd)&state 
  end 
event openDoorAutomatically  
refines openDoors 
 any ds cmd 
 where 
  @grd ds ! generic_door"locked_doors 
  @grd1 ds ! dom(generic_door_state) 
  @grd2 generic_door_state[ds]={CLOSED} 
  @grd3 cmd # command 
  @grd4 command_type(cmd) # 
    {OPEN_RIGHT_DOORS,OPEN_LEFT_DOORS} 
  @grd5 command_state(cmd)=START 
  @grd6 ds ! command_doors(cmd) 
  @grd7 ds $% 
 then 
  @act1 generic_door_state& 
          generic_door_state ' (ds({OPEN}) 
  @act2 door_opening_device & door_opening_device  
                ' (ds({AUTOMATIC_CENTRAL_DOOR}) 
 end 
 
  event closeObstructedDoor  
  refines closeDoors 
   any ds cmd st 
   where 
      @grd ds ! obstructed_door 
      @grd1 ds ! dom(generic_door_state) 
      @grd2 cmd # command 
      @grd3 command_type(cmd)# 
      {CLOSE_RIGHT_DOORS,CLOSE_LEFT_DOORS} 
      @grd4 command_state(cmd)=FAIL 
      @grd5 ds ! command_doors(cmd) 
      @grd6 ds $% 
      @grd7 generic_door_state[ds]={OPEN} 
      @grd8 st # {SUCCESS,FAIL} 
      @grd9 st = SUCCESS ) command_doors(cmd)"ds=%  
            * generic_door_state[command_doors(cmd)"ds] 
            ={CLOSED}        
    then 
      @act1 generic_door_state& 
                  generic_door_state'(ds({CLOSED}) 
      @act2 obstructed_door & obstructed_door " ds 
      @act3 command_state(cmd)&st 
  end 
 
  event lockDoor 
    any d 
    where 
      @guard d # generic_door"locked_doors 
      @guard1 generic_door_state(d)=CLOSED 
    then 
      @act1 locked_doors&locked_doors + {d} 
  end 
 
  event unlockDoor 
    any d 
    where 
      @guard2 d # generic_door 
      @guard d # locked_doors 
    then 
  event lockDoor 
    any d 
    where 
      @grd d ! generic_door"locked_doors 
      @grd1 generic_door_state(d)=CLOSED 
    then 
      @act1 locked_doors#locked_doors $ {d} 
  end 
 
  event unlockDoor 
    any d 
    where 
      @grd1 d ! generic_door 
      @grd2 d ! locked_doors 
    then 
      @act1 locked_doors#locked_doors " {d} 
  end 
 
event openDoorManually refines openDoors 
    any ds open_device platform occpTrns 
    where 
      @guard ds % generic_door"locked_doors 
      @guard1 ds % dom(generic_door_state) 
      @guard2 generic_door_state[ds]&{OPEN} 
      @guard3 open_device ! {MANUAL_PLATFORM,MANUAL_INTERNAL} 
      @grd3 platform ! PLATFORM 
      @grd4 platform ! (occpTrns ' PLATFORM) 
      @grd5 ds &( 
      @grd7 DOOR_SIDE[ds]={PLATFORM_SIDE(platform)} 
    then 
      @act1 generic_door_state#generic_door_state ) (ds*{OPEN}) 
      @act2 door_opening_device # door_opening_device ) (ds*{open_device}) 
  end 
 
  event closeDoors refines closeDoors 
    any ds cmd 
    where 
      @guard ds % DOOR 
      @guard1 ds % dom(generic_door_state) 
      @guard2 generic_door_state[ds]={OPEN} 
      @guard3 cmd ! command 
      @guard4 command_type(cmd) ! {CLOSE_RIGHT_DOORS,CLOSE_LEFT_DOORS} 
      @guard5 command_state(cmd)=START 
      @guard6 ds % command_doors(cmd) 
      @grd3 ds &( 
    then 
      @act1 generic_door_state#generic_door_state ) (ds*{CLOSED}) 
  end 
 
 
  event addDoor extends addDoor 
  end 
 
  event removeDoor extends removeDoor 
    where 
      @grd6 ds'dom(door_opening_device)=( 
      @grd5 +dos·dos!ran(command_doors) , ds'dos=( 
  end 
end 
 
 
 
 
event commandOpenDoors 
any doors cmd cmd_type 
  where 
     @grd doors ! generic_door 
    @grd1 generic_door_state[doors]={CLOSED} 
  @gr 2 cmd_type  
          " {OPEN_RIGHT_DOORS,OPEN_LEFT_DOORS} 
      @grd3 cmd " COMMAND#command 
      @grd4 doors $% 
    then 
      @act1 command_state(cmd)&START 
      @act2 command_doors(cmd)&doors 
      @act3 command & command ' {cmd} 
      @act4 command_type(cmd)&cmd_type 
  end 
 
  event otherCommandDoors 
    any doors cmd cmd_type 
    where 
      @grd doors ! gen ric_door 
  @gr 1 md_type " COMMAND_TYPE 
  @g d3 cmd " COMMAND#command 
 @grd4 oors $% 
then 
      @act1 command_state(cmd)&START 
      @act2 command_doors(cmd)&doors 
      @act3 command & command ' {cmd} 
      @act4 command_type(cmd)&cmd_type 
  end 
 
event doorIsObstructed 
    any ds cmd 
    where 
      @grd ds !  DOOR#(locked_doors ' obstructed_door) 
      @grd1 ds ! dom(generic_door_state) 
      @grd2 cmd " command 
     @grd3 command_type(cmd)  
         " {CLOSE_RIGHT_DOORS,CLOSE_LEFT_DOORS} 
  @grd4 command_state(cmd)"{START,FAIL} 
  @g d5 ds ! command_doors(cmd) 
 @grd6 s $% 
      @grd7 generic_door_state[ds]={OPEN} 
    then 
      @act1 obstructed_door & obstructed_door ' ds 
      @act2 command_state(cmd)&FAIL 
  end 
 
  event updateCmdState 
    any state cmd 
    where 
      @guard3 cmd " command 
      @guard state " COMMAND_STATE#{START} // @guard1 command_state(cmd)=START 
    then 
      @act1 command_state(cmd)&state 
  end 
event openDoorAutomatically  
refines openDoors 
 any ds cmd 
 where 
  @grd ds ! generic_door"locked_doors 
  @grd1 ds ! dom(generic_door_state) 
  @grd2 generic_door_state[ds]={CLOSED} 
  @grd3 cmd # command 
  @grd4 command_type(cmd) # 
   {OPEN_RIGHT_DOORS,OPEN_LEFT_DOORS} 
@grd5 command_state(cmd)=START 
@grd6 ds ! command_doors(cmd) 
@grd7 ds $% 
then
  @act1 generic_doo _state& 
    generic_door_state ' (ds({OPEN}) 
  @act2 door_opening_device & door_ope ing_devi e  
     ' (ds({AUTOMATIC_CENTRAL_DOOR}) 
 end 
 
  event closeObstructedDoor  
  refines closeDoors 
   any ds cmd st 
   where 
      @grd ds ! obstructed_door 
      @grd1 ds ! dom(generic_door_state) 
      @grd2 cmd # command 
 @grd3 command_type(cmd)# 
 {CLOSE_RIGHT_DOORS,CLOSE_LEFT_DOORS} 
 @grd4 command_state(cmd)=FAIL 
 @grd5 ds ! command_ oors(cmd) 
@grd6 ds $% 
  @grd7 generic_door_state[ds]={OPEN} 
  @grd8 st # {SUCCESS,FAIL} 
    @grd9 st = SUCCESS ) command_doors(cmd)"ds=%  
           * generic_door_state[command_doors(cmd)"ds] 
            ={CLOSED}        
    then 
      @act1 generic_door_state& 
                  generic_door_state'(ds({CLOSED}) 
      @act2 obstructed_door & obstructed_door " ds 
      @act3 command_state(cmd)&st 
  end 
 
event lockDoor 
any d 
where 
 @guard  # generic_door"locked_doors 
  @guard1 generic_door_state(d)=CLOSED 
    then 
      @act1 locked_doors&locked_doors + {d} 
  end 
 
  event unlockDoor 
    any d 
    where 
      @guard2 d # generic_door 
      @guard d # locked_doors 
    then 
Figure 6.26: Some events in GCDoors M1
event closeObstructedDoor models a successful attempt to lose an obstructed door.
Otherwise, it needs to be closed manually.
6.12 Third refinement of GCDoor : GCDoor M2
In the third refinement, malfunctioning doors can be isolated and in that case, they
ignore the commands issued by the central command. Isolated doors can be either
opened or closed. After the execution of a command, the corresponding state is updated
according to the success/failure of the command. The properties to be preserved are:
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1. Doors can be isolated (independently of the respective door state) in case of mal-
function or safety reasons.
2. If a command is successful, it means that the command already occurred.
3. Two commands cannot have the same door as target except if the command has
already been executed.
4. If a door is obstructed, then it must be in a state corresponding to OPEN .
The properties to be preserved are mainly defined as invariants. Property 1 is de-
fined by new variable isolated door, inv1, inv6 and events commandIsolationDoors,
isolateDoor and removeIsolatedDoor as seen in Fig. 6.27(b). Property 2 is defined by
several invariants depending on the command: inv2 for opening doors, inv3 for closing
doors, inv4 to isolate doors, inv5 to lift the isolation from a door. Property 3 is defined
by inv7 and the last property by inv8.
An excerpt of GCDoors M2 is depicted in Fig. 6.27. New event commandIsolationDoors
models a command to add/remove doors from isolation refining the abstract event
otherCommandDoors. After this command is issued, the actual execution (or not) of
the command dictates the command state at refined event updateIsolationCmdState.
A command log is created corresponding to the end of the command’s task in event
executeLogCmdState. Other commands could be added in a similar manner but we
restrict to these commands for now. The state update of other commands (opening and
closing doors) follows the same behaviour as the isolation one.
This model has three refinement layers with all the proof obligations discharged. We
instantiate this model, benefiting from the discharged proof obligations and refinements
to model emergency and service doors.
6.13 Instantiation of Generic Carriage Door
We use the GCDoor development as a pattern to model emergency and service doors.
The instantiation is similar for both kind of doors: specific details for each type of door
are added later. We abstract ourselves from these details and focus in the instantiation
of one of the doors: emergency doors.
The pattern context is defined by contexts GCDoor C0 (and context GCTrack C0)
in Fig. 6.23 and GCDoor C1 in Fig. 6.25(a). The parameterisation context seen by
the instance results from the context seen by the abstract machine CarriageDoors as
illustrated in Fig. 6.28(a). CarriageDoors C0 does not contain all the sets and constants
that need to be instantiated. Therefore CarriageDoors C1 is created based on the
pattern context GCDoor C1 (Fig. 6.28(b)).
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machine GCDoor_M2 refines GCDoor_M1  sees GCDoor_C1 
 
variables generic_door generic_door_state isolated_door locked_doors door_opening_device obstructed_door  
           command command_doors command_type command_state 
 
invariants 
  @inv1 isolated_door ! DOOR 
  @inv2 "cmd,d·cmd # command $ command_type(cmd)#{OPEN_RIGHT_DOORS,OPEN_LEFT_DOORS}  
        $d # DOOR$d # command_doors(cmd)$command_state(cmd)=SUCCESS $ d % isolated_door& generic_door_state(d)=OPEN 
  @inv3 "cmd,d·cmd # command $ command_type(cmd)#{CLOSE_RIGHT_DOORS,CLOSE_LEFT_DOORS}  
        $ d # DOOR $ d # command_doors(cmd)$command_state(cmd)=SUCCESS$d % isolated_door& generic_door_state(d)=CLOSED 
  @inv4 "cmd,d·cmd # command $ command_type(cmd)=ISOLATE_DOORS $ d # DOOR  
        $ d # command_doors(cmd) $ command_state(cmd)=SUCCESS & d# isolated_door 
  @inv5 "cmd,d·cmd # command $ command_type(cmd)=REMOVE_ISOLATION_DOORS  
        $ d # DOOR $ d # command_doors(cmd) $ command_state(cmd)=SUCCESS & d% isolated_door 
  @inv6 "d·d#isolated_door $ d # dom(generic_door_state)&  generic_door_state(d)#{OPEN, CLOSED} 
  @inv7 "cmd1,cmd2·cmd1#command $ cmd2#command $ cmd1'cmd2  
        $ command_state(cmd1)'EXECUTED $ command_state(cmd2)'EXECUTED &command_doors(cmd1)(command_doors(cmd2)=)  
  @inv8 "d·d#obstructed_door & generic_door_state(d)=OPEN 
 
events 
  event INITIALISATION extends INITIALISATION 
    then 
      @act3 isolated_door *) 
  end 
 
  event commandOpenDoors refines commandOpenDoors 
    any doors cmd cmd_type 
    where 
      @guard doors ! generic_door 
      @guard1 generic_door_state[doors]={CLOSED} 
      @guard2 cmd_type # {OPEN_RIGHT_DOORS,OPEN_LEFT_DOORS} 
      @guard3 cmd # COMMAND+command 
      @guard4 "cmd1·cmd1#command $ command_state(cmd1)'EXECUTED&doors(command_doors(cmd1)=) 
      @grd4 doors ') 
    then 
      @act1 command_state(cmd)*START 
      @act2 command_doors(cmd)*doors 
      @act3 command * command , {cmd} 
      @act4 command_type(cmd)*cmd_type 
  end 
 
  event commandCloseDoors refines commandCloseDoors 
    any doors cmd cmd_type 
    where 
      @guard doors ! generic_door 
      @guard1 generic_door_state[doors]={OPEN} 
      @guard2 cmd_type # {CLOSE_RIGHT_DOORS,CLOSE_LEFT_DOORS} 
      @guard3 cmd # COMMAND+command 
      @guard4 "cmd1·cmd1#command $ command_state(cmd1)'EXECUTED&doors(command_doors(cmd1)=) 
      @grd4 doors ') 
    then 
      @act1 command_state(cmd)*START 
      @act2 command_doors(cmd)*doors 
      @act3 command * command , {cmd} 
      @act4 command_type(cmd)*cmd_type 
  end 
 
  
  event updateSuccessOpenDoorCmdState refines updateCmdState 
    any cmd 
(a) Variables, invariants
  end 
 
event commandIsolationDoors refines otherCommandDoors 
    any doors cmd cmd_type 
    where 
      @grd doors ! generic_door 
      @grd1 cmd_type " {ISOLATE_DOORS,REMOVE_ISOLATION_DOORS} 
     @grd2 cmd " COMMAND#command 
     @grd3 $cmd1·cmd1"command  
              % command_state(cmd1)&EXECUTED 
            'doors(command_doors(cmd1)=) 
      @grd4 doors &) 
      @grd5 cmd_type = ISOLATE_DOORS * (doors(isolated_door = ) ) 
      @grd6 cmd_type = REMOVE_ISOLATION_DOORS * isolated_door&)  
            % doors(isolated_door&) 
   then 
     @act1 command_state(cmd)+START 
      @act2 command_doors(cmd)+doors 
      @act3 command + command , {cmd} 
      @act4 command_type(cmd)+cmd_type 
  end 
 
  event updateIsolationCmdState refines updateCmdState 
   any state cmd 
   where 
     @grd cmd " com and 
      @grd1 state " COMMAND_STATE#{START,EXECUTED} 
      @grd2 command_state(cmd)=START 
      @grd3 command_type(cmd)  
              " {ISOLATE_DOORS,REMOVE_ISOLATION_DOORS} 
      @grd4 (command_type(cmd) = ISOLATE_DOORS  
            % (-d·d"command_doors(cmd) % d .isolated_door))  
        / (command_type(cmd) = REMOVE_ISOLATION_DOORS  
        % (- ·d"command_doors(cmd) % d "isolated_door))  
            * state = FAIL 
    then 
      @act1 command_state(cmd)+state 
  end 
 
  event executedLogCmdState refines updateCmdState 
   any cmd 
   where 
      @guard3 cmd " command 
      @guard1 command_state(cmd)"{FAIL,SUCCESS} 
    with 
      @state state = EXECUTED 
    then 
      @act1 command_state(cmd)+EXECUTED 
  end 
 
  event openDoorAutomatically refines openDoorAutomatically 
    any ds cmd platform occpTrns 
    where 
      @guard ds ! generic_door#(isolated_door , locked_doors) 
      @guard1 ds ! dom(generic_door_state) 
      @guard2 generic_door_state[ds]&{OPEN} 
      @guard3 cmd " command 
      @guard4 command_type(cmd) " {OPEN_RIGHT_DOORS,OPEN_LEFT_DOORS} 
      @guard5 command_state(cmd)=START 
event executedLogCmdState refines updateCmdState 
    any cmd 
    where 
      @guard3 cmd ! command 
      @guard1 command_state(cmd)!{FAIL,SUCCESS} 
    with 
      @state state = EXECUTED 
    then 
      @act1 command_state(cmd)"EXECUTED 
  end 
  
 event isolateDoor 
    any d cmd 
    where 
      @grd d ! generic_door#isolated_door  
      @grd1 cmd ! command 
      @grd2 command_state(cmd)=START 
      @grd3 d ! command_doors(cmd) 
      @grd4 command_type(cmd) = ISOLATE_DOORS 
      @grd5 generic_door_state(d)!{OPEN, CLOSED} 
    then 
      @act1 isolated_door" isolated_door $ {d} 
  end 
 
  event removeIsolatedDoor 
    any d cmd 
    where 
      @grd d ! isolated_door 
      @grd1 cmd ! command 
      @grd3 d ! command_doors(cmd) 
      @grd4 command_type(cmd) = REMOVE_ISOLATION_DOORS 
      @grd2 command_state(cmd)=START 
      @grd5 generic_door_state(d)!{OPEN, CLOSED} 
    then 
      @act1 isolated_door" isolated_door # {d} 
  end 
 
  event addDoor extends addDoor 
  end 
 
  event removeDoor extends removeDoor 
  end 
end 
!
(b) Some events in GCDoor M2
Figure 6.27: Excerpt of machine GCDoor M2
Following the steps suggested in Sect. 3.5.2, we create the instantiation refinement for
emergency carriage doors as seen in Fig. 6.29. As expected, the generic sets and con-
stants a e replace by th instan sets existing in contexts CarriageDoors C0 and
CarriageDoors C1. Moreover, generic variables are renamed to fit the instance and be
a refinement of abstract machine CarriageDoors. The same happens to generic events
addDoor and removeDoor.
Comparing the abstract machine of the pattern GCDoor M0 and the last refinement of
our initial development CarriageDoors, we realise that they are similar but not a perfect
match. CarriageDoors events contains some additional parameters and guards result-
ing from the previous refinements. For instance, event closeDoors in CarriageDoors
(Fig. 6.30(b)) contains an additional parameter cds compared to event closeDoors in
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context CarriageDoor_C0 
 
constants PLATFORM DOOR_SIDE PLATFORM_SIDE CLOSED OPEN  
           DOOR_CARRIAGE  
 
sets DOOR DOOR_STATE CDV SIDE CARRIAGE  
 
axioms 
  @MetroSystem_C1_axm1 partition(DOOR_STATE, {OPEN}, {CLOSED}) 
  @MetroSystem_C1_axm2 PLATFORM ! CDV 
  @Train_C1_axm2 DOOR_CARRIAGE " DOOR # CARRIAGE 
  @Train_C1_axm3 $c·c"ran(DOOR_CARRIAGE)%DOOR_CARRIAGE&[{c}]'( 
  @Train_C2_axm4 DOOR_SIDE " DOOR # SIDE 
  @Train_C2_axm5 PLATFORM_SIDE " PLATFORM # SIDE 
  @Train_C2_axm6 PLATFORM '( 
end 
!
(a) Context CarriageDoors C0
context CarriageDoor_C1 extends CarriageDoor_C0 
 
constants MANUAL_PLATFORM MANUAL_INTERNAL AUTOMATIC_CENTRAL_DOOR  
START FAIL SUCCESS EXECUTED OPEN_RIGHT_DOORS OPEN_LEFT_DOORS  
CLOSE_RIGHT_DOORS CLOSE_LEFT_DOORS ISOLATE_DOORS REMOVE_ISOLATION_DOORS 
 
sets OPEN_DEV COMD_ST COMD_TYPE COMD 
 
axioms 
 @axm1 partition(OPEN_DEV, {MANUAL_PLATFORM}, {MANUAL_INTERNAL}, 
                                                     {AUTOMATIC_CENTRAL_DOOR}) 
  @axm2 partition(COMD_ST, {START}, {FAIL}, {SUCCESS},{EXECUTED}) 
  @axm3 partition(COMD_TYPE,{OPEN_RIGHT_DOORS},{OPEN_LEFT_DOORS}, 
                   {CLOSE_RIGHT_DOORS}, {CLOSE_LEFT_DOORS},{ISOLATE_DOORS},   
                  {REMOVE_ISOLATION_DOORS}) 
end 
!
!
(b) Context CarriageDoors C1
Figure 6.28: Parameterisation context CarriageDoors C0 plus additional context
CarriageDoors C1
INSTANTIATED REFINEMENT IEmergencyDoor M2
INSTANTIATES GCDoors M2 VIA GCDoor C0 GCDoor C1
REFINES CarriageDoors /* abstract machine */
SEES CarriageDoors C0 CarriageDoors C1 /* instance contexts */
REPLACE
SETS GEN CARRIAGE := CARRIAGE DOOR := DOOR
DOOR STATE := DOOR STATE SIDE := SIDE
OPENING DEV ICE := OPEN DEV COMMAND STATE := COMD ST
COMMAND := COMD COMMAND TY PE := COMD TY PE
CONSTANTS GEN DOOR CARRIAGE := DOOR CARRIAGE
OPEN := OPEN PLATFORM := PLATFORM
CLOSED := CLOSED PLATFORM SIDE := PLATFORM SIDE
. . .
RENAME /*rename variables, events and params*/
VARIABLES generic doors := carriage doors generic door state := carriage ds
EVENTS addDoor := allocateCarriageTrain removeDoor := removeCarriageTrain
END
Figure 6.29: Instantiated Refinement IEmergencyDoor M2
GCDoor M0 (Fig. 6.30(a)). Some customisation is tolerable in the generic event to en-
sure that the instantiation of GCDoor M0.closeDoors refines CarriageDoors.closeDoors
by adding a parameter that match cds and respective guard grd13.
The customisation can be realised by a (shared event) composition of event
GCDoor M0.closeDoors with another event that introduces the additional parameter
cds and guard cds = carriage ds. The monotonicity of the shared event composition
allows the composed pattern to be instantiated as initially desired. Another option is
to introduce an additional step: the last machine of the refinement chain before the
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machine GCDoor_M0 sees GCDoor_C0 
 
variables generic_door generic_door_state 
 
invariants 
  @inv1 generic_door ! DOOR 
  @inv2 generic_door_state " generic_door # DOOR_STATE 
 
event openDoors 
    any ds platform occpTrns 
    where 
      @grd ds ! DOOR 
      @grd1 ds ! dom(generic_door_state) 
      @grd2 generic_door_state[ds]={CLOSED} 
      @grd3 platform " PLATFORM 
      @grd4 platform " (occpTrns $ PLATFORM) 
      @grd5 ds %& 
      @grd6 DOOR_SIDE[ds]={PLATFORM_SIDE(platform)} 
    then 
      @act1 generic_door_state'generic_door_state ( (ds){OPEN}) 
  end 
 
  event closeDoors 
    any ds 
    where 
      @grd ds ! DOOR 
      @grd1 ds ! dom(generic_door_state) 
      @grd2 generic_door_state[ds]={OPEN} 
      @grd3 ds %& 
    then 
      @act1 generic_door_state'generic_door_state  
                                     ( (ds){CLOSED}) 
  end 
 
  event addDoor 
    any ds c 
    where 
      @grd1 ds $ generic_door = & 
      @grd2 ds % & 
      @grd3 ds = GEN_DOOR_CARRIAGE*[{c}] 
    then 
      @act1 generic_door ' generic_door + ds 
      @act2 generic_door_state ' generic_door_state  
                                     + (ds){CLOSED}) 
  end 
 
  event removeDoor 
    any ds c 
    where 
      @grd1 ds ! generic_door 
      @grd2 ds % & 
      @grd3 generic_door_state[ds]={CLOSED} 
      @grd4 ds = GEN_DOOR_CARRIAGE*[{c}] 
    then 
      @act1 generic_door ' generic_door , ds 
      @act2 generic_door_state '  
                          ds-generic_door_state 
  end 
 
( ) Event GCDoor M0.closeDoors
machine CarriageDoors sees Train_C4  
 
variables carriage_door carriage_ds  
 
invariants 
  theorem @typing_carriage_door carriage_door ! "(DOOR) 
  theorem @typing_carriage_ds carriage_ds ! "(DOOR # DOOR_STATE) 
  @Carriage_M1_inv1 carriage_door $ DOOR 
  @Carriage_M1_inv2 carriage_ds ! carriage_door % DOOR_STATE 
 
events 
  event INITIALISATION 
    then 
      @act13 carriage_door &' 
      @act14 carriage_ds &' 
  end 
 
  event openDoors 
    any occpTrns platform ds  
    where 
      @typing_platform platform ! CDV 
      @typing_ds ds ! "(DOOR) 
      @grd2 occpTrns ! "(CDV) 
      @grd3 platform ! PLATFORM 
      @grd4 platform ! (occpTrns ( PLATFORM) 
      @grd7 DOOR_SIDE[ds]={PLATFORM_SIDE(platform)} 
      @grd11 ds $ dom(carriage_ds) 
      @grd12 carriage_ds[ds]={CLOSED} 
    then 
     @act2 carriage_ds&carriage_ds) (ds#{OPEN}) 
  end 
 
  event closeDoors 
    any ds cds  
    where 
      @typing_cds cds ! "(DOOR # DOOR_STATE) 
      @typing_ds ds ! "(DOOR) 
      @grd11 ds $ dom(carriage_ds) 
      @grd12 carriage_ds[ds]={OPEN} 
      @grd13 cds = carriage_ds 
    then 
      @act2 carriage_ds&carriage_ds ) (ds#{CLOSED}) 
  end 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(b) Event CarriageDoors.closeDoors
machine CarriageDoorsInst_M0 refines CarriageDoors  sees CarriageDoors_C0  
 
variables carriage_door carriage_ds  
 
vents 
  event INITIALISATION 
   then 
      @act13 carriage_door !" 
      @act14 carriage_ds !" 
  end 
 
  event openDoors refines openDoors  
    any occpTrns platform ds 
    where 
      @typing_platform platform # CDV 
      @typing_ds ds # !(DOOR) 
      @grd2 occpTrns # !(CDV)
      @grd3 platform # PLATFORM 
      @grd4 platform # (occpTrns " PLATFORM) 
      @grd7 DOOR_SIDE[ds]={PLATFORM_SIDE(platform)} 
      @grd11 ds # dom(carriage_ds) 
      @grd12 carriage_ds[ds]={CLOSED} 
with
      @t t # TRAIN 
    then 
      @act2 carriage_ds!carriage_ds$ (ds%{OPEN}) 
  end 
 
 event closeDoors refines closeDoors  
    any ds  
    where 
      @typing_ds ds # !(DOOR)
      @grd11 # dom(carriage_ds) 
    @g d12 ca riage_ds[ds]={OPEN} 
with
      @cds cds = carriage_ds 
      @t t # TRAIN 
      @closed closed # BOOL 
    then 
      @act2 carriage_ds!carriage_ds $ (ds%{CLOSED}) 
 end 
 
  event allocateCarriageTrain refines allocateCarriageTrain  
    any c ds  
    where 
      @typing_ds ds # !(DOOR) 
   @typing_c c # CARRIAGE 
      @grd14 ds = DOOR_CARRIAGE&[{c}] 
      @grd15 ds"dom(carriage_ds)=" 
    with 
      @t t # TRAIN 
    then 
      @act3 carriage_door ! carriage_door ' ds 
      @act4 carriage_ds ! carriage_ds ' (ds%{CLOSED}) 
  end 
 
  event removeCarriageTrain refines removeCarriageTrain  
    any c ds  
    where 
(c) Event CarriageDoorsInst M0.closeDoors
Figure 6.30: Event closeDoors in the pattern and instance; they differ in the param-
eters, guards and witnesses
instantiation (in our case study, machine CarriageDoors) is refined. The resulting re-
finement machine (CarriageDoorsInst M0) refines the first instantiation machine (i.e.
CarriageDoors v CarriageDoorsInst M0 v EmergencyDoors M0) “customising”
the instantiation. Therefore th additional parameters (and respective guards) can dis-
appear by means of witnesses as can be seen in Fig. 6.30(c). Ideally we aim to have a
syntactic match (after instantiation) between the pattern and the initial instantiantion.
Nevertheless a valid refinement is enough to apply the instantiation.
An instance machine EmergencyDoor M2 (Fig. 6.31) is similar to GCDoor M2 apart
from the replacements and renaming applied in IEmergencyDoor M2 (cf. Figs. 6.27,
Fig. 6.29 and Fig. 6.31). That machine can be further refined (and decomposed) intro-
ducing the specific details related to emergency doors. The instantiation of the service
doors follows the same steps.
Statistics: In Table 6.3, we describe the statistics of the development in terms of vari-
ables, events and proof obligations (and how many POs were automatically discharged
by the theorem prover of the Rodin platform) for each refinement step. Almost 3/4 of
the proof obligations are automatically discharged.
This case study was carried out under the following conditions:
• Rodin v2.1
• Shared Event Composition plug-in v1.3.1
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machine EmergencyDoors_M2 refines EmergencyDoors_M1  sees CarriageDoors_C1  
 
variables carriage_door carriage_ds isolated_door locked_doors door_opening_device obstructed_door 
command command_doors command_type command_state  
 
invariants 
  @inv1 isolated_door ⊆ DOOR 
  @inv2 !cmd,d·cmd " command ∧ command_type(cmd)"{OPEN_RIGHT_DOORS,OPEN_LEFT_DOORS}  
           ∧ d " DOOR ∧ d " command_doors(cmd) ∧ command_state(cmd)=SUCCESS  
           ∧ d # isolated_door$ carriage_ds(d)=OPEN 
  @inv3 !cmd,d·cmd " command ∧ command_type(cmd)"{CLOSE_RIGHT_DOORS,CLOSE_LEFT_DOORS}     
           ∧ d " DOOR ∧ d " command_doors(cmd) ∧ command_state(cmd)=SUCCESS  
           ∧ d # isolated_door$ carriage_ds(d)=CLOSED 
  @inv4 !d·d"isolated_door ∧ d " dom(carriage_ds)$  carriage_ds(d)"{OPEN, CLOSED} 
  @inv5 !cmd1,cmd2·cmd1"command ∧ cmd2"command ∧ cmd1≠cmd2  
            ∧ command_state(cmd1)≠EXECUTED  
            ∧ command_state(cmd2)≠EXECUTED $command_doors(cmd1)∩command_doors(cmd2)=%  
  @inv6 !cmd,d·cmd " command ∧ command_type(cmd)=ISOLATE_DOORS ∧ d " DOOR  
            ∧ d " command_doors(cmd) ∧ command_state(cmd)=SUCCESS $ d" isolated_door 
  @inv7 !cmd,d·cmd " command ∧ command_type(cmd)=REMOVE_ISOLATION_DOORS  
            ∧ d " DOOR ∧ d " command_doors(cmd) ∧ command_state(cmd)=SUCCESS $ d# isolated_door 
  @inv8 !d·d"obstructed_door $ carriage_ds(d)=OPEN 
 
events 
  event INITIALISATION extends INITIALISATION  
    then 
      @act3 isolated_door &% 
  end 
 
  event commandOpenDoors refines commandOpenDoors  
    any doors cmd cmd_type  
    where 
      @guard doors ⊆ carriage_door 
      @guard1 carriage_ds[doors]={CLOSED} 
      @guard2 cmd_type " {OPEN_RIGHT_DOORS,OPEN_LEFT_DOORS} 
      @guard3 cmd " COMD∖command 
      @guard4 !cmd1·cmd1"command ∧ 
command_state(cmd1)≠EXECUTED$doors∩command_doors(cmd1)=% 
      @grd4 doors ≠% 
    then 
      @act1 command_state(cmd)&START 
      @act2 command_doors(cmd)&doors 
      @act3 command & command ∪ {cmd} 
      @act4 command_type(cmd)&cmd_type 
  end 
 
  event commandCloseDoors refines commandCloseDoors  
    any doors cmd cmd_type  
    where 
      @guard doors ⊆ carriage_door 
      @guard1 carriage_ds[doors]={OPEN} 
      @guard2 cmd_type " {CLOSE_RIGHT_DOORS,CLOSE_LEFT_DOORS} 
      @guard3 cmd " COMD∖command 
      @guard4 !cmd1·cmd1"command ∧ 
command_state(cmd1)≠EXECUTED$doors∩command_doors(cmd1)=% 
      @grd4 doors ≠% 
    then 
      @act1 command_state(cmd)&START 
      @act2 command_doors(cmd)&doors 
      @act3 command & command ∪ {cmd} 
(a) Variables, invariants      @act4 command_type(cmd)!cmd_type 
  end 
 
  event commandIsolationDoors refines otherCommandDoors  
    any doors cmd cmd_type  
    where 
      @guard doors ⊆ carriage_door 
      @guard1 cmd_type  
" {ISOLATE_DOORS,REMOVE_ISOLATION_DOORS} 
      @guard3 cmd " COMD∖command 
      @guard4 #cmd1·cmd1"command  
                    ∧ command_state(cmd1)≠EXECUTED 
                $doors∩command_doors(cmd1)=% 
      @grd4 doors ≠% 
      @grd5 cmd_type = ISOLATE_DOORS & (doors∩isolated_door = % ) 
      @grd6 cmd_type = REMOVE_ISOLATION_DOORS & isolated_door≠%  
                ∧ doors∩isolated_door≠% 
    then 
      @act1 command_state(cmd)!START 
      @act2 command_doors(cmd)!doors 
      @act3 command ! command ∪ {cmd} 
      @act4 command_type(cmd)!cmd_type 
  end 
 
  event updateIsolationCmdState refines updateCmdState  
    any state cmd  
    where 
      @guard3 cmd " command 
      @guard state " COMD_ST∖{START,EXECUTED} 
      @guard1 command_state(cmd)=START 
      @guard5 command_type(cmd)  
                         " {ISOLATE_DOORS,REMOVE_ISOLATION_DOORS} 
      @grd3 (command_type(cmd) = ISOLATE_DOORS  
               ∧ ('d·d"command_doors(cmd) ∧ d (isolated_door))  
               ∨ (command_type(cmd) = REMOVE_ISOLATION_DOORS  
               ∧ ('d·d"command_doors(cmd) ∧ d "isolated_door))  
               & state = FAIL 
    then 
      @act1 command_state(cmd)!state 
  end 
 
 
  event updateSuccessOpenDoorCmdState refines updateCmdState  
    any cmd  
    where 
      @guard3 cmd " command 
      @guard1 command_state(cmd)=START 
      @guard5 command_type(cmd)"{OPEN_LEFT_DOORS,OPEN_RIGHT_DOORS} 
      @guard4 #d·d"command_doors(cmd)∧ d(isolated_door$carriage_ds(d)=OPEN 
      @grd6 command_doors(cmd)∖isolated_door≠% 
    with 
      @state state = SUCCESS 
    then 
      @act1 command_state(cmd)!SUCCESS 
  end 
 
  event updateFailOpenDoorCmdState refines updateCmdState  
    any cmd  
    where 
      @guard3 cmd " command 
  event executedLogCmdState refines updateCmdState  
    any cmd  
    where 
      @guard3 cmd ! command 
      @guard1 command_state(cmd)!{FAIL,SUCCESS} 
    with 
      @state state = EXECUTED 
    then 
      @act1 command_state(cmd)"EXECUTED 
  end 
 
 
  event isolateDoor 
    any d cmd  
    where 
      @guard d ! carriage_door∖isolated_door 
      @guard1 cmd ! command 
      @guard2 command_state(cmd)=START 
      @guard3 d ! command_doors(cmd) 
      @guard4 command_type(cmd) = ISOLATE_DOORS 
      @guard5 carriage_ds(d)!{OPEN, CLOSED} 
    then 
      @act1 isolated_door" isolated_door ∪ {d} 
  end 
 
  event removeIsolatedDoor 
    any d cmd  
    where 
      @guard d ! isolated_door 
      @guard1 cmd ! command 
      @guard3 d ! command_doors(cmd) 
      @guard4 command_type(cmd) = REMOVE_ISOLATION_DOORS 
      @guard2 command_state(cmd)=START 
      @guard5 carriage_ds(d)!{OPEN, CLOSED} 
    then 
      @act1 isolated_door" isolated_door ∖ {d} 
  end 
 
  event allocateCarriageTrain extends allocateCarriageTrain  
  end 
 
  event removeCarriageTrain extends removeCarriageTrain  
  end 
end !
(b) Some events in EmergencyDoor M2
Figure 6.31: Excerpt of instantiated machine EmergencyDoor M2
• Model Decomposition plug-in v1.2.1
• Instantiation was done manually (currently tool support is not available).
• ProB v2.1.2
• Camille Text Editor 2.0.1
Although we are interested mainly interested in safety properties, the model checker
ProB [141] proved to be very useful as a complementary tool during the development
of this case study. In some stages of the development, all the proof obligations were
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Variables Events ProofObligations/Auto
TransitiveClosureCtx − − 10/10
MetroSystem C0 − − 5/3
MetroSystem C1 − − 0/0
MetroSystem M0 7 10 75/64
MetroSystem M1 10 13 17/17
MetroSystem M2 12 17 78/57
MetroSystem M3 12 17 24/22
Track 4 10 0/0
Train 7 14 0/0
Middleware 1 4 0/0
Train M1 9 16 74/52
Train M2 13 21 155/79
Train M3 12 21 65/24
Train M4 14 21 119/89
LeaderCarriage 9 21 0/0
Carriage 5 11 0/0
Carriage M1 6 11 28/21
CarriageInterface 4 11 0/0
CarriageDoors 2 5 0/0
CarriageDoorsInst M0 2 5 2/1
GCDoor M0 2 5 6/6
GCDoor M1 9 15 81/80
GCDoor M2 10 22 170/153
Total 909/678(74.6%)
Table 6.3: Statistics of the metro system case study
discharged but with ProB we discovered that the system was deadlocked due to some
missing detail. In large developments, these situations possibly occur more frequently.
Therefore we suggest discharging the proof obligations to ensure the safety properties
are preserved and run the ProB model checker to confirm that the system actually is
free from deadlocks.
6.14 Discussion: Conclusions and Lessons Learned
We modelled a metro system case study, starting by proving its global properties through
several refinement steps. Afterwards, due to an architectural decision and to alleviate
the problem of modelling and handling a large system in one single machine, the system
is decomposed in three sub-components. We further refine one of the resulting sub-
components (Train), introducing several details in four refinements levels. Then again,
due to the number of proof obligations, to achieve separation of aspects and to ease the
further developments, we decompose it into two sub-components: LeaderCarriage and
Carriage. Since we are interested in modelling carriage doors, sub-component Carriage
is refined and afterwards decomposed originating sub-component CarriageDoors. Ben-
efiting from an existing generic development for carriage doors GCDoor, we consider
this development as a pattern and instantiate two kind of carriage doors: service and
emergency doors. Although the instantiation is similar for both types of doors, the
resulting instances can be further refined independently. Using generic instantiation, we
avoid having to prove the proof obligations regarding the pattern GCDoor : GCDoor M0,
GCDoor M1 and GCDoor M2 (in the overall 257 POs). This figure only considers the
instantiation of emergency doors (the instantiation of service doors would imply twice
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the number of POs).
From the experience of other developments involving a large number of refinements lev-
els or refinements with large models, the development tools reach a point where it is not
possible to edit the model due to the high amount of resources required to do it (or it
is done very slowly). The decomposition is a possible solution that alleviates this issue
by splitting the model into more tool manageable dimensions. Following a top-down
approach, developed models become more complex in each refinement step. Neverthe-
less by applying decomposition, we alleviate the consequences of such complexity by
separating concerns (architecture approach), decreasing the number of events and vari-
ables per sub-component which results in models that are more manageable from a tool
point of view. Moreover, for each refinement, the properties (added as requirements)
are preserved. Using generic instantiation, we avoid proving the pattern proof obliga-
tions GCDoor. Therefore we reach our goal of reusing existing developments as much as
possible and discharge as little proof obligations as possible. Even the interactive proofs
were relatively easy to discharge once the correct tactic was discovered. This task would
be more difficult without the decomposition due to the elevated number of hypotheses
to considered for each PO. Nevertheless we believe that the effort of discharging proof
obligations could be minimised by having a way to reuse tactics. In particular when the
same steps are followed to discharge similar POs.
In a combination of refinement and instantiation, we learned that the abstract machine
and the abstract pattern do not necessarily match perfectly. In particular, some extra
guards and parameters may exist resulting from previous refinements in the instance.
Nevertheless the generic model can still be reused. We can (shared event) compose the
pattern with another machine in a way that the resulting events include the additional
parameters and guards to guarantee a valid refinement. Another interesting conclusion is
that throughout an instantiation, it is possible not to use all the generic events. A subset
of generic events can be instantiated in opposition to instantiate all. This a consequence
of the event refinements that only depend on abstract and concrete events. Nevertheless
this only applies for safety properties. If we are interested in liveness properties, the
exclusion of a generic event may result in a system deadlock.
With this case study we aim to illustrate the application of decomposition and generic
instantiation as techniques to help the development of formal models. Following these
techniques, the development is structured in a way that simplifies the model by sepa-
rating concerns and aspects and decreases the number of proof obligations to be dis-
charged. Although we use Event-B, these techniques are generic enough to suit other
formal notations and other case studies. Formal methods has been widely used to val-
idate requirements of real systems. The systems are formally described and properties
are checked to be preserved whenever a system transition occurs. Usually this result
in complex models with several properties to be preserved, therefore structuring and
reusability are pursued to facilitate the development. Lutz [114] describes the reuse of
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formal methods when analysing the requirements and designing the software between
two spacecrafts’ formal models. Stepney et al. [177, 178] propose patterns to be applied
to formal methods in system engineering. Using the Z notation, several patterns (and
anti-patterns) are identified and catalogued to fit particular kind of models. These pat-
terns introduce structure to the models and aim to aid formal model developers to choose
the best approach to model a system, using some examples. Although the patterns are
expressed for Z, they are generic enough to be applied to other notations. Comparing
with the development of our case study, the instantiation of service and emergency doors
corresponds to the Z promotion, where a global system is specified in terms of multiple
instances of local states and operations. Although there is not an explicit separation of
local and global states in our case study, service and emergency doors states are con-
nected to the state of CarriageDoor and we even use decomposition, instantiation and
refactoring (called meaning preservation refactoring steps in Z promotion) to fit into a
specific pattern. [177] suggests template support and architecture patterns to be sup-
ported by tools, something that currently does not happen. We have a similar viewpoint
and we would like to address this issue in the future. Templates could be customised
according to the modeller’s needs and selected from an existing list, perhaps categorised
as suggested in [177].
Butler [44] uses the shared event approach in classical B to decompose a railway system
into three sub-components: Train, Track and Communication. The system is modelled
and reasoned as a whole in an event-based approach, both the physical system and
the desired control behaviour. Our case study follows a similar methodology applied
to a metro system following the same shared event style. Moreover we introduce more
requirements regarding the trains and the carriage doors, expressed through the use of
decomposition and generic instantiation.
Chapter 7
Conclusions and Future Work
In this chapter we wrap up the contributions of this thesis and outline our objectives for
the future. We aim to introduce reusability and modularity mechanisms when developing
system specifications in particular large systems that become cumbersome to manage
when scaling. For that we propose the use of composition, decomposition and generic
instantiation to facilitate the development of large systems. We use the Event-B formal
notation and the Rodin platform for the development of these techniques and respective
tool support. We separate the conclusions and future work into three main topics giving
more detail about each as follows.
7.1 Composition
Based on the close relation between action systems and Event-B plus the correspon-
dence between action systems and CSP [53], we define our Event-B composition with an
event-based behaviour. Shared event composition is proved to be monotonic by means of
proof obligations. Consequently sub-components can be further refined independently.
Refinement in a “top-down” style for developing specifications is allowed including the
generation of POs. During composition, sub-components interact through event pa-
rameters by value-passing. We extend Event-B to support shared event composition,
allowing combination and reuse of existing sub-components through the introduction
of composed machines. Required static checks are defined and POs are generated to
validate the composition. Such an approach seems suitable for modelling distributed
systems, where the system can be seen as a combination of sub-components.
Currently we have developed a plug-in that allows shared event composition using Event-
B in the Rodin platform. Some of the proofs to be generated are also generated in the
included machines. By identifying the similarities between proofs, we have established
that we can reuse proof obligations and reduce the effort of discharging proof obligations
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that are already done in the included machines. The shared event composition tool gen-
erates a new (composed) machine to ensure the validity of the composition using the
already existing validation scheme for machines (generation of proof obligations). In the
future the composed machine generation should be optional since this validation should
be done directly over the composition file. Although the shared variable composition
was not in the initial plans for this thesis, the close relation with our work suggested
a deeper understanding of that style. During that study, we discovered a close relation
between the rely/guarantee composition for VDM and the shared variable composition
for Event-B that is also mentioned in Hoang and Abrial’s work [90]. It should be possible
to create a correspondence between these two approaches and we intend to investigate
this in the future. Schneider et al [159] define a CSP semantics for Event-B as described
in Sect. 1.5.6. Following that work, we define as future work the derivation the CSP
semantics for Event-B machines to define the composition of machines in terms of traces,
failures, divergences and infinite traces. A paper was accepted for the B workshop run-
ning in parallel with FM 2011 (International Symposium on Formal Methods) [161] and
another to FMCO 2010 (International Symposia on Formal Methods for Components
and Objects) based on shared event composition [164] and we gave a presentation about
this work in the Rodin Workshop 2009.
To summarize, we list the future work for composition below:
• Generation of proof obligations for shared event composition directly rather than
indirectly by expanding machine compositions.
• Further investigation on reuse of proofs obligations in the Rodin platform.
• Can rely/guarantee for VDM be applied to (Abrial) shared variable composition
for Event-B?
• Adding enabledness POs when available for the Rodin platform.
• Derivation of CSP semantics for Event-B machines described by Schneider et
al [159] to define the composition of machines in terms of traces, failures, di-
vergences and infinite traces.
7.2 Generic Instantiation
The generic instantiation work was a result of the achievements towards composition and
decomposition. The possibility to have patterns that can be reused in another develop-
ments seems very attractive while creating specifications in particular in a top-bottom
style. Event-B supports generic developments but lacks the capacity to instantiate and
reuse those generic developments. As a solution, generic instantiation is applied to
patterns and as an outcome instantiated machines are created and parameterised. An
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instantiated machine instantiates a generic machine, is parameterised by a context and
the pattern elements are renamed/replaced according to the instance. In a similar style,
an instantiated refinement instantiates a chain of refinements reusing the pattern proof
obligations assuming that the instantiated proof obligations are as valid as the pattern
ones. By quantifying the variables, constants and types we ensure that pattern proof
obligations remain valid when instantiating. A renaming plug-in was developed sup-
porting the renaming of Event-B elements and respective proofs. Optimisation at level
of proof renaming will be investigated in the future as it may become a slow operation
for large proof trees. A paper was accepted at ICFEM 2009 (International Conference
on Formal Engineering Methods) [163] describing this work. In the future, we intend
to have tool support for generic instantiation as described in Chapter 3. With larger
and relevant cases studies we should improve the tool and publish a paper with the re-
sults and conclusions. Moreover a library of patterns could be provided when modelling,
divided according to the categories are suggested in [178].
To summarize, we list the future work for generic instantiation below:
• Optimisation of proof renaming
• Tool development in collaboration with ETH Zurich.
• Application of a large case study to and test the scalability and improve the tool.
• Definition of a categorised pattern library and customisable templates.
• Writing and submitting a paper as a continuation of the initial study describing
the tool support and conclusions of application of a case study.
7.3 Decomposition
There is a need for modularisation and reuse of sub-components in order to model
large systems and manage better the respective POs. Event-B lacks a sub-component
mechanism. Thus we propose to tackle that problem through the decomposition of
a system by their events or variables. The shared variable (state-based) approach is
suitable for designing parallel algorithms while the shared event (event-based) is suitable
for message-passing distributed systems [45]. Following any of these two approaches, the
parallel components of a distributed system can be refined and decomposed separately
without making any assumptions about the rest of the system. The shared variable
style relies on the work of Abrial and Hallerstede [15] where variables are shared and
exists the notion of external events. Butler [45] suggests the shared event decomposition
where events are partition through the sub-components and the interaction occurs via
shared parameters. The work developed by Butler in [40] for action system is strongly
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related with the same approach for shared event decomposition in Event-B [45] as both
approaches are state-based formalism combined with event-based CSP.
We have collaborated in the tool support development for the decomposition technique
in the Rodin platform, being responsable for the shared event approach development.
The tool allows the semi-automatic decomposition in a shared variable and shared event.
An initial study of such work has been accepted as a workshop paper for the ABZ 2010
conference [165] and an extended version of that paper was published in the journal
Software: Practise and Experience expressing our results [166]. With the application of
more case studies, we should have more results and conclusions that can be published.
As described in Chapter 4, the decomposition tool has been widely used with positive
feedback. Some improvements on the tool have been suggested and we intend to carry
them out in the future. A large case study based on some real requirements is described
in Chapter 6 and shows a practical implementation of the technique, the possible com-
bination with generic instantiation and respective tool support. To summarize, we list
the future work for decomposition below:
• Tool development and improvements.
• Extension of the composed machine plug-in to support the shared variable com-
position in order to store the decomposition configuration.
• Application of a large case study to test scalability.
• Writing and submitting a paper with the results of the application of decomposition
in scalable systems.
7.4 Future Work
In the previous sections we described the future related to each technique that we studied
in this document. Although they are powerful techniques that help the formal modelling
of large and/or complex systems, there is still plenty to be studied and researched when
it comes to the reusability of models. In particular, there is a need to decrease the
user’s effort when developing models, in particular, for the reuse of proofs. From our
own experience, discussions with other formal developers and even for the industrial
companies that use formal methods, often the time spent discharging proofs is greater
than the time spent modelling the system itself. The same model can be developed in
many different manners but the generated number of proofs and the ease to discharge
them vary. Therefore although the outcome may be the same, the properties to be proved
may be harder to achieve. This situation somehow suggests the need for guidelines
on how to achieve the same goal in a simpler, cleaner and possible easier in terms of
discharging proofs. These guidelines could be arranged by some modelling patterns that
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tend to occur even when different kind of systems are being developed. We intend to
research these modelling patterns and come up with practical guidelines that can be
easily applied to existing developments (in a way, it is a different continuation path
from generic instantiation).
The reuse of proofs is another topic that also requires further study. Currently the
Rodin platform allows the reuse of existing proofs to be applied to other proofs but these
usually fail if the structure of the proof is slightly different. We need more powerful proof
patterns that can be applied that are less sensitive to the structure. The modelling tactics
often are repeated throughout a development and consequently results in similar kind
of proof obligations to be discharged. Ideally once these kind of proofs are discharged,
that proof tactic should easily be applied to the rest of the family of proof obligations.
What happens at the moment is cumbersome where the user has to redo and re-apply
the proofs steps instead of tackling more interesting and challenging proofs. This topic
is quite broad but we intend to investigate to come up with more possible reuse of proofs
techniques.
More recently, code generation [67] has been proposed for Event-B following the path
of classical B. But this approach is more flexible as it allows the user to define tasking
machines [68] to define how the model can be implemented. Tasking machines can be
periodic, triggered by an event or happen only once (one shot). Moreover the implemen-
tation allows the definition of tasks that model or simulate the environment (Environ
machine) and the definition of data that can be accessed by different threads (Shared
machine). The communication and implementation of these different machines use the
shared event composition to structure them in one single place. Another powerful option
is to define the implementation data structure according to the target language to be
implemented. As future work, we intend to extend the existing theory plug-in [115] to
allow the mapping of new (or existing) theories into executable code. The intention is
to let the user define new Event-B data structures (since they are not fixed) and map to
the corresponding implementation for the specific target language. At the moment only
Ada and C are supported, although in the future other target languages will supported.
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